Close Air Support

[Clark Griswold]

Another article from War on the Rocks contributor Mike Pietrucha on CAS in a high threat environment.

BLUF:  We aren't / can't really do it (sts)

https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/the-myth-of-high-threat-close-air-support/

Right, wrong, not relevant?  Discuss..

[M2]

"In a presumed environment where the air defenses are too lethal for the A-10 to survive..."

Dunno, they seem to have held up pretty well in the past!

10 Reasons Why A-10s Should Stay And F-35s Simply Can’t Match

[nsplayr]

I would argue that some AF units dedicated to SOF support already excel at what the author is calling for with BAI.

Despite his robust background in the subject (-15E WSO patch, DARPA fellow, etc.), he may have never really seen that side of the coin before.  Not that air guys supporting SOF didn't get dynamically re-tasked often, but I personally didn't feel like "detailed integration" was missing all that often between myself and the ground forces.  Other air players were a different ballgame - fighters would routinely blast into the stack right off the tanker and be tasked to gets effects on the ground very quickly, which I'm sure is not an easy task.

BL: Being centrally controlled and bounced between numerous conventional units on a ad-hoc basis produces a far different experience than being directly chopped to a TF and working for the same people day-in and day-out, rotation after rotation.  This BAI-like experience already exists in DoD and the author can get hooked up with some of the guys who are writing the book on it.

Edit to add: my response above was apparently to this article: https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-afghanistan-distorted-close-air-support-and-why-it-matters/

Somehow got my wires crossed...

Others nailed it re: the OP article. CAS in a high treat environment, to me, is a zombie requirement that needs to die a real death. If we're doing CAS or have ground forces in those environments for that matter, we've ticked up massively already. 

Edited July 2, 2016 by nsplayr

[ViperMan]

IMHO, if we are executing CAS in a high-threat environment, we are misapplying airpower.

[Clark Griswold]

Not a bad article and I can't find a fault with his argument that some missions are effectively impossible but reading it I believe he was imagining a high threat environment where CAS is being performed but without support from ISR, EA, SEAD/DEAD, Decoys, Cyber & Space, etc...  If there was a scenario where a ground element requires CAS and where CAS assets could receive SAFIREs from high end threats, they would likely have Growler, CJ, Compass, Rivet, etc... support.  

A CAS asset is not going in alone in that environment as it is going to be a brawl with everyone shooting trons to shut down sensors & links and likely UAVs to serve as lookouts for pop up threats and to hopefully soak up said surprise SAMbush while the manned asset either attacks or escapes the threat

A-X performs the CAS, Growlers jam in the immediate vicinity, Rivet supports from standoff, MQ-9Cs operate where threats are suspected to be and sounds the alarm if detected / take one for the team if the threat starts to emit-target

I could see this coming up (CAS in a contested to possibly contested environment) in Syria if we had to recover downed aircrew or support SOF in Russian backed government controlled areas of Syria, possible but not likely.

Edited July 1, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor

[papajuice77]

I realize he's been out of the game for a while, but the author should look into ops in Northern Syria over the past 2 years. That might quell his misgivings about a lack of aircrew having in-depth understanding of the battlefield situation. Reference Kobane, Hasakah, Tal Abyad, etc. Entire squadrons were dedicated to those fights and had a very detailed collective familiarity with the ground order of battle and the operations therein.

 

[di1630]

I don't expect our leaders to understand CAS. CAS is a support mission to shape the ground picture...given we have no F-cking idea what our end state ground situation is due to inept politicians and PME educated cold war loves anything fast loud and air-to-air still watches top gun religiously mentality leadership. Current CAS education is about what I expect.

You think we don't understand CAS.....you should see our allies.

[sqwatch]

I realize he's been out of the game for a while, but the author should look into ops in Northern Syria over the past 2 years. That might quell his misgivings about a lack of aircrew having in-depth understanding of the battlefield situation. Reference Kobane, Hasakah, Tal Abyad, etc. Entire squadrons were dedicated to those fights and had a very detailed collective familiarity with the ground order of battle and the operations therein.

 

By the time I left, I was more familiar with northern Syria than my home station geographical references. Before the Jtac could give me cords to a new ao in ramadi, faluja, Hasaka, tel abayd, sinjar, margarita ville, etc, I already had a vector. So did the rest of my bros.

