Study: Nuclear Force Feeling 'Burnout' from Work

[HU&W]

New program

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, La. (AFNS) --

Senior Air Force officials put a plan into motion that will give Airmen an opportunity to make real, visible and enduring changes to the Air Force Global Strike Command.

The Force Improvement Program, or FIP, is an aggressive, action-oriented effort with the goal of making rapid and substantial change to the intercontinental ballistic missile mission. Senior leaders designed the FIP from the ground-up as a field-level initiative to draw on the experiences of Airmen at all levels.

"Unlike other studies we have seen in the past, the foundation for the FIP is that our own ICBM base Airmen will identify challenges within (their) mission area and recommend solutions," said Lt. Gen. Stephen Wilson, commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, who wrote in a letter to missile crew members. "I can't stress this enough; this is a grass-roots-level effort. From the bottom, up, that's where the solutions are going to come from."

At the heart of the FIP is the Functional Cultural Working Group, or FCWG. These working groups are composed of teams of Airmen, junior NCOs, senior NCOs and company-grade officers from each missile wing. There are five FCWG teams in total, one each from the fields of missile operations, security forces, maintenance, mission support and helicopter operations.

The FCWG teams will visit each missile wing throughout February to meet with their peers locally and work with them to identify challenges in their respective mission areas, and upon completion will recommend solutions directly to Wilson.

"I will, in turn, implement recommendations within my purview and report the results and Air Force level recommendations to Secretary James and General Welsh for their consideration," Wilson said, "I've spoken to the CSAF and secretary and they are ready to act."

Each FCWG team will be augmented by mentors and experts from outside the ICBM field, such as Navy submariners, Navy or Marine security professionals, bomber combat systems officers and members of the 576th Flight Test Squadron and 381st Training Group from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. These additional members will provide the teams with a fresh perspective from an outside source.

"The goal of the FIP is to identify challenges associated with performing duties at our missile wings and to propose innovative, concrete solutions that your senior leadership can take action on in the coming weeks," Wilson said. "Note, I said 'weeks,' not years."

In addition to the FCWG teams, the program will include several other initiatives running concurrently to achieve more comprehensive solutions.

To better understand the challenges faced by ICBM crew members and their families, an email-based feedback system will be open to family members at AFGSC's three missile wings. This system opens up a direct line of communication to command leadership, giving family members an avenue to voice their concerns, address real everyday challenges and propose solutions. Email addresses of respondents will be masked, providing peace of mind. More information about the program will be provided through the chain of command as it becomes available.

Airmen will also be given the opportunity to participate in a confidential survey that will enable open and honest communication with leadership.

Both the email-feedback system and the field survey will be available Feb. 10 - 20.

"I ask that each of you participate in this program in order to provide honest and constructive feedback to me and our senior leaders," Wilson said. "This is your opportunity to foster positive change within your unit, wing, and our command. Don't pass it up."

[albertschu]

[justajob]

Looks like Lt Gen Wilson doesn't want the input of his FGO's or commanders. Quite a statement.

[Breckey]

One of our pilots and FEs got pinged for this. Long list of things to discuss and I hope it will bring to light the core issues facing the ICBM crewforce. As long as the people selected are actually from the trenches and not the shiny pennies, it may have a chance.

[Cave_Pilot]

Looks like Lt Gen Wilson doesn't want the input of his FGO's or commanders. Quite a statement.

The missile world has, historically, had a strong tendency to discourage questioning of the status quo. Someone questions whether we really need to do things a certain way, and they get told some variation of "it's that way because it's always been that way" or "stop complaining and suck it up, you're in the military" and now they've got a reputation for being a troublemaker. Point in case: a few years ago at the club, someone raised a concern to a local commander about a certain new policy that had been implemented, that was widely seen as unnecessary and cumbersome to the crewforce. Rather than address the concern, his response to this was to ask everyone at the table how long they'd been in the Air Force, then told all of us that he had more time in the AF than all of us combined and that he thought it was a good idea, so deal with it.

