Free thinking and the military

[OverTQ]

Although this link is to a story about AF issues with innovation (I will not attempt to comment on its validity or the author since there are many experts here on both), this is something we talk about across the services. Is being a “free thinker” a personality liability? We all have personal biases and want the way in which makes our living to be the most relevant, but are we going to lose our military edge because we cannot look for answers that may not support theses biases? What are your thoughts?

https://omnifeed.com/article/ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/12/03/a_pilot_speaks_the_usaf_is_harder_on_internal_ideas_than_it_is_on_evil_insurgents_ac_130#./a_pilot_speaks_the_usaf_is_harder_on_internal_ideas_than_it_is_on_evil_insurgents_ac_130?&_suid=141769743900509300164036300569

[Herk Driver]

Free thinking and being in the military are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Not being able to channel your thinking into appropriate venues for change and utilize the chain of command or not knowing when to stop stomping on yourself or your boss can be mutually exclusive from continued military service.

None of that is meant to reflect on the validity or non-validity of his CONOPS since I haven't seen it. And I did search for about .5 secs for it.

[Prosuper]

I came across this today, thinking like this from the boss's explains a lot why leadership hates the A-10

https://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/12/03/a_pilot_speaks_the_usaf_is_harder_on_internal_ideas_than_it_is_on_evil_insurgents_ac_130

[WeatherManC130]

I came across this today, thinking like this from the boss's explains a lot why leadership hates the A-10

https://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/12/03/a_pilot_speaks_the_usaf_is_harder_on_internal_ideas_than_it_is_on_evil_insurgents_ac_130

I flew several rides in the T-6 with this pilot.

[Chuck17]

Cached version of the link provided by Prosuper since it seems the original article is no longer there.

https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:TQPuMvhBKhgJ:ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/12/03/a_pilot_speaks_the_usaf_is_harder_on_internal_ideas_than_it_is_on_evil_insurgents_ac_130+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us

There's a shock.

You know the best thing about people with ideas? They have a lot of them. And they routinely fail to get them implemented. So they keep thinking. And they keep working. And they keep writing. And they keep trying to change the way things work, pushing down the wall one brick at a time instead of charging into it at full sprint.

What they don't do is take offense, jump the chain of command, whine about how everyone is telling them to stop trying to expand the DOC, then write articles about it ten years after the fact saying how "the man" just doesn't get it. Im positive there is more to the story on both sides, but the "everyone is wrong but me" approach tends to turn people off.

Persistence, willpower, determination... And ideas. Don't give up. And don't whine.

But maybe I'm wrong. I don't know the guy, never read his paper, Im not a gunship guy, and this is not my white whale.

The issue is his approach, not the guy or his ideas. Sounds familiar...

Chuck

Edit: spelling

Edited December 5, 2014 by Chuck17

[sky_king]

I flew several rides in the T-6 with this pilot.

You mean 11-2T-Seifert?

[dvlax40]

There's a shock.

You know the best thing about people with ideas? They have a lot of them. And they routinely fail to get them implemented. So they keep thinking. And they keep working. And they keep writing. And they keep trying to change the way things work, pushing down the wall one brick at a time instead of charging into it at full sprint.

What they don't do is take offense, jump the chain of command, whine about how everyone is telling them to stop trying to expand the DOC, then write articles about it ten years after the fact saying how "the man" just doesn't get it. Im positive there is more to the story on both sides, but the "everyone is wrong but me" approach tends to turn people off.

Persistence, willpower, determination... And ideas. Don't give up. And don't whine.

But maybe I'm wrong. I don't know the guy, never read his paper, Im not a gunship guy, and this is not my white whale.

The issue is his approach, not the guy or his ideas. Sounds familiar...

Chuck

Edit: spelling

with respect, is there ever a time to jump the chain of command?

[TnkrToad]

This is already being discussed in the What's Wrong with the Air Force thread.

[HeyEng]

I think we are all pining for our generations Billy Mitchell who is willing to stand up against the rot of what has become of the Air Force no matter what the costs.

Sent from my SAMSUNG-SGH-I337 using Tapatalk

[TnkrToad]

There's a shock.

You know the best thing about people with ideas? They have a lot of them. And they routinely fail to get them implemented. So they keep thinking. And they keep working. And they keep writing. And they keep trying to change the way things work, pushing down the wall one brick at a time instead of charging into it at full sprint.