[papajuice77]

On 7/1/2016 at 3:19 AM, sqwatch said:

 

 

By the time I left, I was more familiar with northern Syria than my home station geographical references. Before the Jtac could give me cords to a new ao in ramadi, faluja, Hasaka, tel abayd, sinjar, margarita ville, etc, I already had a vector. So did the rest of my bros.

Checks.

That's the kind of detailed knowledge that the GFC wants from air players. I always strove for that knowledge as well. In every instance, a crew with high SA drastically reduced the time necessary to complete the kill chain. The fact is that OEF/OFS has been ad hoc as the result of the emphasis on stability operations for the last 10 years. If on-going offensives were the norm in A-stan now, the author might be more familiar with the kind of dedicated integration and knowledge base CAF squadrons actually develop and implement.

 

Edited July 2, 2016 by papajuice77
spelling

[Smokin]

On 7/1/2016 at 0:23 AM, papajuice77 said:

I realize he's been out of the game for a while, but the author should look into ops in Northern Syria over the past 2 years.

I understand you may be talking about another aspect of the article, but Northern Syria is not high threat CAS.  Yes, it is higher threat than Iraq or Afghanistan after the initial invasion, but I don't think our (all allied air) losses over Syria are considerably different than our peacetime training losses.

I also completely agree that true 'high-threat' CAS is an absurd concept.  Ground forces have grown over-reliant on CAS on call anytime they get in a real firefight.  In a high-threat war, anyone on or near the front is going to be a TIC.  Even if you ignore the threat, physical airspace alone is practically prohibitive to CAS.  A standard CAS overhead wheel would encompass an entire division's airspace for 5027.  The best machine ever made to kill enemy tanks is not the A-10; it's the Abrams.  With few exceptions, airpower in a high-threat war is better used further downrange and will save more lives in the long run.

[papajuice77]

8 hours ago, Smokin said:

I understand you may be talking about another aspect of the article, but Northern Syria is not high threat CAS.  Yes, it is higher threat than Iraq or Afghanistan after the initial invasion, but I don't think our (all allied air) losses over Syria are considerably different than our peacetime training losses.

I also completely agree that true 'high-threat' CAS is an absurd concept. 

You're right... I have been cherry picking, and it was probably unnecessary.

Getting back to the real meat of the article, I also agree that "high-threat" CAS is a figment of the imagination. The underlying argument he makes about its irrelevance is solid. It begs the question - are senior leaders who want to ditch CAS assets to pay for systems and capabilities that support core airpower competencies really wrong? I don't want to start another running feud in this thread, but I think Mr. Pietrucha's argument would definitely support that action given our fiscally-constrained environment.

[Stitch64]

15 hours ago, Smokin said:

The best machine ever made to kill enemy tanks is not the A-10; it's the Abrams.  With few exceptions, airpower in a high-threat war is better used further downrange and will save more lives in the long run.

Respectfully, I would submit the AH-64 as the best machine ever made to kill tanks, but I am slightly biased.

7 hours ago, papajuice77 said:

You're right... I have been cherry picking, and it was probably unnecessary.

Getting back to the real meat of the article, I also agree that "high-threat" CAS is a figment of the imagination. The underlying argument he makes about its irrelevance is solid. It begs the question - are senior leaders who want to ditch CAS assets to pay for systems and capabilities that support core airpower competencies really wrong? I don't want to start another running feud in this thread, but I think Mr. Pietrucha's argument would definitely support that action given our fiscally-constrained environment.

Just to play devil's advocate from the below coord perspective: if there are SF - type ground forces (limited organic firepower) setting conditions for a full scale near-peer conflict, I think we as a military need to be prepared to support them with some kind of fires.  The same can be said for defending ground Brigades (4th ID and 3rd ID have Mission Command in the Baltics, but those forces are largely NATO troops - the author missed the mark on this point and could stand to research a little deeper).  If the Air Force gets rid of the CAS platforms, Army Aviation can pick up some of the slack, but we do not have the legs to support as deep as I would expect our advance forces to be (note - we can still get farther artillery).  The author also bases his position on what appear to be current tactics.  You couldn't do what we do now in Afghanistan (I haven't worked in the Middle East, so I can't speak to that) because of the sophisticated air defense systems in a near peer fight, but that does not mean it can't be done.  CAS platforms would have to spend very little time in the target area, have more detailed integration into the ground scheme of maneuver, and probably some EW support.  I know on the AH side we can land in a holding area and wait for the situation to develop, but I'm not sure what that means for FW CAS.  Anyway, my 2 cents, we like CAS. It's a very effective means of tipping the balance of a fight when the ground force does not have the advantage of numbers.

