Study: Nuclear Force Feeling 'Burnout' from Work

[Bender]

92/183... Strong.

"Okay guys, look...I know you're all cheating. I didn't call all of you in here to tell you to stop; I know perfectly well that my asinine policy decisions have driven you to doing this. That said, I need you to split it into two separate operations. If they ever catch on to this, we can't have literally the entire force on base getting pulled. This way we'll still have roughly 50%...Armstrong, it's an odd number in total, so pick your favorite and we'll just split the rest down the middle."

-- Col Stewart "Missile Launcher" Hammerstock, 2003

[Spoo]

Gotcha questions, no standardization, your career depending on 5% of a grade.

I was talking to a former missileer about this very thing the other day. He described a question regarding high beams while driving. My first reaction was, "They ask you a question about using headlights?!?" Yes, yes they do. Question went something like this:

You're driving to site 69 at 2200L with your high beams on. You observe an oncoming vehicle. Q: When are you required to go to low beams? A: 100m Correct. You continue on your drive and observe a second oncoming vehicle. Q: When would you turn off your high beams? A: 100m? WRONG! You never went back to high beams after the first vehicle. Gotcha' fucker! Sorry, FAIL, your career is over.

Really? I mean, REALLY? So you use trick questions about trivial bullshit to evaluate performance and general knowledge? Fantastic. No wonder morale is in the toilet.

[Bender]

Ah shit...I knew that question was on there and I'm not even a missileer.

Granted, 110 posts ago I did not.

Still though, it's like a fun riddle...usually I only have to change my facebook photo to a giraffe or some shit if I get it wrong though...slightly different stakes I'd say.

Bendy

[Cave_Pilot]

Hey guys, I just heard some stuff in an important meeting that directly impacts all of your futures. However, I am not allowed to tell you anything about it. Sorry.

Sorry, I didn't mean to come across like that. But that said, when OSI is investigating 1/3 of the CGOs in your AFSC, it makes you a little paranoid about what you say online.

I was talking to a former missileer about this very thing the other day. He described a question regarding high beams while driving. My first reaction was, "They ask you a question about using headlights?!?" Yes, yes they do. Question went something like this:

You're driving to site 69 at 2200L with your high beams on. You observe an oncoming vehicle. Q: When are you required to go to low beams? A: 100m Correct. You continue on your drive and observe a second oncoming vehicle. Q: When would you turn off your high beams? A: 100m? WRONG! You never went back to high beams after the first vehicle. Gotcha' ######er! Sorry, FAIL, your career is over.

Really? I mean, REALLY? So you use trick questions about trivial bullshit to evaluate performance and general knowledge? Fantastic. No wonder morale is in the toilet.

This captures it perfectly. Our monthly EWO tests should be straightforward tests to gauge whether you understand a particular concept. Unfortunately, every so often, we have people writing tests who get off on writing "trick questions" designed to fail people, which then has a ripple effect on crewmembers - people start looking for tricks in questions that don't have any, and end up convincing themselves out of a right answer.

There was a point in the press conference where she said that people weren't cheating to pass, they were cheating to get it perfect. I can't/won't condone cheating, but I'd be lying if I said the culture didn't make it tempting for some people.

[Azimuth]

Why are EWO tests not standardized between the bases? How come tanker/bomber aircraft that take EWO tests don't have to cheat to pass them?

[Tulsa]

You all follow checklists, right? Your decisions are verified by standard coded procedures, right? In the aviation world we test on at least two basic concepts. Our closed book tests evaluate information that should be able to be recalled immediately, ala in the cockpit. We have public MQFs to study for those. Our open book tests evaluate information that is good to know to perform your job, but not time critical hence open book to find the answer. Pardon my apparent naiveté, but how do these logic rubik cube tests prepare you to do the job? If our aviation exam program has worked well, why don't other operational fields follow suit?

Edited February 1, 2014 by Tulsa

[Cave_Pilot]

Why are EWO tests not standardized between the bases? How come tanker/bomber aircraft that take EWO tests don't have to cheat to pass them?

They are now. That's one of the things that's resulted from all this - all three wings now get the same test, written by 20AF.

