"Fighter Enterprise Redesign" ???

[Warrior]

With regard to fighters and bombers, you probably could do the MAAP job remotely, at least in a steady-state fight.
In my experience, the fighter bubbas spent about 69 seconds of their duty days planning which CAPs they were going to orbit in, and the rest watching movies on the morale server. The more dynamic the operation is, the more you need to have pax forward-deployed to the CAOC. For tankers/other HVAA, remote planning is a much tougher sell. Lots of coord required within and outside of Plans--with Ops Div, AMD, ISRD, SOLE, BCD, coalition partners, etc.--IOT balance competing requirements in multiple JOAs (even in a steady-state operation). Never enough HVAA to go around, so planning those assets is all the more involved and painful. Collocation helps speed coordination.
The above said, TACC could likely take on an even bigger role in moving pax/cargo around theater, which could allow the AMD to shrink significantly. Of course, it would hurt the CENTCOM/CC's feelings to know that he doesn't have complete control (COCOM or OPCON) of everything in his AOR.
 

Hush. You're going to give 18 AF ideas.

There's plenty of OPCON that remains at Scott.

There's that whole unity of command thing that makes me think OPCON should reside with the geographic COCOM, not 18AF.

[TnkrToad]

2 hours ago, Warrior said:

Hush. You're going to give 18 AF ideas.

There's plenty of OPCON that remains at Scott.

There's that whole unity of command thing that makes me think OPCON should reside with the geographic COCOM, not 18AF.
 

So, you'd rather be deployed to the CAOC, than do the exact same job from St. Louis?

BTW, the Army's (read CENTCOM's) notions of unity of command lead to stupid stuff like 80 CAPs worth of UASs/RPAs sitting in Army garrisons back in the US, while the AF struggles to meet COCOMs' requirements for 65 CAPs. But, hey, unity of command is far more important than providing combat capabilities to warfighters . . .

[Warrior]

So, you'd rather be deployed to the CAOC, than do the exact same job from St. Louis?

BTW, the Army's (read CENTCOM's) notions of unity of command lead to stupid stuff like 80 CAPs worth of UASs/RPAs sitting in Army garrisons back in the US, while the AF struggles to meet COCOMs' requirements for 65 CAPs. But, hey, unity of command is far more important than providing combat capabilities to warfighters . . .

Ive deployed to the CAOC and I made the same argument that you're making now.

My point is to keep OPCON aligned with CENTCOM/AFCENT, not to 18AF/TACC. Where I agree with you is to do those jobs from Shaw/Tampa instead of in the desert.

Edit:PM me if you'd like to take the discussion to .mil. There are plenty of examples of COMREL arguments taking precedence over "providing combat capabilities to the warfighters"

[TnkrToad]

1 hour ago, Warrior said:

Ive deployed to the CAOC and I made the same argument that you're making now.

My point is to keep OPCON aligned with CENTCOM/AFCENT, not to 18AF/TACC. Where I agree with you is to do those jobs from Shaw/Tampa instead of in the desert.

Edit:PM me if you'd like to take the discussion to .mil. There are plenty of examples of COMREL arguments taking precedence over "providing combat capabilities to the warfighters"

I get what you're saying. The issue--and trying to keep this related to the "fighter enterprise"--is that unity of command for the CAF, but particularly fighters, fits well with unity of command under geographic COCOMs. You deploy to CENTCOM with your A-10, you're never going to support anyone other than folks in the CENTCOM AOR.

For heavies, the issue is whose unity of command is more important: the geographic combatant commander, or the functional combatant commander? Unity of command for CENTCOM suggests the CENTCOM/CC (via the JFACC) should have OPCON of all the heavies in theater. Unity of command for TRANSCOM--with its responsibility for airlift & tanker ops around the globe--would suggest the TRANSCOM/CC needs to exercise OPCON through the TACC and manage heavies globally (rather than giving each GCC his own rice bowl of assets). We don't penny packet out A-10s to each Army division, for the same reason we shouldn't just penny packet (CHOP) heavies to geographic commanders, when those heavies can support multiple COCOMs from one day to the next.

Anyway, sounds like we both agree--we'd both like to have more C2 tail at home (sts).

TT

[fire4effect]

6 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

So, you'd rather be deployed to the CAOC, than do the exact same job from St. Louis?

