Time to abolish the Air Force?

[Clark Griswold]

13 hours ago, sqwatch said:

You're on the right track with "0 knots 0 feet", but the rest? I don't follow the logic. The last thing I want to do is pack it in because it's the cheap option and I don't buy that a b-1 deployment could pay for the acquisition AND training / mx to support any MWS, no matter how cool a super Tucano looks in you Facebook feed or on some bean counter's spread sheet. Lastly, when you pay the costs in PR and dollars of a downed pilot, all of the sudden those gbu-54s dropped from a viper are a great fvcking deal.

I don't want to ride one in either but I don't think you or any other pilot of a LAAR aircraft would be facing a significantly higher probability of that in a semi-permissive AOR, like Eastern Syria - Western Iraq or Afghanistan.  Manned ISR has been operating in AORs like this for years with only one loss I know of, Iraqi Cessna Caravan shot down by 57mm AAA in open source, and that was  / is an unpressurized aircraft not capable of operating out of the WEZ of a 57mm or above AAA. 

A Super T, AT-6B, Scorpion Jet, etc... would still offer more than enough performance to operate quietly, safely and reliably well above 15k and X miles away to avoid most threats / detection while being surveilled prior to going kinetic and if CAS is required for a TIC, it is built for that also.  Is it the same an A-10?  Nope but for the fight we are in and the modernization efforts we say we want to do, we have to consider costs.  Ultimately it is the TOA of the AF and all the different pots of money that add up to that, that determine whether we can get new toys by not spending all our money in current ops.

Bar napkin math for hypothetical B-1 deployment to the Died I came up with for a year with 6 jets, crews, support, and tankers was about 1.1 billion and for a Super T deployment replacing the B-1s with 20 Super Ts and flying 3 sorties for each B-1 sortie was 52 million.  You could double my estimate for the Super T deployment and cut my estimate for deploying the B-1's in half and sill save in the neighborhood of 500 million per year, serious money. 

This aircraft/mission/capability would be a good fit for a Guard/Reserve unit with specialized group like the CAS integration group being stood up at Nellis being the lead unit or FTU for it,  Call on it as needed and put it back on the shelf if the world somehow becomes more peaceful, not holding breath...

Just my two cents again but the AF has a terrible delusion that it believes it is really only going to fight big Desert Storm or Allied Force style campaigns and that these missions in the Arc of Instability are not going to be the norm or at a minimum a large portion of our likely operations. For the past 15 years they have been the norm and a guess but 15 years from now we will still be doing lots of ISR, kinetic action on dynamic HVTs and targets with a high CDE concern and low destructive effect desired.  I don't think we should be completely focused on CAS / Low Intensity conflicts but keeping something like 10 - 20 % of our air assets geared towards that seems a balanced approach to having a capability to eliminate 3 terrorists in a Hilux for about 10k per mission vice having a capability that costs probably 600k to 700k per mission to deliver the same effect at not really any greater risk.

 

Edited June 28, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor

[Sprkt69]

13 hours ago, sqwatch said:

 

 

 

 

You're on the right track with "0 knots 0 feet", but the rest? I don't follow the logic. The last thing I want to do is pack it in because it's the cheap option and I don't buy that a b-1 deployment could pay for the acquisition AND training / mx to support any MWS, no matter how cool a super Tucano looks in you Facebook feed or on some bean counter's spread sheet. Lastly, when you pay the costs in PR and dollars of a downed pilot, all of the sudden those gbu-54s dropped from a viper are a great fvcking deal.

It's not always about kinetics. Actually having intimate familiarity with your AO and knowing the people who operate there actually counts for something. Despite what the PowerPoint warriors claim to be true on the AF side of the Puzzle Palace, ISR is the vast majority of the mission sets for COIN, not CAS. I can't even begin to fathom the number of times I was ordered to log CAS for all of my air requests, even when it was not warranted. Or breaking up a single air request so that we could have a greater number of requests for the same amount of coverage to make sure, and I wish I were kidding, the PowerPoint slides were greened up.

The best way for the AF to advocate its existence with the Army during COIN operations is the LAAR and pushing the crews forward to operate with a specific Army unit. But this kind of operations mean something Big Blue would completely abhor. That being decentralized planning and execution. You would actually have to empower a pilot to go forth and conquer within the set bounds. Crazy talk I know, especially in this day and age of micromanagement. 

Sure, downed aircrews become a big deal, no one will argue that. There are definitely some inherent risk associated with aviation. So losing an aircraft is going to happen regardless. However, if flown properly, the risks will not be as high as the Army rotorywing assets. So are you going to tell them their risks are too high, and that they should go ahead and park their assets?

