"Fighter Enterprise Redesign" ???

[ViperMan]

Over the past couple of days, A3 has hosted a webinar called the "Fighter Enterprise Redesign." I've been unable to attend. Can anyone provide a summary of what information was passed out?

Thanks,

V-man

[sqwatch]

After nine different attempts, I was unable to log in due to the computers on my end. I'm also curious as to what was said


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[HossHarris]

There are PDF slides and talking points being circulated about. 

Some good ideas. Some stupid ideas. All too little too late. 

[Blue]

Nothing of substance to add.  Except:

When it comes to the military, I hate it when words like "enterprise," "portfolio," and the like are used.  

It's the fvcking military, not a consulting group.

[sqwatch]

All I can think about when I hear "eneterprise" is Capt jean Luke piccard


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[Longhorn15]

It was pretty good info.  The dip in production from 08-14 has rightfully got HAF scared.  If they have 30% retention, which I think is very possible, most of those year groups will have 25-40 11Fs, just enough to fill OG and FW/CV.  They expect experience ratios to slip and it to get worse before it gets better.  Expect to see the quality of the students coming to a squadron near your drop as they cram more through the B-Course.  

To try and keep guys around they are revamping the assignment system.  The goal is more choice and the ability to stay at one place longer.  That seems incompatible with cram more through the pipeline, so we'll see.  You can get most of the info from the slides and exec summary that are going around.  They said goal is summer 17 VML.

They trying to reduce strain on 11Fs, but not hard enough.  Still 21 365s out there, but no 365s for 11Fs unless it requires an 11F.  If they really gave this its due attention, that number would be zero, not 21.

They're also looking at how to incentivize hard to fill spots.  Whether that is guaranteed IDE or assignment choices, TBD.

They're still pursuing pay increases.  The numbers mentioned were 50-60K bonus and $1,500 flight pay

They still have their head in their ass about the airlines.  Overview slide listed airline hiring as the top item.  Slide from aircrew survey had airlines dead last.  Top 3 from aircrew were Assignments, home station ops temps and promotion.

Side note, I also found out that 11Fs are not officially listed as critically manned.  WTF?

[di1630]

The promising thing is that problems are being seriously looked at. Remember we are not far from the Welsh era of "go ahead and quit, we'll train more". It's gonna take a while to find the right fixes.

I think Fingers gets it. The bleeding will continue short term but if leadership can establish some trust and inspire some hope, some of the jumpers may back away from the ledge.

Up pay, cut BS duties, treat me like a valuable trained asset, not a replaceable 18 yr old with BMT training.

It's not too complicated.


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[TnkrToad]

On 1/20/2017 at 1:30 AM, Longhorn15 said:

They trying to reduce strain on 11Fs, but not hard enough.  Still 21 365s out there, but no 365s for 11Fs unless it requires an 11F.  If they really gave this its due attention, that number would be zero, not 21.

They're also looking at how to incentivize hard to fill spots.  Whether that is guaranteed IDE or assignment choices, TBD.

They still have their head in their ass about the airlines.  Overview slide listed airline hiring as the top item.  Slide from aircrew survey had airlines dead last.  Top 3 from aircrew were Assignments, home station ops temps and promotion.

I've not seen the brief you've seen, but a few things just don't make sense to me:

- There should be no 11F required 365s? I agree that requirements need to be scrutinized, but c'mon, man--if 11F experience were that valueless downrange, Big Blue wouldn't be quite so concerned about 11F retention. The point is to have competent folks in force application/other 11F-relevant billets. Who else would you suggest fill those CAF-type downrange billets? 11Ms? Intel officers? Space officers? It ain't like the 11B community is awash with extra bodies.

- Re: IDE, I'd say this should be the other way around--follow the Petraeus model. If one wants to go to IDE, or especially SAASS, he/she should have a meaningful overseas deployment under his/her belt. Too often the bright and shinies find ways to avoid ever doing much of anything operationally relevant as they work their way up the ranks

- Airline hiring is a major factor. I'd say you need to think a bit bigger-picture:

-- There is a very clear historical negative correlation between a-word hiring and AF pilot retention. This is true in all AF pilot communities

-- Going back to the discussion above, even if a-word doesn't necessarily make a direct difference in 11Fs' decisions to take the bonus, the indirect impact is huge. Let's say Big Blue works to limit the number of 11F-required billets downrange, and adds other sweeteners (beyond pay) to encourage 11Fs to stay on AD. Guess what--the billet will likely still be filled. Problem is, it ends up being filled by an 11M or perhaps 11R--which our primarily fighter pilot leaders have blithely decided are somehow healthy on manning. Hmm--11Ms have the choice between either getting beaten down on active duty, or heading for the exits and within a year enjoying better pay, better quality of life, and freedom from getting tagged with downrange deployments that should in fact be filled by folks with force application backgrounds (not to mention the many other 11M-required billets). At a very minimum, the airlines drain the Air Force of all the other folks that are backfilling 11Fs in jobs around the globe.