BTW, the Army's (read CENTCOM's) notions of unity of command lead to stupid stuff like 80 CAPs worth of UASs/RPAs sitting in Army garrisons back in the US, while the AF struggles to meet COCOMs' requirements for 65 CAPs. But, hey, unity of command is far more important than providing combat capabilities to warfighters . . .

In fairness I've wondered the same thing. Unless they're planning to integrate them into operations in a novel way I'm not familiar with which is quite possible. Still hard to fathom. If anyone is inclined to enlighten me please pm and we can go  .mil 

[Fuzz]

9 hours ago, TnkrToad said:

So, you'd rather be deployed to the CAOC, than do the exact same job from St. Louis?

BTW, the Army's (read CENTCOM's) notions of unity of command lead to stupid stuff like 80 CAPs worth of UASs/RPAs sitting in Army garrisons back in the US, while the AF struggles to meet COCOMs' requirements for 65 CAPs. But, hey, unity of command is far more important than providing combat capabilities to warfighters . . .

Forward deploy the AMD Chief, tactics, intel and security forces personnel to the CAOC and stand up a AMD Detatchment under one of the deputy chiefs at Scott for the rest of the personnel. AMD gets to tap into TACCs in place infrastructure and knowledge while allowing AFCENT/CC to retain OPCON of CHOP'd assets. The only people that need to be forward are the previously named people because they interface with all the other divisions on a daily basis especially when big mobility operations are going on which also includes briefing the DIRMOBFOR, CAOC director and CFACC. Sure it could be done via VTC/VOSIP but I found it easier to be able to talk in person.

Edited January 24, 2017 by Fuzz

[Lord Ratner]

Is there anything the MAAP cell does at AUAB that can't be done at Shaw?

This! So much this!

We aren't in a war at Qatar. If the war can be done over the phone and internet from Qatar, it can be done over the phone and internet from Shaw. Sure, you don't get complete ownership over the mind and body of your "warfighters," but maybe in a manning crisis you can make some compromises...

[Chuck17]

18 hours ago, Warrior said:

Hush. You're going to give 18 AF ideas.

There's plenty of OPCON that remains at Scott.

There's that whole unity of command thing....
 

The mobility enterprise is way ahead of you on this, for once. There are folks with stars asking the same questions, making the same arguments, and that's a good thing... 

Similar to the MAAP function consolidation from "home", they're also asking why we need a separate AMD... why mobility isn't integrated with the rest of everything else... why we can't do more C2 from the 618th... even working (from above and below) to force a discussion on  things like OPCON and TACON... because right now in the mobility and some other communities (GS, etc), we operate between the lines more often than not in execution of global missions.

It's nice to see smart, engaged leadership re: these topics instead of just going along with "the way it's always been."

Chuck

[Fuzz]

15 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

The mobility enterprise is way ahead of you on this, for once. There are folks with stars asking the same questions, making the same arguments, and that's a good thing... 

Similar to the MAAP function consolidation from "home", they're also asking why we need a separate AMD... why mobility isn't integrated with the rest of everything else... why we can't do more C2 from the 618th... even working (from above and below) to force a discussion on  things like OPCON and TACON... because right now in the mobility and some other communities (GS, etc), we operate between the lines more often than not in execution of global missions.

It's nice to see smart, engaged leadership re: these topics instead of just going along with "the way it's always been."

Chuck

Do you see CENTCOM giving up their CHOP'd assets? Given the consternation I saw over reworking the deployed tanker iron, I'm skeptical how AFCENT would respond to removing more assets from under their control.

[Bowser36]

On 1/22/2017 at 2:30 AM, Longhorn15 said:

I'm not saying we don't need 11F experience downrange, we clearly do, or that others should go instead.  I'm saying if HAF wanted to fix the 11F problem they would get CENTCOM to agree to 120 day non-flying deployments rather than 365s to fill these spots, at least below the O-6 Command level.  Make it 120, and you'll get volunteers.  When it's 365, you push people out, both the ones that 7-day opt and those that leave at 11 yrs rather than 7-day opt at 14-16 yrs.  We are already filling some W11F-coded billets with 120s, due to the patch community being devastated by 365s, why not the rest of the force too?