And, over time, the people who have bought into the status quo get promoted, get command, and perpetuate the cycle, and the people who questioned it get disillusioned and get out. (There's exceptions, but that is largely the way it goes.) As a result, we have numerous leaders that don't listen to or address our concerns, but instead tell us to shut up and color and report up the chain that everything is fine. So if I were LtGen Wilson and I really wanted to know what was going on with the ICBM crewforce... I'd be bypassing the chain too, because nobody's going to say anything honest if they think there's any chance their commander will find out they said anything negative to a higher-up.

It's going to be interesting to see what people end up saying when the fear of retribution is removed. When the CSAF/SECAF were making the rounds a couple weeks ago, they met with the junior CGOs separately from our leadership - and from what I've heard, the junior CGOs gave them some very candid opinions about certain commanders and the cultures they promulgated.

[Bender]

That sounds a lot like the USAF as a whole...the missile world just being an insulated laboratory for the bacteria to thrive and grow.

There should be a whole lot more of this going on...before the "rot" starts showing (too late in most cases).

I hope this makes things better for you guys/gals and doesn't just result in another inaction pony show.

Bendy

[BitteEinBit]

It actually appears to me that those at the top are finally realizing they are so far disconnected from the realities of the "workerbees" and now they're trying to figure out how things really work. I like this idea. This is one of the critical first steps to changing that "culture" we all complain about. Yes men (or women) can no longer lie to their bosses and say "We have burgers and tots, everything is great." I like it....

Edited for misplaced modifier

Edited February 8, 2014 by BitteEinBit

[JarheadBoom]

I really hope LtCol TaterTots is escorted to the door when all this force shaping is said and done. It's mind-boggling how clueless she was/is, and how rampant her POV seems to be in the AF nuke world.

[albertschu]

I really hope LtCol TaterTots is escorted to the door when all this force shaping is said and done. It's mind-boggling how clueless she was/is, and how rampant her POV seems to be in the AF nuke world.

It is much more likely that she will be Col TaterTots.

[17D_guy]

The missile world has, historically, had a strong tendency to discourage questioning of the status quo. Someone questions whether we really need to do things a certain way, and they get told some variation of "it's that way because it's always been that way" or "stop complaining and suck it up, you're in the military" and now they've got a reputation for being a troublemaker. Point in case: a few years ago at the club, someone raised a concern to a local commander about a certain new policy that had been implemented, that was widely seen as unnecessary and cumbersome to the crewforce. Rather than address the concern, his response to this was to ask everyone at the table how long they'd been in the Air Force, then told all of us that he had more time in the AF than all of us combined and that he thought it was a good idea, so deal with it.

But that's just this young generation who's weak, expects no challenges, and is unmotivated. /S

Getting to listen to retired and/or dead-eyed old officers tell me that the young Airmen/Officers coming in have it so cushy when we're 1/4 of the force and funding these mental rust buckets had is getting old fast. Keep leading by being blatantly biased in your selection of shiny pennies who can do no wrong, writing tests that don't actually take into account skill or experience, work to destroy any sense of team morale and camaraderie and then to top it off write about "rot" that is (apparently) just starting and only occurring at the lowest ranks or how people are motivated for fried potato snacks.

If we don't see a sweep out of leadership in the next 3 months then nothing will change. Those leaders who got "counseled" will hide away until the current thing blows over and then come back with mission-planning for driving to the capsule and contingency plans for insect attacks on convoys.

[BB Stacker]

contingency plans for insect attacks on convoys.

That is still my favorite AIB report.

[Breckey]

It is hilarious. Probably not so much for the cops and helos that were escorting the thing. "Well that's a debrief item!"

[guineapigfury]

That is still my favorite AIB report.

I'm imagining this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dU97w2DH5mc&feature=player_detailpage

Edited February 9, 2014 by guineapigfury

[JarheadBoom]

Interesting read. The parts relevant to the current nuke force discussion are quoted below (emphasis is mine)...