-- I would be curious if the survey only focused on those approaching the ends of their SUPT commitments, or if they also surveyed those hitting the 20-yr retirement decision. The choices then are even more stark--one can remain on AD and effectively work for half pay and postpone building airline seniority, or get out at exactly 20 years, and within a year be making more--between AF retirement and a-word paycheck--than they ever would have on AD. 

In sum, I get that 11F manning is a substantial concern. I agree the Air Force needs to make a number of changes--not all of them costly--to encourage folks to stay in (reviewing AFSC requirements for various billets, minimizing unnecessary PCSs, pushing back against stupid COCOM requirements, etc.), no argument there. The above said, AF senior leaders are rightfully acknowledging that airline hiring is a big deal, and they need to continue working to find ways to minimize its negative effects on retention. Perhaps just as importantly, they need to stop insulting our intelligence. All the public handwringing over 11F shortages (with little mention of other pilot communities) implies that other AF pilot communities are somehow fat, dumb and happy. Nothing could be further from the truth, and a-word hiring is just getting warmed up. A sure way to keep retention low is to stay on this fighter-myopic track the USAF is currently on. 

TT

[pawnman]

11Bs and 12Bs are picking up a LOT of 11F 365 and 179 taskings.  My wing alone has filled something like 7 365s in the past year...which is not helping the FTU manning (currently at 43%) which, in turn, puts a crimp in production, which means less 11B and 12B folks to take the next round of taskers...

[Longhorn15]

12 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

- There should be no 11F required 365s? I agree that requirements need to be scrutinized, but c'mon, man--if 11F experience were that valueless downrange, Big Blue wouldn't be quite so concerned about 11F retention. The point is to have competent folks in force application/other 11F-relevant billets. Who else would you suggest fill those CAF-type downrange billets? 11Ms? Intel officers? Space officers? It ain't like the 11B community is awash with extra bodies.

I'm not saying we don't need 11F experience downrange, we clearly do, or that others should go instead.  I'm saying if HAF wanted to fix the 11F problem they would get CENTCOM to agree to 120 day non-flying deployments rather than 365s to fill these spots, at least below the O-6 Command level.  Make it 120, and you'll get volunteers.  When it's 365, you push people out, both the ones that 7-day opt and those that leave at 11 yrs rather than 7-day opt at 14-16 yrs.  We are already filling some W11F-coded billets with 120s, due to the patch community being devastated by 365s, why not the rest of the force too?

The reason they're focused on 11Fs isn't just undermanning now.  Due to CAF REDUX, fighter pilot production was less than half of what was needed from 08-14.  Remember the days of 1 fighter per UPT class and ENJJPT guys mostly going to heavies?  The chickens are coming home to roost and it's going to get much worse before it gets better, that is why HAF is so concerned about retaining those year groups.  Not saying other communities don't have problems, but it's not as acute...yet.

[magnetfreezer]

5 hours ago, Longhorn15 said:

I'm not saying we don't need 11F experience downrange, we clearly do, or that others should go instead.  I'm saying if HAF wanted to fix the 11F problem they would get CENTCOM to agree to 120 day non-flying deployments rather than 365s to fill these spots, at least below the O-6 Command level.  Make it 120, and you'll get volunteers.  When it's 365, you push people out, both the ones that 7-day opt and those that leave at 11 yrs rather than 7-day opt at 14-16 yrs.  We are already filling some W11F-coded billets with 120s, due to the patch community being devastated by 365s, why not the rest of the force too?

The reason they're focused on 11Fs isn't just undermanning now.  Due to CAF REDUX, fighter pilot production was less than half of what was needed from 08-14.  Remember the days of 1 fighter per UPT class and ENJJPT guys mostly going to heavies?  The chickens are coming home to roost and it's going to get much worse before it gets better, that is why HAF is so concerned about retaining those year groups.  Not saying other communities don't have problems, but it's not as acute...yet.

 

11 hours ago, pawnman said:

11Bs and 12Bs are picking up a LOT of 11F 365 and 179 taskings.  My wing alone has filled something like 7 365s in the past year...which is not helping the FTU manning (currently at 43%) which, in turn, puts a crimp in production, which means less 11B and 12B folks to take the next round of taskers...