[Clark Griswold]

Further thought on this idea, feasibility of CAS in a High Threat Environment, and while I am not aware of any specific work analyzing this I have considered a historical precedent, the Yom Kippur War, where Israel had command of the air (not exactly Air Superiority) andt a significant and effective threat from the ground in AAA, SA-2 & 3's that extended a threat envelope well over the FEBA, resulting in the loss of over 100 aircraft.  

Has anyone in the CAS community studied this or has it been discussed (assuming it can be discussed openly here) Israeli CAS tactics where only a "fast pass" in support of TICs might be possible due to a not yet suppressed threat?  

I imagine this could be a possibility in an AOR where an advancing enemy ground force is operating a long range threat (S-300 or above) from a no-go political boundary and if their offensive is not blunted quickly the facts on the ground will be such that the conflict is over.  Baltics, Eastern Ukraine, Iraq or Afghanistan bordering Iran, etc...

Could CAS still be effective and be morphed into a "fast pass" with a quick re-attack but the asset escapes after delivering a PGM but before it is engaged?  

As always OPSEC trumps everything, probably not much discussion can be had here but an idea.

Edited July 4, 2016 by Clark Griswold
minor

[magnetfreezer]

15 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

Further thought on this idea, feasibility of CAS in a High Threat Environment, and while I am not aware of any specific work analyzing this I have considered a historical precedent, the Yom Kippur War, where Israel had command of the air (not exactly Air Superiority) andt a significant and effective threat from the ground in AAA, SA-2 & 3's that extended a threat envelope well over the FEBA, resulting in the loss of over 100 aircraft.  

Has anyone in the CAS community studied this or has it been discussed (assuming it can be discussed openly here) Israeli CAS tactics where only a "fast pass" in support of TICs might be possible due to a not yet suppressed threat?  

I imagine this could be a possibility in an AOR where an advancing enemy ground force is operating a long range threat (S-300 or above) from a no-go political boundary and if their offensive is not blunted quickly the facts on the ground will be such that the conflict is over.  Baltics, Eastern Ukraine, Iraq or Afghanistan bordering Iran, etc...

Could CAS still be effective and be morphed into a "fast pass" with a quick re-attack but the asset escapes after delivering a PGM but before it is engaged?  

As always OPSEC trumps everything, probably not much discussion can be had here but an idea.

Yes, CAS with threats has been discussed/practiced. Depends if the CAS is attacking known targets, 45 minute NTISR orbits or CDE scans for 30 minutes waiting for strike approval won't even be feasible in a medium threat environment. Hard to support the ground commander's objectives when he doesn't even know them.

[brabus]

"fast pass" gets you shot down.  When there's a SA-6+ threat, that becomes the priority.  The dudes on the ground will have to live with organic fires until SAM threat suppressed/destroyed (assuming it can't be avoided).  We have defined "high threat" CAS for years as SA-6/8/AAA (maybe 15).  That's hard enough; the idea we'll do effective CAS (within a reasonable ALR) in anything beyond that is borderline ludicrous at the current state.  These threats have to be neutralized before we can honestly say CAS is an option.  Stealth is not the savior in this problem either.

Edited July 4, 2016 by brabus

[Lawman]

"fast pass" gets you shot down.  When there's a SA-6+ threat, that becomes the priority.  The dudes on the ground will have to live with organic fires until SAM threat suppressed/destroyed (assuming it can't be avoided).  We have defined "high threat" CAS for years as SA-6/8/AAA (maybe 15).  That's hard enough; the idea we'll do effective CAS (within a reasonable ALR) in anything beyond that is borderline ludicrous at the current state.  These threats have to be neutralized before we can honestly say CAS is an option.  Stealth is not the savior in this problem either.

This.

Ground commanders who grew up mostly or entirely in a COIN fight are having to relearn this at NTC/JRTC right now. It is critically apparent with smaller lighter ground units like light infantry and Stryker infantry that they fully expect to just hold air power in their hand like the trump card for when they encounter hostile Armor or are counter attacked. Problem is they have no understanding of threats to our operations and are myopic in prioritizing fires or EW to enable those combat air assets.

