C-130 down in Afghanistan

[Insubordinate & Churlish]

... Holding the yoke back was/is a common J community technique for their ERO,...

I was an enlisted cargo loader and am now an H pilot. I haven't heard of this technique, and neither had some H model LMs I spoke with. Is tail clearance an issue that often in the J? Is the geometry back their that much different from an H?

[pawnman]

II was very surprised to learn they don't do flight control checks before every takeoff.

[sqwatch]

I don't

[Herk Driver]

I was an enlisted cargo loader and am now an H pilot. I haven't heard of this technique, and neither had some H model LMs I spoke with. Is tail clearance an issue that often in the J? Is the geometry back their that much different from an H?

There is not much different about the back of the J than an H. In the past several incidents occurred with a 25K loader and forklift that resulted in tail damage. Some people started doing this in order to prevent such damage. Current policy is that if a forklift is used to place additional pallets onto a 25K that the 25K must be bridged with a second 25K loader or the loader must be backed outside the 25 foot safety circle. Unfortunately there is no real need to hold the elevator out of the way.

[AFsock]

My $.02: Since the control column rests on the stops and the NVG case didn't move it that far from back (from a 0 GS perspective) I doubt a control check would have helped.  The crew would have pulled the yoke back from what felt like normal, pulled it back to the stop, moved it left/right and then placed it back on what they thought was the stop.  But the check will probably be added to the checklist and summarily called "previously checked" or halfassed a generation or so from now when everyone forgets this AIB/SIB.

As disgruntled pointed out the real problem was the crew intentionally blocking the controls.  I'll agree with Herk Driver as well, there is no real need to hold the elevator out of the way.  The lowest point of an elevator on its stops is still well below the beavertail/door of a herc.

 

Edited April 18, 2016 by AFsock

[MD]

On Sunday, April 17, 2016 at 9:29 AM, Toasty said:

This is the answer...I have never, ever heard of someone blocking a flight control in my ten years of flying the Herk.  This was the outlier.

It was also a young crew, and I absolutely understand a 2-man cockpit making mistakes in the desert at night.  This one just bit harder.

Herks do a LOT of stops each mission, often times only 20-30min apart with 5-10min on the ground.  Very easy to overlook things, and I'm always grateful we have an FE in the H to keep us honest.

This apparently wasn't a new practice. I remember when a civil LOGAIR C-130 (L-382) crashed on a night takeoff from SKF in October 1986. Crashed onto the parking ramp and into two of the flightline hangars, killing all 3 crew aboard. Nearly exact scenario 29 years ago as this one here, only a different method of securing the yoke back for loading/unloading.

Goes to show, we don't really find new ways to have accidents.

Detatiled here in fact:

https://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR87-04.pdf

Edited April 18, 2016 by MD

[HuggyU2]

Great find, MD. 

I never knew the cause of this until your post. That Herc hit right in front of the Base Ops hangar, and it could have killed a lot more people had it been another 75 meters to the left. 

Edited April 19, 2016 by Huggyu2

[MD]

27 minutes ago, Huggyu2 said:

Great find, MD.

I never knew the cause of this until your post. That Herc hit right in front of the Base Ops hangar, and it could have killed a lot more people had it been another 75 meters to the left.

Most definitely. I'd been living in San Antonio at the time of that accident and remember it being big news, and a little later when I got into aviation, studied the NTSB report. Hadn't put any thought into it until the findings of this accident came out, and immediately reminded me of the details of the Southern Air Transport accident. Eerie the similarities, yet weird that this accident.....albeit being a civil Herk accident......wouldn't have been one that would've made it into some kind of "Road to Wings"-type of compilation of Herk accidents that may have been covered at Herk RTU or something.

Sadly, SAT lost another Herk 2 years later during a landing accident at SUU, killing all 5 onboard the training flight.

Edited April 19, 2016 by MD

[fox two]

I still remember, many years ago, my UPT dollar ride instructor telling me on the ramp, "The flight control check is the single most important preflight item, many pilots have died from forgetting to remove a control lock or something".

Sucks that it wasn't part of the checklist in their situation.  Anything could damage flight controls during a cargo offload- birdstrike, bullet hole, dinging the plane on landing, IDF shrapnel, etc (all these have happened to hercs in that theater).