At the macro level, yes (high level of 11B/12B for example). The problem is Big Blue doesn't track K-prefix, which is what the ops squadrons need to get guys out of the FTU qualified, effective and safe (not to mention FTU/OT/WIC/etc). After a few 365s and homestation buffoonery, IPs generally pull the handles for a reserve+airline/FedEx job. IWSOs don't have the airline opportunity but only have a 6-year commitment after winging, so they tend to be out even earlier in their careers.

Root cause is too many non-tactical taskings; a few ideas to reduce these (probably require DoD level attention if congressman is listening...)

1. Do we really need a forward A-staff?
2. Does the CAOC need to be forward (conduct most ops over BLOS comms/SIPR, with a small comm relay function at the forward base)
3. Look at eliminating/combining some of the proliferation of joint task forces (each of which require their own staff)
4. If we decide we need to continue training an Afghan air force, use contractors or bring them CONUS to a training course

[RTB]

11 hours ago, Longhorn15 said:

I'm not saying we don't need 11F experience downrange, we clearly do, or that others should go instead.  I'm saying if HAF wanted to fix the 11F problem they would get CENTCOM to agree to 120 day non-flying deployments rather than 365s to fill these spots, at least below the O-6 Command level.  Make it 120, and you'll get volunteers.  When it's 365, you push people out, both the ones that 7-day opt and those that leave at 11 yrs rather than 7-day opt at 14-16 yrs.  We are already filling some W11F-coded billets with 120s, due to the patch community being devastated by 365s, why not the rest of the force too?

This is SO TRUE!  I very clearly (and fondly) remember the days before the 365 monster was born.  Prior to about 2005, deployments that are now 365s were always filled by 90-120 deployments.  SIGNIFICANTLY more palatable for everyone.  Not sure why we had to go to the 365's either because the personnel drain is essentially the same (1 body-equivalent deployed for a year).  But with a 365 you have the added pressure of a TX course for the 365 dude, not to mention the morale crushing effects to a guy and his family.   I've asked the question many times in the past but was never able to get a good answer on why we let that genie out of the bottle.  About the only reason I can fathom is the continuity of a single person, which IMO is significantly overshadowed by the negative retention impacts.  

 

[Homestar]

6 hours ago, magnetfreezer said:

 

1. ...or bring them CONUS to a training course

How do you think this happens?

Or this

[TnkrToad]

1 hour ago, RTB said:

This is SO TRUE!  I very clearly (and fondly) remember the days before the 365 monster was born.  Prior to about 2005, deployments that are now 365s were always filled by 90-120 deployments.  SIGNIFICANTLY more palatable for everyone.  Not sure why we had to go to the 365's either because the personnel drain is essentially the same (1 body-equivalent deployed for a year).  But with a 365 you have the added pressure of a TX course for the 365 dude, not to mention the morale crushing effects to a guy and his family.   I've asked the question many times in the past but was never able to get a good answer on why we let that genie out of the bottle.  About the only reason I can fathom is the continuity of a single person, which IMO is significantly overshadowed by the negative retention impacts.  

 

In general, the justification for 365s is, or at least should be, that it's long enough for someone to make substantial changes, if they're called for. If deployed to a CAOC, for instance, it takes some time to get the lay of the land/get settled into the job. If on a 90- or 120-day rotation, by the time you really get to know what's broke, know which key players you need to convince to fix whatever's broke and earn their trust, you're basically out of time to actually enact any value-added change. The more people there are in the CAOC/JTF-Whatever you're deployed to who are on 90-120 day rotations, the worse this dynamic is. Jjust about the time you're ready to pull the trigger on a substantial change, the other key players rotate out and you're back to square one. Gotta educate and build trust with the FNGs. Before you know it, you reach the end of your tour, and--despite your and others' best efforts--the status quo remains. It's hard enough to enact change in the CAOC, where you're primarily working with other AF bubbas, with a smattering of air minded folks from other countries. It's even worse when working in a JTF, where you have to convince senior leaders from other services to make changes to processes or programs. Their experiential blinders and service parochial interests can be (and frequently are) huge impediments to success. 

I presume Big Blue has done the calculus, and has determined that losing some folks to 7-day opts is worth it, in order to ensure we have staffers who can save lives and money by fighting bad ideas (the Army is especially full of them) downrange. If we're deploying folks to 365s to serve as Powerpoint rangers and other monkey-work billets, though, that crap has gotta stop. 