The AF is doing a great job breaking its own aircraft, burning out its people and spending way too much overall. Why else would there be a push for the transition to the laser rocket? Because it is a lot more cost effective than a GBU-54 dropped by a Strike Eagle with a lot less collateral damage. Hell, just look at the success and cost of the recent OV-10 deployment the Afghanistan. Now there is a time and place for a real kick down the door fighter armed with multiple 500/2000#s of hate, like when thing get bad. Therefore the LAAR would be your armed FAC-A, working in concert with JTACs, and be a local pilot with some real knowledge of what is going on/where people are. Now you have someone that can advocate the service while gaining intimate knowledge of a specific AO to aid the local unit in kinetic and mainly non kinetic operations. Fly-Fight-Win or some such thing.

This is COIN, so let's fight it that way.

 

[TnkrToad]

13 hours ago, Sprkt69 said:

The best way for the AF to advocate its existence with the Army during COIN operations is the LAAR and pushing the crews forward to operate with a specific Army unit.

I buy the idea of LAAR (and likely C-27J also) on the cost basis argument--in the right context. In the LOBOG (Lots of Boots on the Ground) days of Afghanistan/Iraq, LAAR would have made a whole lot of sense in-country. I'm not so sure LAAR is as much of a panacea today, now that we're going with light footprints in-country. Regardless, directly attaching Air Force aircraft and crews to specific Army units is exactly what we do not want to do. It is more convenient for ground forces to complain about non-support from the Air Force than it is for them to convince Army leaders to buy adequate numbers of aircraft types to provide ground forces with what they theoretically need. 

- If the Army wants more unmanned ISR, it can buy more Gray Eagles

- If it wants more dedicated manned CAS, it can buy more Apaches

- If it want more dedicated manned ISR, it can buy more RC-12s

       Funny, I guess the Army doesn't really want any of those things, since I don't see Army leaders clamoring for the funds to massively expand their Gray Eagle/Apache/RC-12 fleets beyond what they currently have/are projected to buy.

       Senior Army leaders don't want to buy enough of these assets to provide each ground commander with his own fleet of air assets, because doing so would be prohibitively expensive. Investing in enough airpower to satisfy ground commanders' desires would in turn choke out other vital elements of Army ground power . . . if the Army had to pay for it. What works great for ground commanders is to instead demand the kitchen sink from the Air Force, without (a) taking time to acknowledge that their own service has shortchanged them, or (b) considering the entirety of the problem of providing support throughout the AOR/the world. I'm not saying the guys on the ground are wrong for wanting every asset possible to support them/their mission. If I were in their shoes, I would be doing the same thing. That doesn't make the math any less true--we can't/won't spend the cash to give ground guys everything they want--especially in the era of sequestration. 

      When I consider environments where LAAR makes sense, I think a very strong case could be made for buying a small fleet. It could save significant cash/wear & tear on other airframes. As Sqwatch indicated, there are lots of cases where LAAR makes little sense at all, though. I can imagine a number of cases where a Viper, in a centrally-located CAS orbit with tanker support, would be a better/cheaper option than LAAR for on-call CAS support. Whether LAAR, Vipers or other AF assets, they should never be penny-packeted out to Army units. 

TT

[busdriver]

LAAR makes a shit load of sense to increase absorbable cockpits.   

[Clark Griswold]

7 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

  they should never be penny-packeted out to Army units. 

TT

2 

If you aren't paying for it you won't appreciate it.

On the LAAR, it amazed me how hidebound the leadership of the AF is but perhaps this is reading too much into the background of senior leadership, but as far as I can tell none of them were ever in any low intensity conflicts or COIN actions, their experience and paradigm was Desert Storm, Allied Force, etc... they just couldn't imagine doing things any other way, UAVs slowly took root but even they have a large footprint, considering the reachback and MCE structure.  It just wasn't big enough, sts...  

Always a favorite concept when there was some semi-serious discussion on acquiring a LAAR was the OV-10X

[Stitch]

17 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

 

Always a favorite concept when there was some semi-serious discussion on acquiring a LAAR was the OV-10X

 

Sure a "new, improved sweeter smelling OV-10X" would be cool.  But with costs associated with re-opening that production line/refurbishing old airframes out of the boneyard, perhaps the already in production A-29 Super T with a training pipleine already up and running would be a better choice if this whole pie in the sky pipe dream came true.  And I bet unlike the Pred & GH communities, there would be no shortage of volunteers to not just start up the program, but you'd have to drag guys/gals out of it kicking and screaming when its time to move on to other assignments.     

[Clark Griswold]

5 minutes ago, Stitch said:

Sure a "new, improved sweeter smelling OV-10X" would be cool.  But with costs associated with re-opening that production line/refurbishing old airframes out of the boneyard, perhaps the already in production A-29 Super T with a training pipleine already up and running would be a better choice if this whole pie in the sky pipe dream came true.  And I bet unlike the Pred & GH communities, there would be no shortage of volunteers to not just start up the program, but you'd have to drag guys/gals out of it kicking and screaming when its time to move on to other assignments.     