As for the second, you're off slightly. Like the SECAF said, people aren't cheating to pass, they're cheating to get 100% and stay off their leadership's radar. Other than that, I'd say there are two main reasons... tanker/bomber crews are allowed to test as crews (as are sub officers.) We aren't - all our tests are "individual effort." So if you're a brand new deputy who hasn't even pulled a single alert yet, and your first EWO test just happens to be one of the "trick question" tests... too bad, your crew commander (who you'd be working with on literally any real-world EWO scenario) can't help you, or you're cheating. The other reason is because aircrews don't place the same emphasis on testing that the ICBM side does - the "100% or you're a disgrace to the service" culture doesn't exist.

You all follow checklists, right? Your decisions are verified by standard coded procedures, right? In the aviation world we test on at least two basic concepts. Our closed book tests evaluate information that should be able to be recalled immediately, ala in the cockpit. We have public MQFs to study for those. Our open book tests evaluate information that is good to know to perform your job, but not time critical hence open book to find the answer. Pardon my apparent naiveté, but how do these logic rubik cube tests prepare you to do the job? If our aviation exam program has worked well, why don't other operational fields follow suit?

No argument here. People have been asking similar questions for as long as I've been a missileer.

Nobody likes what's going on right now, obviously. But as much as I hate being under pressure from the SECDEF/SECAF/etc., the fundamental review of our culture and standards that we need would never have happened if we weren't getting this level of outside attention.

Edited February 1, 2014 by Cave_Pilot

[Tulsa]

Cave_Pilot,

I'm sorry, that is a horrible environment to work in. There should be a testing mechanism like I described above, especially when you don't execute your tasking on a day to day basis. 85% pass rate for your annual or Stan/Eval requirement, whatever you call it, but the ability to learn from your mistakes. Do you guys brief, execute, and debrief your rotations, without fear of being turned in? From what I've read a more open environment may help in keeping crews focused on the mission they are tasked to do.

[Fuzz]

other than that, I'd say there are two main reasons... tanker/bomber crews are allowed to test as crews (as are sub officers.) We aren't - all our tests are "individual effort." So if you're a brand new deputy who hasn't even pulled a single alert yet, and your first EWO test just happens to be one of the "trick question" tests... too bad, your crew commander (who you'd be working with on literally any real-world EWO scenario) can't help you, or you're cheating. The other reason is because aircrews don't place the same emphasis on testing that the ICBM side does - the "100% or you're a disgrace to the service" culture doesn't exist.

Our Open and Closed book tests are written tests taken individually, no crew help, however we do have an MQF so you know the exact questions.

[SurelySerious]

Our Open and Closed book tests are written tests taken individually, no crew help, however we do have an MQF so you know the exact questions.

He's referencing the nuke procedures testing, not the normal aircrew testing.

[Fuzz]

He's referencing the nuke procedures testing, not the normal aircrew testing.

Yeah I got that, I was responding to him say: "tanker/bomber crews are allowed to test as crews (as are sub officers.) We aren't - all our tests are "individual effort.""

Poor quote editing on my part.

[ram02]

Cave_Pilot,

I'm sorry, that is a horrible environment to work in. There should be a testing mechanism like I described above, especially when you don't execute your tasking on a day to day basis. 85% pass rate for your annual or Stan/Eval requirement, whatever you call it, but the ability to learn from your mistakes. Do you guys brief, execute, and debrief your rotations, without fear of being turned in? From what I've read a more open environment may help in keeping crews focused on the mission they are tasked to do.

The missile culture can't accept the fact that there will be mistakes. Any mistake, no matter how small, is unacceptable because perfection is the standard when dealing with nuclear weapons. There is no such thing as "recognize and correct" to a missileer. Until the retribution-based culture changes, you will never see an honest debrief environment like the flying world where someone stands up in front of everyone and fesses up to their mistake, because once you admit you made a mistake, you will immediately be punished. So, instead of bringing mistakes to light so everyone can learn from them, missileers from very early on learn to bury and cover up their mistakes lest they be made an example of.

[ThreeHoler]

Yeah I got that, I was responding to him say: "tanker/bomber crews are allowed to test as crews (as are sub officers.) We aren't - all our tests are "individual effort.""

