Toxic Communities

[General Chang]

Ok guys, serious post for once (yeah, shut-up haters; you loved it the past couple of years).

Tony recently published an article on his site about dealing with toxic leaders to fix the Air Force.

I look around my aviation community (remaining unnamed to protect the guilty), and I just don't see it.  Guess I'm either lucky, clueless, or one of the culprits (again, shut up haters.  Actually trying to be serious here).

Who's in a community out there that actually breeds multiple toxic leaders?  Is there a root cause or is it a conglomeration of problems?  Is your community on the upswing or trending downward?

Conversely, who is in a community with leadership that really "gets it" from Sq CCs on up?  What are they doing right to sustain the greatness of your aviation community?

Really think about these answers.  They could make a difference. 

 

[BashiChuni]

In on page 1

[Hacker]

Vampires can't see their own reflection in a mirror.

[nsplayr]

You have no credibility here to ask serious questions and receive serious responses. Your trolling is A+, but the downside of all those grins is that no one takes you seriously, nor should they. 

I highly encourage everyone else to either move along or make this thread a new chive image repository for morale purposes. 

To Chang: re-cage your attitude and approach, delete your account, GFY and have a great Air Force day.

 

Edited April 24, 2017 by nsplayr

[tk1313]

Tell us your other username.

[Duck]

Meh, I disagree nsplayer. I enjoyed the show while it lasted.

More importantly, I will tell anyone who listens with what is wrong with the Air Force. Some I have solutions for and for others I am at a loss on how to fix.

Actually Chang, the persona that you portrayed here, although completely overdone, are the sum total of the sentiments that are causing people to head for the door.

What causes disappointment? Unrealized expectations. I think you have to start there. The last 10 or so years have been really tough on the CGOs. We came into the AF after 9-11 being told that the #1 priority of the AF is lethality, yet we are held to a completely different standard of measurement.

I was an '08 commissionee from ROTC and worked my butt off to get to UPT, 38s and hopefully to a fighter, just to be told that there was no where for us to go except RPAs and AMC. Big disappointment, but whatever, I press on. Get to my AMC unit and less than a year later I am writing a RRF for my 1st of 2 RIF boards. Meanwhile my fighter brethren (the 30 or so they created in my whole year group) were now considered undermanned. On my 4th deployment, my CC calls me to tell me that he has to get me on the next VML otherwise an RPA may be non-vold must-fill from AFPC. I end up going to T-6 UPT, my dream job at the time. While I am in PIT I face the #2 RIF/VSP of my career, while my 11F brothers (whoever is left) are now critically manned. I get sat down by my T-6 SQ/CC and told that although my record is outstanding, my career field (11M) is 175% manned and I haven't even completed PIT yet, so prepare for the worst/hope for the best. Also, we are cutting for the next 5 years. I go out and get my dream job, and apply for Palace Chase only to be denied because now even though my career field is still overmanned, the AF as a whole is short on pilots. Me, I still keep kicking @ss, pulling down #1 Sq/OG strats and moving my way up in the Sq. Get tasked with a 6 month non-flying deployment to some $hithole to be underemployed and a job that would have actually been better to have been CONUS doing (timezone differences).

Somewhere in there my family (wife+kids) made up their mind that we were done getting jerked around, so I have been making my way to the door ever since.

After 10 years of stellar service, 5 deployments, missing years of my kids lives, I get called a quitter and told that I have no future in my Sq.

I could write a lot more, but I just don't care to relive it anymore. I hate the fact that the AF made me fall out of love with something that I fought so hard to be apart of. I have seen this organization change in just the 10 years I've been in and it is unrecognizable.

I sincerely want the AF to get better and be better, so let me know if you have any questions.

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[VMFA187]

3 minutes ago, Duck said:

What causes disappointment? Unrealized expectations. I think you have to start there. The last 10 or so years have been really tough on the CGOs. We came into the AF after 9-11 being told that the #1 priority of the AF is lethality, yet we are held to a completely different standard

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This, so many times over.