What they don't do is take offense, jump the chain of command, whine about how everyone is telling them to stop trying to expand the DOC, then write articles about it ten years after the fact saying how "the man" just doesn't get it. Im positive there is more to the story on both sides, but the "everyone is wrong but me" approach tends to turn people off.

Persistence, willpower, determination... And ideas. Don't give up. And don't whine.

But maybe I'm wrong. I don't know the guy, never read his paper, Im not a gunship guy, and this is not my white whale.

The issue is his approach, not the guy or his ideas. Sounds familiar...

Chuck

Edit: spelling

While I get what you're saying, the author's basic point is that airpower gets misused when it's penny packeted out to ground units. In this case, it's a foul that the TSOC had control of the AC-130s in theater and, even though the gunships could/should have been released to support conventional units in many cases, the TSOC wouldn't let them go. We won this argument way back in Northwest Africa during WW II, ensuring airmen were in charge of running air support and getting away from air umbrellas. Apparently, AFSOC leadership never read their history (FM 100-20), nor did they ever clue in about current Air Force doctrine. If senior AFSOC leaders and the folks they deploy to theater JSOACs are so obtuse about (or incapable of arguing for) value-added airpower employment--or conversely the ARSOF/NAVSOF commanders are so thick skulled that they can't be convinced to do the right thing and release their assets to conventional units when they have the greater need, then we really are in trouble.

Seifert gets no points for style, going way outside of his chain of command, but his general point is valid. There is never enough airpower to go around--it should be used wisely. I hope that it is.

[FlyinGrunt]

I am a gunship guy, with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. I just read his paper. Here's my take:

1. SOCOM leadership has decided, and continues to decide, that capturing/killing high value enemies has a huge impact on the enemy's ability to kill Americans.

2. America's best SOF units execute that mission. As callous as it may sound, it is exponentially more difficult to replace an experienced SOF operator than your average 18-year-old soldier/marine. There are NEVER enough gunships to support everyone, as much as I wish there were.

3. As much as I LOVE killing bad guys, Seifert misses the entire point of what he was doing. An AC-130's presence usually DOES make sure the enemy doesn't attack, just like he suggests. That is likely precisely the desired effect the GFC wants! He's going in to c/k a HVI, not kill 50 teenage insurgents.

This article, for those familiar with SOF operations in the past wars, is a keen example of not understanding anything at the operational and strategic levels of war. There was a time when we measured "winning" simply by the number of enemy killed. That was Vietnam. How did that one turn out?

[10percenttruth]

I haven't read the paper, but if he wrote it anything like how he wrote that article, he's already lost me. That crap was all over the place & full of logical fallacies & obvious half-truths.

Edited December 5, 2014 by 10percenttruth

[TnkrToad]

I am a gunship guy, with multiple deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. I just read his paper. Here's my take:

1. SOCOM leadership has decided, and continues to decide, that capturing/killing high value enemies has a huge impact on the enemy's ability to kill Americans.

2. America's best SOF units execute that mission. As callous as it may sound, it is exponentially more difficult to replace an experienced SOF operator than your average 18-year-old soldier/marine. There are NEVER enough gunships to support everyone, as much as I wish there were.

3. As much as I LOVE killing bad guys, Seifert misses the entire point of what he was doing. An AC-130's presence usually DOES make sure the enemy doesn't attack, just like he suggests. That is likely precisely the desired effect the GFC wants! He's going in to c/k a HVI, not kill 50 teenage insurgents.

This article, for those familiar with SOF operations in the past wars, is a keen example of not understanding anything at the operational and strategic levels of war. There was a time when we measured "winning" simply by the number of enemy killed. That was Vietnam. How did that one turn out?

No argument with your points above, but to get back to the author's underlying point--if/when you get to the point in a mission when the ground SOF unit no longer needs you, are you sent straight home, or are you released to support conventional units if needed (assuming crew duty day/turn times allow)?

- If not, that's a foul--as the article indicates

- In my experience with TSOCs, JSOTFs and JSOACs--and I've got plenty--integration/mutual support between SOF and conventional units is a significant problem. Within the Air Force, there is plenty of blame to go around between conventional and AFSOC components. Even more so, however, I have seen too few AFSOC guys who were able/willing to advocate for the rational use of airpower--whether they be gunships, MC-130s, or other assets--to TSOC commanders. The end result is SOF air that could support conventional folks gets held back by TSOCs, and missions that conventional aircraft could do as well (and in some cases better) than AFSOC assets never get asked for. As a result you end up with Talons flying basic airland missions and (if the article is to be believed), guys in conventional units die because TSOCs are unwilling to provide excess capacity (when they have it) to support the joint force

The article's author isn't the only one who has trouble understanding the operational and strategic levels of war.