An ICBM officer recalls 9/11

I am proud of my time as a missileer. I am proud of the role I fulfilled and the mission we did. Over the four years I spent in the job I pulled somewhere around 275 alerts in the field, most not nearly as memorable as that on 9/11. I also had the opportunity to be an instructor and hold two different flight commander leadership positions. It was my first real job in the military and it taught me lifelong lessons about responsibility, discipline, preparation, and patience. There’s nothing like being 28 years old and having the responsibility for the actions and performance of 47 other people day-in and day-out, including no-notice nuclear surety inspections, to drive home the meaning of professionalism and duty.

My time certainly had its share of frustration and stress. The constant training, testing, and pressure to not make any mistakes, along with the huge amount of micromanagement from the leadership over just about every aspect of our job aside from the nuclear launch part. The morbidly hilarious “morale patches” we designed and sold as fundraisers, and the board games about driving to alert we invented in the field to make fun of the crazy things our leadership made us do to satisfy their bosses. And I also remember the camaraderie, the shared experience that stress and frustration created among the crew force that forged a lot of the friendships I have to this day.

In all of this, my experience on 9/11 takes center stage. For me, it was the day that the nuclear deterrent’s new clothes were revealed to be nothing more than a pair of boxer briefs and a sword instead of the full set of armor we had previously believed. Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, we in the nuclear business had known in the back of our minds that the world had changed, but hadn’t really come to grips with what that meant. We were still going through the motions, doing much of the same thing as our predecessors from decades past, telling each other that we were the sword and shield of America. If we did our jobs and were the best we could be, we would keep America safe.

For me, those scales fell from my eyes on 9/11. The nuclear deterrent did not keep America safe, and in the years that followed with the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, we were on the sidelines. Our leadership still told us that we were important, that because of our existence our troops overseas and Americans at home would be same from any WMD attacks in retaliation for our offensives. But that argument didn’t hold much water as we watched the very public and extensive preparations for combat ops in a chemical and biological environment our brothers and sisters in arms were preparing for in Iraq.

I still believe there is a role for the nuclear deterrent in America’s national security strategy. Part of me hopes the day will come when it’s no longer needed and the world can move to something like global zero, but the realist part of me knows that will not happen for a long time yet (if ever). But in the meantime, one of the most pressing national security issues we have is figuring out what the proper role of nuclear deterrent is now and what force structure and posture we need to implement that role.

The answer cannot be the same role, the same force structure, and the same posture as we’ve had for the last few decades. The world has changed. That sounds trite, but it’s important to keep repeating. I am a big believer in our personal experiences shaping our worldviews. As my experience on 9/11 has shaped my worldview on the role of nuclear weapons, I know that nearly all of our current senior military and political leaders – and many of the most well-respected scholars and analysts – spent their formative years locked in the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Just as I do not fully understand or appreciate that experience, I do not expect them to fully understand my generation’s experience with the new threats America faces such as terrorism.

The more those leaders and pundits insist that the world has not changed, that nuclear deterrence is still just as important to U.S. national security as it has “always” been, the more I think that falls flat with today’s crew force. This goes doubly so when those claims are used as the rationale for why today’s crew force needs to spend more time training, be held to even higher standards, more inspections, and deal with more micromanagement from above.

I think this disparity between what the leadership says and the reality the crew force sees plays a role in the current crisis of leadership in the ICBM world. Leadership is about getting people to willingly do what you say, and a critical piece of that is building trust with those whom you lead. That trust needs rest on bedrock of honesty about what it is we do and why we are doing it. Dishonesty, even if well-intentioned, will ultimately lead to relationships that fail when truly tested. And proclamations that fail face validity, such as “the nuclear deterrent is more important than ever”, serve as poor bedrock upon which to demand even more professionalism and sacrifices from those you lead.