The other issue people are missing out on is the airspace coordination piece. If you have to get up close and personal with targets ala Hawg with the 30, you are putting yourself into the same area as all the gun target lines and support fire positions a ground force in a near peer/peer fight is going to not only have but need to be using especially if your threat defeat tactic is to get low. Not a lot of that to worry about in Syria/Iraq/Astan with the hybrid SF/Ranger driven fights we are waging. If they have indirect it's pretty limited. A Brigade or Battalion movement to contact is going to have multiple PAAs and transitioning them to perform CAS may actually have a negative effect on the total battle area because we shut down fires or suppression or smoke. It also requires a higher level of knowledge from the ground commanders to make sure they don't F themselves and more importantly you/me in only leaving us options of in/egress that are poor to terrible because they used up all the other airspace for their stuff.

No we are not ready to fight a high threat CAS fight, because we aren't ready to fight a high threat Joint fight, because conversely we aren't ready to fight a high threat ground fight. It's that integration on the battlefield and institutional knowledge that's really going to screw us now, not the fact we have point nose fast air planes or ones that carry a bigger stick but go slower.

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[schokie]

That's a more detailed version of the argument that Pako makes in the article Nsplayer linked to above. 

Hopefully we have time to relearn all our lessons from Fulda Gap scenario training before they're actually required. 

[Sprkt69]

9 hours ago, Lawman said:

No we are not ready to fight a high threat CAS fight, because we aren't ready to fight a high threat Joint fight, because conversely we aren't ready to fight a high threat ground fight. It's that integration on the battlefield and institutional knowledge that's really going to screw us now, not the fact we have point nose fast air planes or ones that carry a bigger stick but go slower.

This times 100

[Lawman]

That's a more detailed version of the argument that Pako makes in the article Nsplayer linked to above.

Hopefully we have time to relearn all our lessons from Fulda Gap scenario training before they're actually required.

I literally spent all of May in a craptastic place in the Mojave watching a ground brigade completely f@ck away its entire aviation task force on a daily basis.... And the koolaid drinking people that keep pretending we are anything but a U on all those METL tasks need to be taken out and beaten with a sack full of 1950s toasters.

[Sprkt69]

37 minutes ago, Lawman said:

I literally spent all of May in a craptastic place in the Mojave watching a ground brigade completely f@ck away its entire aviation task force on a daily basis.... And the koolaid drinking people that keep pretending we are anything but a U on all those METL tasks need to be taken out and beaten with a sack full of 1950s toasters.

So hanging out in the Dustbowl?

[di1630]

Hi threat CAS could be used in the unlikely scenario ground forces are outmatched/outnumbered being overrun. The A-10 was going to get slaughtered in the Fulda Gap but the hope was it could help kill a few tanks to balance the huge outnumbered armor matchup. That was just accepted we'd lose most hogs in the opening days of WW3.

CAS assumptions / conditions have evolved dramatically since the advent of the Hog. New weapons, threats, tactics....unfortunately I don't think our esteemed leaders have kept up.

It's why we still have a cold war ATO cycle, consider a $140M aircraft for low end missions and call anything airborne talking to the ground close air support.

[Clark Griswold]

Back to basics might be the new black with a resurgent Russia, China on the build up, etc...

Army

https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/20/heres-a-reason-for-army-to-get-back-to-basics-it-isnt-good-at-remembering-them/

Air Force

https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/2612/Article/715384/ellsworth-launches-for-large-force-exercise-in-prtc.aspx

Getting back to Large Force Exercises with an enemy that has more than VBIEDs and AKs is long overdue. 

On the idea of CAS within a threat envelope, I always wondered if the Concept Bird of Prey aircraft could have been developed into a light LO CAS / RECCE platform at relatively low cost.  No big gun but if you could have an LO platform to deliver X SDBs or JDAMs against the SA-22s & 6s, that moves the needle significantly.

With all the development successes and programs coming in on time and on budget, I am sure this could happen...

CAS can be done in a High Threat Environment, ref Battle of Hoth...

 

Edited July 6, 2016 by Clark Griswold

[Stitch]

 

4 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

CAS can be done in a High Threat Environment, ref Battle of Hoth...

 

Yea, that worked out great...

[Clark Griswold]

1 hour ago, Stitch said:

Yea, that worked out great...

Tragic losses yes, but epic effects...

[Lawman]

Tragic losses yes, but epic effects...

All forces evacuated... Ground commanders intent met. Their cot is up.

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