The reason they're focused on 11Fs isn't just undermanning now.  Due to CAF REDUX, fighter pilot production was less than half of what was needed from 08-14.  Remember the days of 1 fighter per UPT class and ENJJPT guys mostly going to heavies?  The chickens are coming home to roost and it's going to get much worse before it gets better, that is why HAF is so concerned about retaining those year groups.  Not saying other communities don't have problems, but it's not as acute...yet.

By year group, do you mean upt graduation year or commissioning? I think the biggest drawdown occurred between 2008-2010, so I'm assuming you mean upt class.

I heard this current VML you can't get an F-35 TX slot unless you were commissioned after 2008. Its going to be tough to keep some dudes in if they can't even compete for the assignment they want.

[RTB]

11 hours ago, Bowser36 said:

I heard this current VML you can't get an F-35 TX slot unless you were commissioned after 2008. Its going to be tough to keep some dudes in if they can't even compete for the assignment they want.

There was a lot of that in the F-22 after the initial flood of "#1 of x"'s were brought in.  Severely limited the pool of pilots who were eligible for quite a few VMLs.  Apparently there was a need to get younger blood in after the initial flurry of FGO IPs and Patches got things going.  I've often wondered if the Navy and ANG method of simply transitioning an entire squadron with the existing personnel isn't a better way to do things.

[Bowser36]

On 1/22/2017 at 5:30 AM, Longhorn15 said:

The reason they're focused on 11Fs isn't just undermanning now.  Due to CAF REDUX, fighter pilot production was less than half of what was needed from 08-14.  Remember the days of 1 fighter per UPT class and ENJJPT guys mostly going to heavies?  The chickens are coming home to roost and it's going to get much worse before it gets better, that is why HAF is so concerned about retaining those year groups. 

HAF may be concerned about those year groups, but I doubt anything will change to retain them. If anything, I'd expect TX slots to diminish for dudes in those year groups as AFPC tries to cram as many B-coursers through as possible. Several years from now, the shortage may appear over when you look at the number of bodies, but our fighter force will consist of dudes all from a couple of year groups.

[Sprkt69]

10 hours ago, Bowser36 said:

HAF may be concerned about those year groups, but I doubt anything will change to retain them. If anything, I'd expect TX slots to diminish for dudes in those year groups as AFPC tries to cram as many B-coursers through as possible. Several years from now, the shortage may appear over when you look at the number of bodies, but our fighter force will consist of dudes all from a couple of year groups.

Cause that is the recipe for success

[pawnman]

11 hours ago, Bowser36 said:

HAF may be concerned about those year groups, but I doubt anything will change to retain them. If anything, I'd expect TX slots to diminish for dudes in those year groups as AFPC tries to cram as many B-coursers through as possible. Several years from now, the shortage may appear over when you look at the number of bodies, but our fighter force will consist of dudes all from a couple of year groups.

We're having the opposite problem.  Most of our B-course pilots are now FAIPs or prior MDS guys...which means a lot of them will be out of the LAR for WIC when the time comes.  Our WIC is already struggling to get applicants to fill classes, it's only going to get worse when your line guys are pinning on major before they become instructors.

[Smokin]

Why do we keep talking about 120 day deployments?  When I signed up, 90 days was the normal AEF and I'm not that old.  Transportation to/from deployment costs a whole lot less than replacing people who get out.  Even the spin up argument doesn't make sense with more numerous but shorter deployments.  If I'm in Afghanistan 3 months out of every 15, how much spin-up do I really need?  And 3 months is far more tolerable to my family.  Every additional month is like a year to a little kid who can't remember what Daddy looks like other than on a computer screen.

[Duck]

Why do we keep talking about 120 day deployments?  When I signed up, 90 days was the normal AEF and I'm not that old.  Transportation to/from deployment costs a whole lot less than replacing people who get out.  Even the spin up argument doesn't make sense with more numerous but shorter deployments.  If I'm in Afghanistan 3 months out of every 15, how much spin-up do I really need?  And 3 months is far more tolerable to my family.  Every additional month is like a year to a little kid who can't remember what Daddy looks like other than on a computer screen.

This!!!


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[Learjetter]

Why talk 90 day deployments that never end? How about the US decide if having forces in CENTCOM is a necessity, then SECDEF apportion and station forces from EUCOM, PACOM, CONUS, etc...

We've been cheating our own system for decades now.,.and THAT is a major factor in why everything else is in the suck right now.