[Rudy the Rabbit]

I think it was hilarious!  Only because I've met so many people that were like that. 

Edited April 24, 2017 by Rudy the Rabbit

[pilotguy]

UPT is toxic. It's full of guys who were "screwed over" in their previous community. Now they are mentoring all the young folks on why the Air Force sucks. Sounds like a great recipe.

[Duck]

3 hours ago, pilotguy said:

UPT is toxic. It's full of guys who were "screwed over" in their previous community. Now they are mentoring all the young folks on why the Air Force sucks. Sounds like a great recipe.

It's only a matter of time before the service does something to "screw" someone over, even O-6s.. A wise Commander once told me, "you can only ask for people to chose either their family or the Air Force so many times before the Air Force loses"


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[ImNotARobot]

2 hours ago, Duck said:

...the AF made me fall out of love with something that I fought so hard to be apart of.

Quote for posterity. My younger self would have never believed that to be possible.

[Bobby]

Don't waste your time on Chang...now, for something more entertaining. FLBP




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[BashiChuni]

2 hours ago, pilotguy said:

UPT is toxic. It's full of guys who were "screwed over" in their previous community. Now they are mentoring all the young folks on why the Air Force sucks. Sounds like a great recipe.

Some truth to that statement but guys are smart enough to see the bull shit for themselves...and these days it's not hard to see

[ViperMan]

I'll add my two cents (and some more).

Soooooo not everyone on this board agrees with Tony Carr's perspective on the USAF - see his editorial on the Thunderbird mishap from last June and (if you know ANYTHING), you'll know that that piece was designed to elicit an emotional response, did nothing to satisfy public curiosity about the event, shed no new light on the event, and was literally the journalistic equivalent of throwing $hit at a wall - in the name of smearing the AF (cause he thinks it's fun, IMO). After that post I was honestly not sure whether or not to take him seriously any more - and I don't. He was a previous safety guy who "had F-16 experience" but yet he wrote it as someone would who lacked a military flying background. His response to my analysis (https://disq.us/p/1ejpsoe) of his editorial was dismissive, and when presented with facts, he avoided the issue. I don't consider him value-added at this point - as I do this message board. I think he's a semi-talented, own-press-reading, bitter, (ret) Lt Col who has nothing better to do with his time than sport bitch on the internet. I think lots of people agree with that sentiment, and while he can sometimes come close the mark, I don't think (in general) he is that interesting any more.

On that note, and to your question, I don't think the root cause of the USAF's current crisis has much to do with leadership in a traditional sense, but then again, I was never one who drank the AF koolaid that would have all its officers believe that leadership is the panacea to every and all problems. No, sometimes, people make poor decisions and it's not because they are poor leaders. And sometimes, it doesn't matter who's at the seat, there can be (and are) systemic issues in an organization which have far greater effects. Pinning it all on "toxic leadership" is what someone who is still pissed at a lot of previous superiors does when he is no longer subject to their rule. That said, if you choose to orient yourself in such a way, then I suppose that everything can be boiled down to poor leadership (not toxic), but I think there are more systemic issues as to why the USAF is in its current state, and when viewed in that light, will lead to more fruitful changes.

1. 179s: Look a troop in the eye, and tell them that the reason they're going down range for 179 days (vs 180 or more) has nothing to do with the USAF's policy of granting short-tour credit for deployments of longer length (sts). https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/112915/air-force-normalizes-short-tour-credit-policy/. IMO, there is only one reason such a policy could exist, and it is to screw airmen out of a medal, deployment credit, make it easier for the personnel machine to send them downrange again sooner, or whatever. Justifications along the lines of "well, we will need to be able to deploy them again" do not hold water. All airmen who were getting short-tour credit for 180+ day deployments were playing by the same rules, and were all on the same "list". What shifting a policy did while we were in the middle of a war, was create two groups of people - those who had deployed for >181 and <365 who got credit, and those who did not - that is a ripple in the system, and though it may not have an immediately visible consequence, it certainly has an effect and was unfair to lots of people. So, that's one example of something wrong, which has nothing to do with anyone wearing < 4 stars on their shoulders. But toxic leadership? Maybe, but by only one person - not a culture of it.