No argument on the logistics and expense of reinventing the wheel vice buying an airplane already in production, in this case the Super T or alternatively the AT-6B.  I left out the Scorpion Jet as I don't think they have finalized the production configuration yet until they get a launch customer.

I am biased for the Scorpion Jet as I got to see it at WEPTAC a couple of years ago and I think that it could be an easier sell to the AF even though it is a pricier jet to buy and operate compared to the Super T or AT-6B, but still way cheaper than a 4th gen fighter or attack for COIN / Light CAS.

My suggestion would be to re-mission probably 25 Wings, 8 Active & 17 ARC, for these missions:

Scorpion Jets for LAAR, C-27Js for Light Air Mobility, Firebirds & MQ-9s for persistent ISR / Precision Strike with the PED, JTACs, TACPs and ALOs to keep the customer up to speed on how and what Air Support can do.  I added the Firebird even though it is just a development effort but having an Optionally Manned Vehicle with persistence you need and the ability to go unmanned when warranted (really most missions).

All it takes is moving a mountain of institutional inertia and billions of dollars, that's all..

[Stitch]

42 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

....Scorpion Jet.......    ...but still way cheaper than a 4th gen fighter or attack for COIN / Light CAS... 

...re-mission probably 25 Wings, 8 Active & 17 ARC....

I can see Big Blue’s love of a pure jet but when we go back to a whole new airframe acquisition costs/software problems/where to build the factory, etc… But at least with Super T or AT-6B, airframes with somewhat “proven” track records, you could roll right into operational squadrons from the get-go.  It’s sorta like being the wingman settling for the fat chick, sure it’s not the ideal “airframe” for the evening’s sortie, but it is a suitable sub to meet mission needs.          

[Clark Griswold]

39 minutes ago, Stitch said:

I can see Big Blue’s love of a pure jet but when we go back to a whole new airframe acquisition costs/software problems/where to build the factory, etc… But at least with Super T or AT-6B, airframes with somewhat “proven” track records, you could roll right into operational squadrons from the get-go.  It’s sorta like being the wingman settling for the fat chick, sure it’s not the ideal “airframe” for the evening’s sortie, but it is a suitable sub to meet mission needs.          

Yup - my thoughts also, the AF likes turboprops but loves jets.

If it is a pick, the Super T would be my choice for the capability afforded for the cost and ease of acquisition (relatively).  It has a strong track record with the Columbian AF and I believe only one has been shot down in over 20k operational hours and that is not acknowledged by the Columbians, only claimed by the FARC.

Suitable as you said is the key word, we (USAF) sometimes shoot ourselves in the foot by by striving for the perfect plane when pretty good is the right answer.

[Inertia17]

3 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Suitable as you said is the key word, we (USAF) sometimes shoot ourselves in the foot by by striving for the perfect plane when pretty good is the right answer.

Settling for pretty good is only acceptable for morale apparently.

[Clark Griswold]

24 minutes ago, Inertia17 said:

Settling for pretty good is only acceptable for morale apparently.

Touche

I honestly believe Gen Welsh cared and tried but if a CSAF really wanted to improve morale it would not just be new policies and strategies but a purge of leadership at all levels that I doubt legally he could ever actually do, I have hope that the shoe clerks will be purged so for some brief period of time before they regenerate I could see an AF truly mission and not queep focused but over a number of years it has "corprotized" and the ability of an inspirational leader who espouses change is probably aspirational in reality, not that I am cynical or anything...

[pawnman]

47 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

Touche

I honestly believe Gen Welsh cared and tried but if a CSAF really wanted to improve morale it would not just be new policies and strategies but a purge of leadership at all levels that I doubt legally he could ever actually do, I have hope that the shoe clerks will be purged so for some brief period of time before they regenerate I could see an AF truly mission and not queep focused but over a number of years it has "corprotized" and the ability of an inspirational leader who espouses change is probably aspirational in reality, not that I am cynical or anything...

I'm not sure he would have needed a full purge.  Just a few strategic firings to send a message to the rest of the senior leadership.

[guineapigfury]

1 hour ago, pawnman said:

I'm not sure he would have needed a full purge.  Just a few strategic firings to send a message to the rest of the senior leadership.

pour encourager les autres

[pawnman]

7 hours ago, guineapigfury said:

pour encourager les autres

Sure.  But I just meant firing them, not killing them.

[guineapigfury]

Firing, firing squad ... let's not get quibble over grammar.

[Sprkt69]

Finally got around to listening to Dr Farley. Anyone else have the takeaway that he is a condescending douche? I mean, he is the type of PhD that would be recruited for McNamara's Whiz Kids. Just, astonishingly condescending with no real check from reality.