TT

[RTB]

40 minutes ago, TnkrToad said:

In general, the justification for 365s is, or at least should be, that it's long enough for someone to make substantial changes, if they're called for. If deployed to a CAOC, for instance, it takes some time to get the lay of the land/get settled into the job. If on a 90- or 120-day rotation, by the time you really get to know what's broke, know which key players you need to convince to fix whatever's broke and earn their trust, you're basically out of time to actually enact any value-added change. The more people there are in the CAOC/JTF-Whatever you're deployed to who are on 90-120 day rotations, the worse this dynamic is. Jjust about the time you're ready to pull the trigger on a substantial change, the other key players rotate out and you're back to square one. Gotta educate and build trust with the FNGs. Before you know it, you reach the end of your tour, and--despite your and others' best efforts--the status quo remains. It's hard enough to enact change in the CAOC, where you're primarily working with other AF bubbas, with a smattering of air minded folks from other countries. It's even worse when working in a JTF, where you have to convince senior leaders from other services to make changes to processes or programs. Their experiential blinders and service parochial interests can be (and frequently are) huge impediments to success. 

I presume Big Blue has done the calculus, and has determined that losing some folks to 7-day opts is worth it, in order to ensure we have staffers who can save lives and money by fighting bad ideas (the Army is especially full of them) downrange. If we're deploying folks to 365s to serve as Powerpoint rangers and other monkey-work billets, though, that crap has gotta stop. 

TT

I would agree for some key jobs a year is helpful.  But IMO we went full retard on 365s for a while to prove we were in for the win.  For a while back in the late 200x's, those thing were dropping all the time for jobs I'd categorize as less than critical.  I'd also argue that someone who's there for 3-4 months can make an impact, as long as others around them are willing to listen to new ideas.  Problem is it doesn't look good to our Army brothers who always deploy for 12+ months.

And I personally wouldn't presume Big Blue has done the robust calculus on which jobs need a 12 month stint, although someone may think it's a good idea.  Maybe I'm too jaded but I saw FAR too many unnecessary deployments in my time to believe we did a good job using our manpower downrange.  I'd also argue that turning an otherwise fired up warrior into a bitter hater of all things Blue during a painful 365 doesn't help the greater AF situation.

Edited January 23, 2017 by RTB

[HossHarris]

I'm still unsure how they can get away with calling it an "indeterminate" TDY and using those flex rules when they know good and damn well it's a 365. 

Which means it should be an unaccompanied remote PCS.  

Start attaching that financial tail to a 365 and see how quick it turns back into a 120 or 179

[magnetfreezer]

1 minute ago, HossHarris said:

I'm still unsure how they can get away with calling it an "indeterminate" TDY and using those flex rules when they know good and damn well it's a 365. 

Which means it should be an unaccompanied remote PCS.  

Start attaching that financial tail to a 365 and see how quick it turns back into a 120 or 179

Latest for a few AFG jobs is 395s... the Army is mandating 30 days of overlap, +3-4 months of stateside expeditionary courses = 1.5 years away from the family

[HossHarris]

9 minutes ago, magnetfreezer said:

Latest for a few AFG jobs is 395s... the Army is mandating 30 days of overlap, +3-4 months of stateside expeditionary courses = 1.5 years away from the family

Isn't nation building more of a state department thing .......

[SurelySerious]

Isn't nation building more of a state department thing .......

Whoa whoa whoa whoa

[Sprkt69]

4 minutes ago, HossHarris said:

Isn't nation building more of a state department thing .......

Not according to the Army

[fire4effect]

2 hours ago, HossHarris said:

Isn't nation building more of a state department thing .......

 

2 hours ago, Sprkt69 said:

Not according to the Army

Wellll. It takes a village sts. USAID, Department of Agriculture, State Dept., World Bank, Army Corp of Engineers, various UN entities etc. LOTs of players. I want to say the last I heard was a quote of 70 percent plus of Afghanistan's budget comes from foreign donations at least in the 2013 time frame. Including India as a small poke in the eye to Pakistan I'm sure. Army is as much about providing security for all those agencies to operate as anything. The footprint has not at all surprisingly shrunk significantly since I was last there. Unfortunately Nation Building entails working with the LNs over which there is very little control so you can only hope for maybe a 70 percent solution. I hate the thought of a large ground contingent but after what gains made in Iraq were nearly lost to ISIS for good hedging your bets against ISIS and the rest of their ilk is really the only option I can see for now. I really do understand how a 365 (and all the pre deployment BS) can wear you down especially if your primary skill set is aviation or otherwise far removed from the job your tasked with.