2. RIFs/Force-shaping: During my time in the USAF, I "survived" two RRFs (I think, maybe, I can't remember at this point). One occurred shortly after I finished the B-Course. The U-S-A-F sent me, a fighter pilot, paperwork that suggested I may not be retained, literally immediately after I finished soaking up the better part of $5M in training costs/taxpayer money and with nearly 10 years of commitment remaining. IMO, this was done in the name of "social justice" - an example of a policy enacted to make everyone feel like they're on the same page and are all of equal value. Was I actually concerned I was going to be force-shaped? Nope. But this is an example of something that is wrong with the AF at a cultural level. Fixing this would go a long way toward re-orienting the AF in the correct direction, but (I get it) it would cause A LOT of teeth-gnashing with the REMFs, and that is a merge I highly doubt the AF wants to buy - because we MUST be socially just, we absolutely must be (sarcasm).

2a. In 2011, the USAF got rid of 157 Majors who should have been allowed to retire:

https://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocates-decry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/
https://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/

This occurred, and then (almost immediately), the USAF sought to be granted TERA (and was given it) in order to "slim down":

https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467816/eligible-officers-enlisted-members-offered-early-retirement/
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/483997/af-opens-additional-tera-vsp-windows/
https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/467713/af-announces-additional-force-management-programs-to-reduce-force-size/
https://federalnewsradio.com/retirement/2016/01/greg-rinckey-air-force-officers-demand-reinstatement/

Does that not cause one to scratch their head (who said head)? Look a troop in the eye and tell them this is not the apex of hypocrisy and short-sighted decision making. If you ask me, this is an instance of breaking faith with people. And before we cry uncle and say "well we're subject to civilian leadership decisions", I don't remember any stars falling on their swords over that one. GOs should have been resigning up and down the chain over that one. Again, like it or not, when people witness decisions like this, it affects their "matrix" and they then re-evaluate their criteria for staying in the AF for the long haul. What this sequence of decisions made clear was that a member's continued service was arbitrary, and subject to the flavor of the month. That is not going to be good enough for most people who are investing the most valuable years of their working lives towards a successful career, and I think this has had a direct and lasting affect on morale and retention. Again, this is an example of a policy decision that created two classes of people: those who served > 15 years and were not given a retirement, and those who were.

3. Shortly on the pilot bonus: the fact that it hasn't change in what, 20+ years, communicates a lot - if not directly, then indirectly. All the hand-wringing about increased amounts being just around the corner is a little pathetic, and is obviously being done from a reactionary perspective. This should have been addressed YEARS ago, because the Airline hiring wave is NOT a surprise.

4. Focus: This, to me, boils down to what the USAF should be focused on. IMO, it is high-time that "space" and "cyber" became their own separate service (or perhaps services). Much like the USAF growth out of the Army benefited both branches, I think another, modern version of that evolution needs to take place with those two realms so they can get the focus they need, and we can get ours. No, space is NOT a continuation of the "air domain", and neither is cyber. There, I said it. Sure, they abut, but so does the surface of the sea/Earth, with the sky, yet we have different branches dedicated to those domains. IMO the AF is in love with the idea of being a one-sized fits all solution to all problems (or maybe they're addicted to the money, IDK). That last point will lead me to #5.

4a. It was suggested on other message boards that more 11X presence is needed throughout the AF - from staffs, to the FSS. I fully agree with this sentiment, and would happily displace an FSS Maj or Lt Col (while remaining on flying status) and run that shop/unit. Would I be there everyday? Nope, but I wouldn't need to be. See, it's all about policy and setting an expectation. The USAF for far too long has been ceding ever more control to those who don't have to cross a wire. Why is this? Do we really need a finance-trained, specialized Maj/Lt Col to run the finance shop? Really? Does that person even know how to operate DTS or whatever else? And even if they do know how, do they? I highly suspect they fill more of figure-head roll; a leader of those units could easily come from an 11X background and provide actual, bonafied leadership. I would go so far as to say that in order to command anything, you should have to be a rated officer. Yes, this caps non-rated officers - tough shit. Go get wings.