Poor quote editing on my part.

He is not referring to the open and closed books...stay in your lane C-17 dude, for you know not what you speak.

[Gravedigger]

Even if the culture is directed to change by HAF/OSD, I'm not sure it will stick. One of the issues in the missile community is how to differentiate and stratify the CGOs. They go out on alert, they don't fuck anything up, they go home. Everybody looks the exact same on paper, and there is no working interaction with leadership for them to evaluate you. So how do you stand out? You can be fortunate enough to have some emergency happen while you're on alert. There's a joke about crews setting their own capsules on fire to win crew of the qtr. You can also stab your peers in the back by identifying things they did wrong, which is incredibly common. The quickest way to ruin your chances of ever moving to OSS/OGV or having a good follow-on assignment are bombing an eval or having a crappy EWO test. Since everyone can get a 100% on a straightforward test, they make them tricky to help thin the population. In turn, people cheat to stay competitive, and the cycle feeds itself. I'm afraid this is so engrained in all levels of the community that changing the culture would be futile. For their sake, I hope I'm wrong.

[Fud]

They are now. That's one of the things that's resulted from all this - all three wings now get the same test, written by 20AF.

Are they still dong scenario questions on the EWO tests? We always gave feedback that those shouldn't exist because we are tested on those in the MPTs.

Even if the culture is directed to change by HAF/OSD, I'm not sure it will stick.

It won't stick. In a culture, which is inundated with backstabbing, it will not change. I saw flight commanders and Sr. Crews who were terrible operators and worse people, yet leadership thought they were gods.

[SuperWSO]

I've talked to 13Ns in the past and the "zero defect" assumption makes this sort of problem inevitable. There is no debrief concept in missiles. Unlike aircrew, if you made a mistake and no one caught it, you dodged a bullet. No learning occurs and problems continue to multiply until the errors are too gross to hide. There has to be some room for non-punitive feedback in order to grow and improve or things will continue to get worse. In my opinion, this defective culture is so ingrained from top to bottom that there is no way to come in and impose change that the crews will be able to believe. Everyone will continue to say what they think the boss wants to hear, while doing what they think they need to advance.

[Azimuth]

Fire all the 13N leadership, replace with rated leadership to change the culture, reverse brainwash young CGO's and FGO's. Any O-6+ 13N is too far along in their mindset to be saved and should be taken out of command. It's almost like a Rage virus, you'll have to see who's infected and who's not.

This is going to be as painful, if not worse, than the Shaw scandal that spawned all the Witch hints for "questionable" material.

[Breckey]

I think that the debrief culture and feedback is why the icbm wic was stood up. They're always looking to see how aircrew brief and prepare for sorties. Unfortunately, as was just mentioned, the most effective tool that we have is the debrief, and that will not happen unless you have a nearly complete gutting of the Sr. CGOs on up.

Edited February 1, 2014 by Breckey

[Stretch]

I think that the debrief culture and feedback is why the icbm wic was stood up. They're always looking to see how aircrew brief and prepare for sorties. Unfortunately, as was just mentioned, the most effective tool that we have is the debrief, and that will not happen unless you have a nearly complete gutting of the Sr. CGOs on up.

You can see the bleed-over into the 13S Space community as well. The commanders who have been of the CGO missile breeding baulked at the debrief process and did everything possible to sweep mistakes under the rug. Likewise, their recurring training and eval outbriefs spent more time weaseling out of their mistake rather than finding anything to learn from it. More than one officer in that room would defend the evasive actions and let it start occurring at the line-crew level. That led to a double standard where some of the 'chosen ones' would be able to dodge-duck-dip-dive-dodge a Q3 and for others not to. There in starts the breach of integrity for a commander that guts the morale of the crew force and corrupts the trust we have/had with the public we are sworn to defend (additionally: developing young officers who will some day be a commander themselves someday and continue to cycle).