[Clark Griswold]

On 7/27/2016 at 0:57 AM, Sprkt69 said:

Finally got around to listening to Dr Farley. Anyone else have the takeaway that he is a condescending douche? I mean, he is the type of PhD that would be recruited for McNamara's Whiz Kids. Just, astonishingly condescending with no real check from reality.

He seems gullible, just a gut feeling based on the few articles/interviews of his I have read.  I think he believes basically hook, line and sinker anything anyone writes about how the AF doesn't give a shit about the Army, USMC and how the Navy is perfect. 

His background professionally is all in academia with no gaps for military, government or private service and as you said, no real check from reality that would open his ideas to the tactile reality of the cultures, motives, strengths, weaknesses, obsessions and quirks of each of the services.  

If he had that first hand knowledge from a stint of service, particularly with anytime working jointly, I think he would be able to more readily see the competitive and somewhat cutthroat nature of the jockeying for money, power and prestige all branches of service have with each other.  Just the nature of the beast and everything that any branch says about another branch should be taken with a generous dash of salt.

[Clark Griswold]

Thread relight.

Read this today: https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/no-end-in-sight-to-the-armys-dependence-on-airpower/

Thought it was a pretty good read and the AF is not going anywhere but the most interesting take away was the Army's new concept, Multi-Domain Battle.  

Summary:  Army enables entry into contested AORs for Air/Naval forces thru long range precision fires and small ground force elements to take advantage of fleeting moments where they have the advantage, go static and defensive until the next moment of advantage comes up and advance, repeat until the enemy is cooked thoroughly. 

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/11/under-enemy-skies-armys-multi-domain-battle/

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/10/miserable-disobedient-victorious-gen-milleys-future-us-soldier/

Not really buying that at all, also not buying that it will only be one service kicking down a robust A2/AD brick wall and knocking a peer foe on his ass.

Grist for the mill but interesting.

[Jaded]

Man, that sounds completely different than AirLand Battle, errr, I mean, Full Spectrum Operations.

[Clark Griswold]

10 hours ago, Jaded said:

Man, that sounds completely different than AirLand Battle, errr, I mean, Full Spectrum Operations.

Distinct similarities but what was interesting was the message I inferred was the Army shifting from COIN, not going back to a conventional focus but high end next generation focused conflict.  

As the WOR article mentioned: "The Army isn’t going to act as an anti-access enabler unless it is providing logistical support and communications or bothers to deploy its point defense systems to defend US air and naval facilities against cruise missile attack."  

This has to be realized by Army leadership and if they are truly serious about this concept, then would this drive the need for organic mobility, they apparently have confidence in tilt-rotor technology (Valor 280) and I am surprised that a large tilt rotor mobility platform hasn't been at least proposed to get the Army directly to the fight:

Not sure if this is really necessary, direct air land delivery via tilt rotor but if the Army wants to lead the way they will have to get close to roll in...

Edited December 15, 2016 by Clark Griswold

[Clark Griswold]

Relight on thread:

Another interview with Prof Farley - https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/2462/

Worth a listen if sitting SOF, filling out airline apps or both...

Thought his comments on reorganizing the military was interesting, going away from the idea of domains as the principle factor in defining a service but to the overall goal / mission to define a service (a strategic deterrence, a territorial defense, an expeditionary service, etc...) allowing these new branches to operate across multiple domains but focused to their mission without the parochial fight over intrusion into the exclusive domain of another branch...

[nunya]

Meh, just another academic trying to legitimize his paycheck.

7 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

without the parochial fight over intrusion into the exclusive domain of another branch

His ideas will not achieve this end.  It'll only shift the battle lines from between domains to between locales.  There's no way to eliminate territorial overlap battles, especially when the perceived relevance of those territories directly correlates to their granted budgets.

He said himself, it's just about what you choose to optimize.

[Clark Griswold]

42 minutes ago, nunya said:

He said himself, it's just about what you choose to optimize.

I think that was his best point.  Seems like common sense but mil / civ leadership believe it can all be done with flat budgets, just honestly admiring we will not do certain missions any longer could in theory allow us to focus resources but then that would be admitting things like we are not actually going to send 4,000+ tanks into the Fulda Gap

Edited December 6, 2017 by Clark Griswold

[Clark Griswold]

This article is 50% relevant  (maybe)…

https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-the-air-littoral-and-the-looming-irrelevance-of-the-u-s-air-force/

[jice]

14 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

This article is 50% relevant  (maybe)…

https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/drones-the-air-littoral-and-the-looming-irrelevance-of-the-u-s-air-force/

At that Army General: Tell me you think dozens of miles at a time in a poorly contested EMS without saying you think dozens of miles at a time in a poorly contested EMS.