5. This is likely an unpopular opinion on this board, but the biggest mistakes we have recently made (as a nation) have been the strategic errors of invading Iraq in 2003, the "how" of invading Afghanistan in 2001, and then the subsequent withdrawal from Iraq in whenever we actually did it. Bottom line on this one, is that the USAF leadership (at the time) should have thrown down a firm "no" when the Army demanded we play in the conflict for as long as we have, as should have the Navy. Drones and snake eaters? You bet. Multi-million dollar fighter jets, the full capes of the world's greatest AF burning holes in the sky, US Navy billion-dollar aircraft carriers? No way. We have WAY over-extended ourselves in these conflicts and have NOTHING to show for it. Well, except a military full of equipment that is falling apart at a time when we least need it.

I fully grasp that we were sent to war by our civilian leadership, but not calling a goat by its name isn't solving the problem. No, AFPAK Hands will not succeed. Not because of lack of awesome people and their concerted and earnest efforts, but because the strategic context of its goal is illogical and nonsensical. No amount of Air University PHD-research-papering will make it so. The point of the military is to kill people and break their shit; not to nation-build before a war is won. Advising people who don't want what we want isn't the answer - if there's one thing I learned from my experiences, combined with the 'cross cultural competency' assigned by ACSC, it's that. The sooner our "leadership" - of whatever flavor and level - wake up and recognize this, the better. We have poured (and continue to pour) far too much in time, resources, blood, and money into an unwinnable situation. We need to get back to defining realistic, measurable goals, by which we can actually measure a 1 or 0, we can start counting those. I would much prefer to hear from our leadership that the new, stated goal in Afghanistan is to never allow a Taliban, or al Qaeda sponsored/sympathetic government to take root - and leave it at that. We're not interested in standing up a government there; we're not interested in building girls' schools there; we're not interested in teaching air advisers how to read the JP 3.09-3. We are interested in shooting Hellfires off of drones at anyone associated with the Taliban or al Qaeda for the next 1000 years - that's it. This section has run on way too long, but to sum up: our current strategy only exists because we misunderstand who and what type of people we are fighting.

6. HPO lists, etc. This category is all about creating "classes" of people. The military has always been a good 'ol boys club, and it always will be. Formalizing it in Excel spread sheets, and choosing people while they are Captains is what has created and perpetuated a perception that it literally doesn't matter what you do if you're not on that list. It is nothing more than playing favorites, and creates an environment that leads people to separate - now there's some "leadership". I ultimately believe that more transparency in the assignment and promotion system will go a long way to correcting a lot of the AF's current problems as well.

I could, and might, write more, but until next time, if you haven't read this article, the author hits on some extremely relevant points: https://philipgmorrison.wordpress.com/2017/01/15/its-your-move-the-dilemma-of-incurred-commitment-in-the-modern-job-market/.

- ViperMan

 

Edited April 25, 2017 by ViperMan

[Hacker]

I actually enjoyed being a UPT IP, and it was an opportunity to be on the leadership train since I wasn't a shiny enough penny to be a Strike Eagle SQ/CC.

[Guest]

 

Great post ViperMan! I disagree with you a bit on the Tony Carr point, however. Since the JQP sellout, I think there have been quite a few articles (wasn't there a saddle soap ad or something???) written by staff writers without his coordination. The t-bird article may have been among them. That said, it's on him if Bright Mountain is posting in his name and he doesn't correct them.


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[LookieRookie]

5 minutes ago, cantfly said:

The Navy doesn't do FAIPs and your post about UPT is the reason why.