[brickhistory]

I think we are all pining for our generations Billy Mitchell who is willing to stand up against the rot of what has become of the Air Force no matter what the costs.

Today's "Billy Mitchell" can never exist.

He scored an 80% on a PT test in 2009 as a 250+ day deployed O-3 crewdog.

Or he didn't 2 below BTZ to O-5, thus will never see GO.

Or he spoke up against The Man who therefore didn't stratify him.

Being a maverick today at any level of authority at most means being "a character" who can tell a good story, not someone who truly bucks the system.

The system is a vindictive b1tch who does not like past boyfriends talking smack.

[Majestik Møøse]

Billy Mitchell was court martialed for criticizing superiors.

[Hacker]

An interesting topic, but unfortunately that "article" linked is basically a big whine about how big AF didn't buy into his idea even after it was presented multiple times to multiple different levels and authorities. If there's a point in there, it is completely obscured by his "woe is me" story. Guess what, dude: lots of us have "woe is me" stories about our careers, we just sport bitch about it to our bros at the bar, not publish articles about it trying to point the finger at The Man.

All ideas don't have equal merit, nor do all ideas deserve equal further consideration. Even more importantly, while sometimes the "view from the Captain level" offers important insight that senior leaders may not be seeing or have not considered, often it also shows that the Captain-level is completely ignorant of higher, strategic-level aspects that outweigh the Captain's great idea.

Culturally, the AF tolerates free-thinking. -- but don't you dare act on any of it, lest you risk any semblance of having a "good career". If you are willing to take that risk, then fire away. More officers should be willing to take that risk for a greater good of American airpower, unfortunately when given the choice between putting it all out there and advancing the larger cause and protecting the security of a "good career", most of us choose the latter.

[Spoo]

He seems to claim he washed out of WIC for communicating with the AFSOC/CC about this paper? I smell some bullshit.

Can anyone vouch for this guy?

I hear one or two of his WIC instructors violently disagree with that assertion...

Edited December 5, 2014 by Spoo

[Whitman]

An interesting topic, but unfortunately that "article" linked is basically a big whine about how big AF didn't buy into his idea even after it was presented multiple times to multiple different levels and authorities. If there's a point in there, it is completely obscured by his "woe is me" story. Guess what, dude: lots of us have "woe is me" stories about our careers, we just sport bitch about it to our bros at the bar, not publish articles about it trying to point the finger at The Man.

Hacker, just a counter argument but maybe the author wrote the article so others in similar situations could learn from his story? Often times doing the right thing and sticking to your conviction carries a huge price, especially in this AF. Wouldn't writing this with that in mind empower those who have been shut down for similar reasons? I'm not a CAS dude and don't have a dog in the fight but the AF needs to find a way to encourage more disruptive thinking. Edited December 5, 2014 by Whitman

[Warrior]

Today's "Billy Mitchell" can never exist.

Or he spoke up against The Man who therefore didn't stratify him.

Being a maverick today at any level of authority at most means being "a character" who can tell a good story, not someone who truly bucks the system.

I don't totally disagree with your points. But we over sell this one about not being able to speak up.

It's all about context. If you're the CGO making comments in a CC call or not supporting the CC once a decision has been made then you're wrong. I've been fortunate to have CCs who were at least willing to hear me out when I had a gripe or thought they were screwing up. But those are closed door sessions that aren't in front of the squadron.

No one is going to be 100 percent right all the time. Sometimes you may still disagree with what the boss says, but once you've said your piece it's time to get in line. Billy Mitchell didn't fall in his sword because he didn't like the color of the napkins at the Christmas party.

[Majestik Møøse]

I think there is a problem, in some corners of the Air Force, that everyone has become so busy supporting the bureaucracy that the proper time can't be given to brainstorming sessions and idea development. Guys are treading water in the office while min-running mission knowledge. The only active idea soliciting going on is the "anybody got anything for me" part of the weekly CC call. Guys may have good ideas or bad ones, but they'll never be asked in the first place. Fixing tactical problems is priority #22 in a lot of places.

Leading an open, honest, and non-retributional "bitches/gripes/complaints" session once every couple of weeks might help open things up a bit.

[brickhistory]

I don't totally disagree with your points. But we over sell this one about not being able to speak up.

