The USAF Safety Process

[Learjetter]

*sigh*

One more time: if you ask me if you can READ a SIB, ANY SIB, you can read it, including the recommendations, if you have ANY remotely legitimate reason to (aircrew, maintainer, etc).

But you can't HAVE it. Nor will I get you TAB access. (The Tabs have the data the SIB used to write their report.)

LOL

By way of explanation: I originally wrote something like: "...the c-17 mishap, even if you fly C-17s"...then I genericized it. I'll go edit it so it makes more sense.

[Toro]

I've split this discussion from the MC-12 thread into its own.

Who are you to decide what I need to correctly ascertain the lesson? What if 7 day history is part of the problem? The system is terrible and doesn't work at all.

If 7 day history (in the tabs) is part of the problem, it will be summarized in the report. I take it you've never looked through mishap tab data - it is mind-numbingly overwhelming. Getting the recreation videos is what you want, not tab data.

This hyper-control of information, fear-of-god bullshit comes straight from the AF Safety Center. I disagreed with it when I went through the courses, and I still disagree with it. "Toe-ing the line" and deciding who "needs to know" what information is garbage, and safety offices continue to hide behind it.

I 100% agree that the AFSEC too close-hold on things like briefings and videos. I've had safety officers try on a couple occasions to get them - totally possible, but it takes longer than it should.

As far as the privilege concern, I see this is a MAJCOM/leadership issue, not AF Safety as a whole. It seems like most of the concerns over the release of privileged information for punitive purposes has been in AMC. I've never seen or heard of it in ACC or AETC (not to say it hasn't happened). I have personally overseen two class A mishaps, and in both the pilot was found at least partially causal. In both cases, the pilot was required to acknowledge the findings (and allowed to provide input), and both pilots were extremely concerned about how that would affect them. I explained there was nothing that could happen to them as a result, and in both cases absolutely nothing happened.

The MAJCOM/CC is the convening authority, and if they are allowing that information to be used for anything punitive, then your problem lies with leadership, not the safety process.

[Champ Kind]

It seems like most of the concerns over the release of privileged information for punitive purposes has been in AMC...

your problem lies with leadership, not the safety process.

Ain't that the truth.

[stract]

there are some mishaps where I definitely get more from reading the final message than reading the final outbrief. Having been a part of two SIB outbriefs to COMACC, the SIB has to decide what from their report is absolutely necessary for the convening authority to know or understand, and some details, which may actually be quite useful to someone else, are left out of the brief. The briefing is great when it's time to brief it to everyone in the SQ, but any FSO worth their salt better understand they need to read the final message and be able to speak to the details.

I've even called the pilot member or IO to clarify things prior to briefing the SQ if it's a SIB I wasn't a part of. I agree that photos and videos speak a thousand words...and it's also important to periodically revisit a mishap, so that the lessons learned continue to stay learned. Arbitrary requirements to not save a briefing to a drive, and delete it after a set period of time are ridiculous. The AFI guidance is to "delete when no longer required for mishap prevention purposes" but of course people will hoard things they're giving such limited access to, b/c they will ALWAYS be needed for mishap prevention purposes! I don't download and save final messages because I can readily access that information in AFSAS. If I could readily access the outbrief (Part 1A/B/C) and any re-creation as well, we wouldn't have these problems.

Bringing a solution to the table: when the final message is released and after the AFSEC QC process is complete, Part 1 of te Tabs (where the outbrief is) should be automatically unlocked. If AFSEC or the Convening Authority is concerned about folks downloading things and saving them locally (even with password protection), then make it readily available so that folks don't feel the need to download and save a local copy.

[JSChmed]

Does the USAF safety system have some kind of process where members of the affected community can give some feedback to the safety board telling them the community thinks their findings are off base and need to be reexamined? If not, do we just have to live with the causal factors and recommendations however ridiculous and "uncausal" they may be?

[Toro]

Does the USAF safety system have some kind of process where members of the affected community can give some feedback to the safety board telling them the community thinks their findings are off base and need to be reexamined? If not, do we just have to live with the causal factors and recommendations however ridiculous and "uncausal" they may be?

Yes...but.

After the report is finalized and approved, requests for inputs to a Memorandum of Final Evaluation (MOFE) are sent to involved parties for any inputs they have to the report. Here's from the safety investigation reg (91-204):

7.2 Memorandum of Final Evaluation (MOFE). Organizations will review Class A and B final message/formal reports and send their response back to AFSC within 45 days after final message release by the convening authority. Comments received after the 45 day deadline may not be considered in the MOFE unless an extension is granted through AFSC/SEFO.

7.2.1. AFSC will publish a MOFE on all on-duty Class A safety reports within 90 days after release of the final message. Additional MOFE requirements and exemptions are specified in AFMAN 91-22X.

7.2.2. AFSC will consider inputs from the following in preparation of the MOFE:

7.2.2.1. Convening authority.

7.2.2.2. Lead command of weapons system (AFPD 10-9).

7.2.2.3. Air component commanders of unified commands when the mishap occurred during contingency operations. NOTE: The unified command staff offices must agree to safeguard the information according to rules contained in this instruction.

7.2.2.4. Designated action agencies (OPR/OCRs).

7.2.2.5. Commander of the mishap wing.

7.2.2.6. Statements of person(s) found causal in the formal report.

7.2.2.7. Air Force agencies outside the investigating command if their functions were involved in the mishap (e.g., HQ AFFSA/A3A for air traffic services and airfield management, DCMA for mishaps involving contracts managed by DCMA).

7.2.2.8. Unsolicited comments. Agencies and organizations reviewing the final message report may comment on the investigation, findings, causes, and recommendations even though they are neither in the chain of command nor a designated action agency.

So in theory, your comments could fall under that last category, but I doubt this would happen. First, it assumes your safety office queried for comments from the general public (and you would have to represent an "agency or organization"). Next, it assumes that you actually get a chance to read the report, hear of the MOFE, and reply within the 45 day limit. Last, it assumes that they actually took your comments - this would probably be your biggest hurdle.

Your best bet would be to convince your safety office to submit comments on your behalf (which they would actually have to submit on behalf of the Wg/CC).

[stract]

When comments for MOFE are submitted, they are actually posted below the final message for a given mishap in AFSAS. Anyone can read those comments. One can also look at the access log to see that folks at AFSEC are in fact reading these comments as well. I can't speak to how much weight they give to unsolicited comments as I haven't sat through an actual MOFE, but I would think if the comments are intelligent and thought-provoking, they would be considered. I'll ask some folks I know at AFSEC about this.