Yea they do, they're called SERGRADs. (Selectively Retained Graduates)

 

[cantfly]

37 minutes ago, LookieRookie said:

Yea they do, they're called SERGRADs. (Selectively Retained Graduates)

 

I stand corrected. I went through Corpus in 2005 and there weren't any SERGRADS instructing us in the mighty T-44. That's a T-34 thing coming directly from a friend of mine who is a Navy IP. I never even heard of that term until now. We flew with experienced/combat time herk, C-2, and P-3 drivers in the T-44. Show up to fly and your Navy IP has his flight suit zipper almost down to his belly button.

Lt, here are the keys for your solo cross country and dont call us if you have any problems. Figure that sh$t out, because you are a pilot. Classmates weren't supposed to fly cross country at night. Well, two of mine sure as hell did. The Navy has that Nike mentality of "Just do it." You have a PPL. Get back by this time, if you don't it's cool. In the AF you would never have graduated attempting to fly back at night. I guess in the Navy eyes the worst you can do is pull a John McCain. They still clown him about almost drowning in the Corpus Bay after him ditching there.

I wanted to go cross country to where I garnered my PPL. Corpus was working on approving far more airfields and if I had asked earlier, I probably could have gone to the airfield of my choice.

Edited April 25, 2017 by cantfly

[dream big]

5 hours ago, pilotguy said:

UPT is toxic. It's full of guys who were "screwed over" in their previous community. Now they are mentoring all the young folks on why the Air Force sucks. Sounds like a great recipe.

Maybe that has been the trend? The last 4-5 guys we sent to UPT from our MAF squadron were all stellar dudes who volunteered..minus one who had "back issues" in PIT and ended up going to Mildenhall then passed over for Major.

If commanders are sending their "rejects" then that is a foul.  Molding the next generation of pilots is no pety task.

 

[cantfly]

3 hours ago, ViperMan said:

Bottom line on this one, is that the USAF leadership (at the time) should have thrown down a firm "no" when the Army demanded we play in the conflict for as long as we have, as should have the Navy. Drones and snake eaters? You bet. Multi-million dollar fighter jets, the full capes of the world's greatest AF burning holes in the sky, US Navy billion-dollar aircraft carriers? No way. We have WAY over-extended ourselves in these conflicts and have NOTHING to show for it. Well, except a military full of equipment that is falling apart at a time when we least need it.

The point of the military is to kill people and break their shit; not to nation-build before a war is won. Advising people who don't want what we want isn't the answer - if there's one thing I learned from my experiences, combined with the 'cross cultural competency' assigned by ACSC, it's that. 

Tell the Army no? Dude, the guys on the ground whether SOF, Army, Marines or SOF from our allies get a boost from our presence. Hell, I checked in via radio with my dads old unit 10th Mountain to their surprise while in Afghanistan. In the DFAC you see guys who have been hit by IEDs but lived to fight another day. I would never put the cost of a jet over the opportunity to save lives and to return mothers and fathers back home to their kids. 

Kill people and break their sh$t? What was there to break in Iraq or Afghanistan? The sanctions kept Iraq in check and you just pissed the Taliban off even more when you blew up their mud and clay mixture huts.  Interrupting their little boys dressed as girls parties. The whole country is Taliban friendly and its spreads throughout generations. They are the cool guys to their people and have the best motorcycles and Toyota Hilux's opium can buy.

[magnetfreezer]

Tell the Army no? Dude, the guys on the ground whether SOF, Army, Marines or SOF from our allies get a boost from our presence. Hell, I checked in via radio with my dads old unit 10th Mountain to their surprise while in Afghanistan. In the DFAC you see guys who have been hit by IEDs but lived to fight another day. I would never put the cost of a jet over the opportunity to save lives and to return mothers and fathers back home to their kids. 
Kill people and break their sh$t? What was there to break in Iraq or Afghanistan? The sanctions kept Iraq in check and you just pissed the Taliban off even more when you blew up their mud and clay mixture huts.  Interrupting their little boys dressed as girls parties. The whole country is Taliban friendly and its spreads throughout generations. They are the cool guys to their people and have the best motorcycles and Toyota Hilux's opium can buy.