It's all about context. If you're the CGO making comments in a CC call or not supporting the CC once a decision has been made then you're wrong. I've been fortunate to have CCs who were at least willing to hear me out when I had a gripe or thought they were screwing up. But those are closed door sessions that aren't in front of the squadron.

No one is going to be 100 percent right all the time. Sometimes you may still disagree with what the boss says, but once you've said your piece it's time to get in line. Billy Mitchell didn't fall in his sword because he didn't like the color of the napkins at the Christmas party.

No argument from me about when it's time to step, the discussion ends.

However, as a general thought about the Air Force, indeed, the US military, senior leadership is much more comfortable with it being the provider of "insight" and new ideas than having the masses (or one from it) do so.

I make no points for or against the article referenced above.

But about a "new" Billy Mitchell, my sarcastic note was about how that mythical being out there today would never make it to any position to where he could make a difference and a real change.

As a start, society, including the military, was much different then. Officers were much more a kind of knightly class; the proverbial "profession of arms" we're always told to emulate.

Besides having been the face of airpower during WWI, where he built up all kinds of political capital, including lots of friends in high, non-military, places, Mitchell was, if I recall correctly, independently wealthy.

Today's "Billy" is much more blue collar (sts) in that his ability to pay the bills and feed the family depends on the paycheck from Uncle Sam, thus the risk to all of that is immediately greater than one who has a "fcuk it" option as did Mitchell and his willingness to speak his mind knowing it would lead to a court-martial.

So, today's "Billy" needs to be independent of The Man, needs higher top cover than is realistically plausible, and likely, as Hacker noted above, more likely to just say to hell with it after The Man has told him to KIO. Would that Billy really put up with it or stay in the private sector where he can make a bazillion dollars while not living in an 12-man tent for 8-10 months per year?

This topic is of professional interest to me due to that is supposed to be my job at the sleepy combatant command at which I presently work.

I'm charged with leading "disruptive" thinking and the CCDR says the buzz words, but the follow-up isn't there. Consequently, trying to institute the ability to challenge a plan during the planning phase in order to find weak spots before execution* is about as popular as...well, I can't use the analogy of days past. Guess that's changed since Mitchell's time as well.

I am not encouraging folks not to tilt at windmills. Sometimes, it's gotta be done.

Just don't be surprised when you see dudes saddling up get passed over. The casualty rate is high. Pk > .5 in my experience. YMMV.

The Man doesn't like his wings rocked.

*Think Army's Red Teaming. That is our approach with some local twists.

Edited December 6, 2014 by brickhistory

[pawnman]

Today's "Billy Mitchell" can never exist.

He scored an 80% on a PT test in 2009 as a 250+ day deployed O-3 crewdog.

Or he didn't 2 below BTZ to O-5, thus will never see GO.

Or he spoke up against The Man who therefore didn't stratify him.

Being a maverick today at any level of authority at most means being "a character" who can tell a good story, not someone who truly bucks the system.

The system is a vindictive b1tch who does not like past boyfriends talking smack.

People also seem to forget that Billy Mitchell's reward was a court martial. One in which he was found guilty and suspended for five years without pay, which the convening authority declared was "lenient".

You can't have a Billy Mitchell until you have someone willing to put their career and well-being on the line for what they believe.

[ClearedHot]

So this "Bob" articulately writes an article where he gets to frame the story about the injustices done to him over his own theory and opinions? He seems to claim he washed out of WIC for communicating with the AFSOC/CC about this paper? I smell some bullshit.

Can anyone vouch for this guy?

He was absolutely NOT washed out of WIC for writing this paper or contacting the AFSOC/CC.

To preserve what little dignity this chucklehead has, I will leave it at that.

[Hacker]

Hacker, just a counter argument but maybe the author wrote the article so others in similar situations could learn from his story? Often times doing the right thing and sticking to your conviction carries a huge price, especially in this AF. Wouldn't writing this with that in mind empower those who have been shut down for similar reasons?

A fair-ish point, but how would sharing him having his good-idea-fairy shut down empower other folks who've had similar experiences? Other people who've had it happen are probably well aware of the consequences and are all ready just as cynical about Big Blue as he is.

If there were an altruistic motive here, it could simply be as a warning to others to not do what he did the way he did it...but it is pretty evident that's not the case, given the title of his piece and the punchline in the article.

[sky_king]

I have no insight to his WIC situation, but I knew him from elsewhere.

If his social skills are any indication... He and PYB would probably be friends. The WIC instructors were probably just tired of hearing him talk.