Likewise, the leaders who happened to be a squadron commander (a different subset than the previous paragraph) were the ones to help turn that around. Nothing made me respect my at-the-time new commander than when an evaluator tried to give the man his "due" wiggle room out of a critical error than when he stopped the entire outbrief, picked up the phone in the conference room, and called all the offices required for him to be immediately restricted until retrained. At that point, we went into an hour long debrief concerning conduct, training, and evaluation - having my personal views (that the more senior CGOs and senior leadership had told me to shove) being up in bright blue on the whiteboard was a godsend. You can bet that I would trust that man from that point on. Training and evaluation in a small squadron stopped being a recurring check and became a chance to get *better*. "Retraining" was only a bad word if it occurred multiple times for the same thing. Outbrief and debriefs were seen as (appropriately) separate events. This mission set was a bit more dynamic than the one that the missile dudes performed, but not by much.

But to this day, when most of the guys around me get a new boss or commander, the question shortly come up of "How long were they in missiles?" The preconceived ass-pain being imagined from that point on is established there. Most missile folk I've met have been good dudes/dudettes who are very, very conscious of the culture they escaped from. Likewise, when they hear someone say "In missiles, we did it this way..." they understand the concerns that crosses the face on us non-missile guys. I'm not talking all day-to-day CGOs, but those who had leadership positions for a duration in the missile mission.

DISCLAIMER 1: That second commander was indeed a former missile guy, but having been in some very dynamic mission sets as a 13S and a WIC grad, helped break that stereotype to me. I've been lucky with a number of good commanders who also happened to be leaders.

DISCLAIMER 2: Not a missile guy - pure space bubba, inherent to my experiences and biases expressed above.

[ram02]

"I'm sorry, who is this again?"

https://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/473240/secdef-makes-surprise-calls-to-malmstrom-afb-officers.aspx

I wonder how candid these "candid" conversations really were.

[HIgrown]

You can see the bleed-over into the 13S Space community as well. The commanders who have been of the CGO missile breeding baulked at the debrief process and did everything possible to sweep mistakes under the rug. Likewise, their recurring training and eval outbriefs spent more time weaseling out of their mistake rather than finding anything to learn from it. More than one officer in that room would defend the evasive actions and let it start occurring at the line-crew level. That led to a double standard where some of the 'chosen ones' would be able to dodge-duck-dip-dive-dodge a Q3 and for others not to. There in starts the breach of integrity for a commander that guts the morale of the crew force and corrupts the trust we have/had with the public we are sworn to defend (additionally: developing young officers who will some day be a commander themselves someday and continue to cycle).

Huge 2 on that. Another 13S here, my last assignment, Stan/Eval, DO, and CC were all products of the 13N CYA mentality. I can't tell you how many times I got into arguments with leadership and Stan/Eval regarding the style of training and evaluation (trapping style questions, punishing creativity during non-standard EP presentations, debriefs which never addressed deficiencies). It always boiled down to "well, this is how we did it in missiles". Luckily, leadership changed and the missile mentality disappeared but it seems that it's a problem that the 13N career field breeds.

[albertschu]

Fire all the 13N leadership, replace with rated leadership...

Be careful what you wish for.

[Bender]

Are they still dong scenario questions on the EWO tests? We always gave feedback that those shouldn't exist because we are tested on those in the MPTs.

It won't stick. In a culture, which is inundated with backstabbing, it will not change. I saw flight commanders and Sr. Crews who were terrible operators and worse people, yet leadership thought they were gods.

How often does squadron, group, or wing leadership actually pull alert with a crew?

Be careful what you wish for.

I would do this. It sounds like a great (if not monumental) challenge. I would not know where to start, I am certain my functional would get a good laugh out of it though.

Bendy

[Gravedigger]

Would this be the same rated leadership that bans morale patches and Friday shirts, requires reflective belt wear and empowers chiefs to parade around as uniform police? Not sure that will help.

[Breckey]

If a missileer is assigned to EWO/Weapons Shop/Scripts/OGV they do not pull alert. This means that the people making the tests are not currently CMR. The wing and group leadership do not pull alert. I think that the sq leadership pulls alert but not too often. Also the instructor/evaluator dynamic is much different than in the flying world. Evaluators are not instructors and then only for their crew position. So if you are a deputy commander (co-pilot) you first pull crew, then you upgrade to instructor, then to evaluator, Once they move to crew commander (AC) then they start the entire process again.