Edited January 23, 2017 by fire4effect
typing while tired, I need a GO-Pill

[Fuzz]

6 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

In general, the justification for 365s is, or at least should be, that it's long enough for someone to make substantial changes, if they're called for. If deployed to a CAOC, for instance, it takes some time to get the lay of the land/get settled into the job. If on a 90- or 120-day rotation, by the time you really get to know what's broke, know which key players you need to convince to fix whatever's broke and earn their trust, you're basically out of time to actually enact any value-added change. The more people there are in the CAOC/JTF-Whatever you're deployed to who are on 90-120 day rotations, the worse this dynamic is. Jjust about the time you're ready to pull the trigger on a substantial change, the other key players rotate out and you're back to square one. Gotta educate and build trust with the FNGs. Before you know it, you reach the end of your tour, and--despite your and others' best efforts--the status quo remains. It's hard enough to enact change in the CAOC, where you're primarily working with other AF bubbas, with a smattering of air minded folks from other countries. It's even worse when working in a JTF, where you have to convince senior leaders from other services to make changes to processes or programs. Their experiential blinders and service parochial interests can be (and frequently are) huge impediments to success. 

I presume Big Blue has done the calculus, and has determined that losing some folks to 7-day opts is worth it, in order to ensure we have staffers who can save lives and money by fighting bad ideas (the Army is especially full of them) downrange. If we're deploying folks to 365s to serve as Powerpoint rangers and other monkey-work billets, though, that crap has gotta stop. 

TT

Having done a 180, I'll agree with you to an extent. Our unit didn't really hit its stride till about 60 days into the deployment. I would say 120-180 days is the ideal length, I noticed no appreciable difference between the 180 day people & the 365ers besides the later usually were more disgruntled. Two things that make shorter deploymenus work is good handoffs by the outgoing personnel and good leadership helping to bridge the gaps between rotations (I know preaching to the choir). The POC of one of our main customers rotated out about 2/3s of the way through the deployment but he gave his replacement a good handoff and we continued to work with only minor issues till he got his feet fully under him. 

[Disco_Nav963]

I vote 90-120 days for flying units and 180 days for the CAOC (but better yet, move 90% of its functions to Shaw or Tampa and make it a PCS)... 180 days is way too long for multi-mission aircraft to focus on doing only one or two things. As a BUFF guy I can tell you everything except for CAS and Nuke has dropped from the crosscheck since April of last year, and we still need to be prepared to sprinkle a little MALD/JASSM/CALCM dust on other situations that may arise. I suspect that similar things happen in fighter world with OCA/DCA/SEAD, although probably less so now than when Afghanistan was the main show in town.

[pawnman]

12 hours ago, RTB said:

I would agree for some key jobs a year is helpful.  But IMO we went full retard on 365s for a while to prove we were in for the win.  For a while back in the late 200x's, those thing were dropping all the time for jobs I'd categorize as less than critical.  I'd also argue that someone who's there for 3-4 months can make an impact, as long as others around them are willing to listen to new ideas.  Problem is it doesn't look good to our Army brothers who always deploy for 12+ months.

And I personally wouldn't presume Big Blue has done the robust calculus on which jobs need a 12 month stint, although someone may think it's a good idea.  Maybe I'm too jaded but I saw FAR too many unnecessary deployments in my time to believe we did a good job using our manpower downrange.  I'd also argue that turning an otherwise fired up warrior into a bitter hater of all things Blue during a painful 365 doesn't help the greater AF situation.

Is there anything the MAAP cell does at AUAB that can't be done at Shaw?

[TnkrToad]

2 hours ago, pawnman said:

Is there anything the MAAP cell does at AUAB that can't be done at Shaw?

With regard to fighters and bombers, you probably could do the MAAP job remotely, at least in a steady-state fight.

In my experience, the fighter bubbas spent about 69 seconds of their duty days planning which CAPs they were going to orbit in, and the rest watching movies on the morale server. The more dynamic the operation is, the more you need to have pax forward-deployed to the CAOC. For tankers/other HVAA, remote planning is a much tougher sell. Lots of coord required within and outside of Plans--with Ops Div, AMD, ISRD, SOLE, BCD, coalition partners, etc.--IOT balance competing requirements in multiple JOAs (even in a steady-state operation). Never enough HVAA to go around, so planning those assets is all the more involved and painful. Collocation helps speed coordination.

The above said, TACC could likely take on an even bigger role in moving pax/cargo around theater, which could allow the AMD to shrink significantly. Of course, it would hurt the CENTCOM/CC's feelings to know that he doesn't have complete control (COCOM or OPCON) of everything in his AOR.