Not all missileers, or maybe not even a majority, share my thoughts on this issue. I still remain in contact with quite a few from my crew time through Facebook and I can say that our conversations on these topics reveal differing opinions. Some agree with me, some do not. But the lack of consensus does not itself invalidate the link I believe exists between the changing role of nuclear deterrence and the perception that the crew force is becoming less professional or fails to meet the same high standards as their predecessors. And I believe coming to grips with this disparity between the role of the nuclear deterrent and the realities of the threats and challenges we face is crucial in ensuring a professional, safe, and effective nuclear deterrent going forward.

[SurelySerious]

It seems like the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review addresses the fact that the world has changed and nuclear deterrence isn't effective against non-state (i.e. terror) groups, but is still essential for nuclear-states and that the Administration [reluctantly] still views it as important. Whether that is effectively communicated to the nuclear force is a different issue, but the information is out there.

ETA: So I guess what I'm going for is, 1) is this guy aware of what America says its Nukes are really doing (deterring nations)? And 2) does he actually think that America thinks a bunch of goat farmers in Afcrapistan care about our nuclear deterrence? My impression from this article is 1) No and 2) Yes because of the answer to #1. There are my spears.

The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military

confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly

regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear

policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear

proliferation.

This does not mean that our nuclear deterrent has become irrelevant. Indeed, as long as nuclear

weapons exist, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These

nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and

reassuring allies and partners around the world.

The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons

exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.

Reinforcing strategic stability. Given that Russia and China are currently modernizing their

nuclear capabilities – and that both are claiming U.S. missile defense and conventionally-armed

missile programs are destabilizing – maintaining strategic stability with the two countries will be

an important challenge in the years ahead.

Edited February 10, 2014 by SurelySerious

[Cave_Pilot]

16 years of being the redheaded stepchild of AFSPC didn't help either.

That's 16 years of future commanders of ICBM units growing up in a MAJCOM that didn't really understand or care about our mission.

[MSCguy]

16 years of being the redheaded stepchild of AFSPC didn't help either.

That's 16 years of future commanders of ICBM units growing up in a MAJCOM that didn't really understand or care about our mission.

Almost any non-rated officer could make that argument...somehow I doubt ACC, AMC, etc put developing personnel officers, loggies, etc at the top of their list.

[Azimuth]

Almost any non-rated officer could make that argument...somehow I doubt ACC, AMC, etc put developing personnel officers, loggies, etc at the top of their list.

Actually this is the USAF, they probably did. Remember, flying the aircraft is only #18 on their list.

[MSCguy]

If I were a pilot and saw that #18 on the list I would GTFO. If a company in the real world put producing their product as priority #18 they'd be out of business within a year.

[17D_guy]

16 years of being the redheaded stepchild of AFSPC didn't help either.

That's 16 years of future commanders of ICBM units growing up in a MAJCOM that didn't really understand or care about our mission.

Moved you guys out, moved us in. Perfect.

[Breckey]

Are You Smarter than a Nuclear Launch Officer?

“The higher-ups generally don’t hold squadron and group commanders responsible,” he says. “The system is so ingrained with this poisonous mentality that your generals and colonels—all those who have succeeded and been promoted in nukes—are the ones who have excelled in this environment, and so they perpetuate it.”

It has become a self-perpetuating caste. “It’s command incest—you get a bad leader who finds a subordinate who’s just as bad as he is, and he promotes that subordinate, and on and on. It’s been going on for four decades now and so you mostly get a crop of leaders who are more interested in their careers than they are in actually leading,” he says. “Leadership is a human endeavor, and the Air Force takes the humanity out of it.”

[panchbarnes]

Unfortuantely these leadership issues are not limited to the 13N career field. I hope whatever fix they put in place gets adopted AF-wide as much as practical.

'It has become a self-perpetuating caste. “It’s command incest—you get a bad leader who finds a subordinate who’s just as bad as he is, and he promotes that subordinate, and on and on. It’s been going on for four decades now and so you mostly get a crop of leaders who are more interested in their careers than they are in actually leading,” he says. “Leadership is a human endeavor, and the Air Force takes the humanity out of it.”'