 

[JS]

On 4/18/2016 at 0:10 PM, AFsock said:

My $.02: Since the control column rests on the stops and the NVG case didn't move it that far from back (from a 0 GS perspective) I doubt a control check would have helped.  The crew would have pulled the yoke back from what felt like normal, pulled it back to the stop, moved it left/right and then placed it back on what they thought was the stop.  

 

I believe had they pulled the yoke back at all that the NVG case would have fallen down, thus clearing the obstruction.  I see what you are saying - that they hardly would have noticed that the yoke was 2 inches aft already and they would not have noticed it - but I think it was just wedged against the MFD by the back of the yoke and would have fallen down had they initially pulled back on the yoke during the stall (like the Colgen guys did) and then let the pusher help them recover.  

[MD]

On Sunday, April 17, 2016 at 8:55 AM, disgruntledemployee said:

 

This was one of the hardest briefs I've ever listened to.  I really learned something, even beyond the flight control issue.  I hope everyone here does too.

Out

It's too bad that the lessons of the SAT L-382 at SKF 29 years ago weren't kept alive in the safety community enough to be something briefed early on to C-130 crews of "what not to do" in their future. Sadly, this C-130 was lost for nearly the exact same reason.

[AFsock]

On 4/20/2016 at 7:24 AM, JS said:

I believe had they pulled the yoke back at all that the NVG case would have fallen down, thus clearing the obstruction.  I see what you are saying - that they hardly would have noticed that the yoke was 2 inches aft already and they would not have noticed it - but I think it was just wedged against the MFD by the back of the yoke and would have fallen down had they initially pulled back on the yoke during the stall (like the Colgen guys did) and then let the pusher help them recover.  

Maybe at that nose up attitude?  I keep monsters and other things leaned up against the instrument panel on those pusher bars and they stay nice and stable through regular flight.

   
Not scientific or AIB/SIB, but some guys here tried it out in the sim (using FLIP and pubs cases, which are softer) and despite knowing what was going to happen weren't successful in beating the stick pusher, clearing the obstruction, and recovering the aircraft.  A quick pull back on the yoke to check/clear the controls may have worked but I have a feeling it was unrecoverable after the early liftoff.

Edited April 21, 2016 by AFsock

[lloyd christmas]

I am a Herc load.  There are some situations that exist where it would be appropriate for the loadmasters to ask the front enders to raise the elevators during loading.  It is not common though.  Been doing the load thing for 13 years or so with multiple deployments along the way.  I have only had to ask the pilots to raise the elevators once.  In my case, it was the loading equipment in Uganda that they were using and not the height of the cargo that was the problem.  

For the non Herc folks on this thread, it is in the AOR regs that you can't have a 25K K-loader behind the aircraft and use a forklift to load additional pallets on the aircraft. You have to bridge two 25K K-loaders together and load that way.  Here is what that means.  A 25K K-loader is capable of moving 25,000lbs of cargo.  It can only hold 3 pallets at a time.  An H model Herc can hold 6 pallets and a stretched J can hold 8.  The 25K is short.  When it is behind the aircraft, it doesn't go out past the tail.   Some loadmasters were using a stationary 25K K-loader behind the aircraft and then loading the rest of the pallets using a forklift to load pallets onto the K-loader and then just pushing the pallets across the K-loader and onto the aircraft.  The problem was, while operating the forklift to load pallets onto the K-loader, the cargo on the forklift had the very real potential for hitting the tail of the aircraft because the 25K doesn't extend out past the tail.  So again, the local regs prohibited this.  These guys were abiding by the regs.  They had two 25Ks bridged together.  So, sadly, there was no reason to have the pilots hold the yoke back.  I don't want to speculate, but my guess is that somebody tapped an elevator with a pallet and the unit fried the loadmasters publicly.   That would cause them to be over cautious.   

Edited April 22, 2016 by lloyd christmas

[Crown]

Completely agree about the problems with a controllability check, several individuals have recommended a Warning to prevent aircrews from intentionally blocking or binding the flight controls.  Should be added to the -1 shortly.