He's not against helping the US on the ground. If the Army is in an unsustainable position, though, grinding air resources at the problem without clear, achievable, measurable objectives merely keeps those soldiers in the same position longer vs realigning objectives (we are generally better at surgical excision of terrorist structures vs whole scale nation building)

[ViperMan]

59 minutes ago, cantfly said:

Tell the Army no? Dude, the guys on the ground whether SOF, Army, Marines or SOF from our allies get a boost from our presence. Hell, I checked in via radio with my dads old unit 10th Mountain to their surprise while in Afghanistan. In the DFAC you see guys who have been hit by IEDs but lived to fight another day. I would never put the cost of a jet over the opportunity to save lives and to return mothers and fathers back home to their kids. 

Kill people and break their sh$t? What was there to break in Iraq or Afghanistan? The sanctions kept Iraq in check and you just pissed the Taliban off even more when you blew up their mud and clay mixture huts.  Interrupting their little boys dressed as girls parties. The whole country is Taliban friendly and its spreads throughout generations. They are the cool guys to their people and have the best motorcycles and Toyota Hilux's opium can buy.

In lieu of making that previous post even longer, I decided to not go into the 'how' of our fight in Afghanistan. In short, I think we've eff'd it up wholesale by going in as heavily-handed as we did. Putting 100,000+ troops on the ground was not the answer - I think history and the present proves that. 15 years ago, it was Army leadership's job to tell their bosses that going into a 3rd world shit-hole like that was not a winning gameplan. Going in with SOF/surgical airpower/Jason Bourne/etc was the right answer. But, of course, we were reeling from 9/11, and IMO, we acted emotionally instead of rationally. Now, we designed a fight without realistic conditions for victory, and we're left with a quagmire that I literally think no one has any realistic idea on how to get out of victoriously. I'm sure there's lots of pretty slides and strategy papers on the who, what, where, when, and how, but I just don't buy it at this point - in fairness, I didn't buy it 15 years ago either - call me cynical.

I too, am happy when our bros on the ground make it back, but the sad fact is that many of them have been killed without our nation having achieved its strategic objectives. So, with that as context, and arguably the only legitimate reason to be able to justify asking soldiers to give their lives, what is the solution? Burn up our Air Force and Navy? The two arms of the DOD that give us truly global power and asymmetric advantage? Right now Navy and Marine Hornets have <50% MC rates in some cases. That is what fighting a ground/guerilla war with air power gets you: not much.

To your second paragraph, that's basically my point. We never should have invaded in '03, and we never should have fought Afghanistan with the tactics and strategy we chose. I chalk it up to our national leaders having access to the 'easy button', i.e. air power - low political cost, high-impact, immediate effect.

35 minutes ago, magnetfreezer said:

He's not against helping the US on the ground. If the Army is in an unsustainable position, though, grinding air resources at the problem without clear, achievable, measurable objectives merely keeps those soldiers in the same position longer vs realigning objectives (we are generally better at surgical excision of terrorist structures vs whole scale nation building)

Pretty much.

Edited April 25, 2017 by ViperMan

[HeyWatchThis]

14 hours ago, Bobby said:

Don't waste your time on Chang...now, for something more entertaining. FLBP




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God bless Katy Perry

[Vetter]

God bless HPOs!  I literally didn't do anything my last year in the AF.  Every time I was asked to do something, I would say "I can't help you, but I'm sure Capt HPO can help".  They will get the credit either way, might as well let them do the work.

 

On a side note, after being pushed around by scheduling, marveling at the ineptitude of my union, or sitting through a painful red-eye, I come back here and realize just how much better my life is now.  I am thankful.

[HU&W]

4 hours ago, Vetter said:

They will get the credit either way, might as well let them do the work.

For posterity.