I've met an O-6 who believes if your sole purpose in life is not going after O-6 then you are not AF "leadership" material. He likes to say "Oh you won't make O-6 if you took that assignment" to junior officers filling out the ADP and will it hold it against them if they don't take his advice and follow his path.

Edited February 14, 2014 by PanchBarnes

[Azimuth]

https://swampland.time.com/2014/02/13/are-you-smarter-than-a-nuclear-launch-officer/

[Torch]

Fun talk from our WG/CV the other day regarding this issue.

Its not an issue with culture, its an issue with the climate. Culture change (if you can define it) will take years to put in effect, climate change can happen in a day - "You're fired" and introduce someone in where they need to be. To change the climate of the crew force, there needs to be a new emphasis on what is acceptable and what isn't when it comes to failure and training.

Regarding training: Missile guys take their monthly trainer rides in which if they screw up they're castrated, examined and then racked/stacked so everyone knows about it. Failures on these rides have a direct impact on your shop tour (fail and you can be dropped back to line crew) which leads to the enviornment of "no error" accepted. These are trainer rides, currencies..if you will from the explanation. He voiced that training rides are where mistakes should be happening within a enviornment to accept critiques and fix those mistakes...kind of like if we go out and do a sortie and screw something up, we'll debrief it, I'll learn, and should recall it again if a situation arises. This would hopefully lessen the "stress" level that comes with standard rides to where there is an expectation of knowledge and proficiency, but also the availability to make mistakes in a learning and improvement minded enviornment.

For once, it was the first time I saw hope for some of the guys I know that are missileers and have talked to regarding what the hell is going on inside their organization. A lot of voice goes towards the ways to stratifiy within the squadron and the "100% Perfection is the Standard". This is changing. Perfection is the expectation, excellence is the standard. As pilots, we all know we take something away from every flight as a way to improve; hopefully the nuke force will start to get this understanding.

[Chuck17]

Fun talk from our WG/CV the other day regarding this issue.

Its not an issue with culture, its an issue with the climate. Culture change (if you can define it) will take years to put in effect, climate change can happen in a day - "You're fired" and introduce someone in where they need to be. To change the climate of the crew force, there needs to be a new emphasis on what is acceptable and what isn't when it comes to failure and training.

Regarding training: Missile guys take their monthly trainer rides in which if they screw up they're castrated, examined and then racked/stacked so everyone knows about it. Failures on these rides have a direct impact on your shop tour (fail and you can be dropped back to line crew) which leads to the enviornment of "no error" accepted. These are trainer rides, currencies..if you will from the explanation. He voiced that training rides are where mistakes should be happening within a enviornment to accept critiques and fix those mistakes...kind of like if we go out and do a sortie and screw something up, we'll debrief it, I'll learn, and should recall it again if a situation arises. This would hopefully lessen the "stress" level that comes with standard rides to where there is an expectation of knowledge and proficiency, but also the availability to make mistakes in a learning and improvement minded enviornment.

For once, it was the first time I saw hope for some of the guys I know that are missileers and have talked to regarding what the hell is going on inside their organization. A lot of voice goes towards the ways to stratifiy within the squadron and the "100% Perfection is the Standard". This is changing. Perfection is the expectation, excellence is the standard. As pilots, we all know we take something away from every flight as a way to improve; hopefully the nuke force will start to get this understanding.

Just so we are clear - are we collectively saying a massive shift from inbred toxicity is expected to occur rapidly because of all the bad press lately? And yet, the same clownshoes commanders who WERE IN CHARGE previously are still in charge...? No one was fired?

I won't hold my breath.

When you have to be told by someone who's been SECAF for five seconds that your shits in the street for you to realize it, you have insurmountable SA problems and nothing short of wholesale leadership cleansing followed by crew force reeducation and will fix them.

Chuck