C-130 down near Savannah, GA

[HossHarris]

If it’s outside footage (security camera, etc) it’s not 

[Orbit]

I was talking about the CSAF video.  I think the security cam footage was released days after the accident.  

[viper154]

1 hour ago, Orbit said:

That is safety privileged, so it should not be.

The video by CSAF is also safety privileged. Standard disclaimer at the beginning and end.  I am always skeptical of leadership, but I give CSAF some respect for this one. 

Unfortunately (my opionion only) our safety process has become to bound by red tape. My MAJCOM has been very open about making sure aircrew see incedents and learning from them. I am in the process of going through a course outside my MAJCOM, and taking to instructors at the unit/MAJCOM of the course I am going through to much red tape has been strung to allow aircrew to see safety resaults. 

Edited November 11, 2018 by viper154
To much boooze

[BashiChuni]

Too*

[Tonka]

5 hours ago, viper154 said:

The video by CSAF is also safety privileged. Standard disclaimer at the beginning and end.  I am always skeptical of leadership, but I give CSAF some respect for this one. 

Unfortunately (my opionion only) our safety process has become to bound by red tape. My MAJCOM has been very open about making sure aircrew see incedents and learning from them. I am in the process of going through a course outside my MAJCOM, and taking to instructors at the unit/MAJCOM of the course I am going through to much red tape has been strung to allow aircrew to see safety resaults. 

I asked to see the SIB report and was told no, since I'm "currently" not flying that platform... and even though I tried to explain how I could use the knowledge attained to prevent mishaps (which, is of course the crux of safety investigations), I was told no... and that they could maybe give me a sanitized report (but a month later, I have nothing except the AIB).  The idea that I should "know" what is in a SIB report, so that I can justify reading it is a foul... the fact that I could not read it attests to the brokenness of the system.  I can read classified easier then I can read privileged.

I don't blame the pilot, no offense to the legacy of this platform (the fvcker rocks at its mission, but I would say that is a testament to it's crews... take a look at figure 1, if you can overcome the craziness of that and still do your mission... you rock), but there is a reason we have modernized aircraft.  Obviously speculation - but this mishap doesn't occur as easily on the J-model (yes, we as aviators can/will screw up in unique ways on other platforms) or other modern heavy aircraft (I also believe the C-5 modernization played a lot into that mishap, but I digress).  Why? because the human factors put in to making life easier on the pilot is obvious in the J and other modern airliners (yes, they still have lots of issues)... If you've flown the legacy herc, it is easy to fly but hard to fly well (or fly precisely).  There is no good feedback to the pilot, except the voice of 3-4 other people on the intercom... you are left with shitty instruments, shitty throttles, shitty flight controls , and hopefully a well-tuned seat-of-the-pants feel.  I would wager I could hop in a J-model after not flying it for a few years and get it safely airborne all by myself... even at the peak of my knowledge in the E/H, no damn way I would even think about it.  Humans are awesome, but there is a limit to what we can do.

If you are dependent on hearing 3 peoples voices to fly, it is tough when things go south... we all process visual stuff faster than audible inputs. We have all been in the sim or other aircraft EP where we "Tune out" what is being said because we channelize on "analyzing the situation"... this guy put all his brain power on figuring out what the fvck was going on, he couldn't even maintain the aircraft, much less take the next step.  What do you do when that happens? you fixate on something (i.e. an intuitive ADI, instruments, HUD data that has required A/S markers, turn/slip, flight path vector, etc) and you react to what you see (muscle memory), when you have to read or try to remember a greased number on a worn down TOLD card and then try to analyze an ADI/ASI designed 80 years ago... you already have 2 strikes against you.  Non-herc bubbas look at figure 15, tell me you can figure that out when the heat is on.

He put in rudder and put in too much (maybe), so he took it out then maybe the engine "recovers"? a bit and as he is taking some of that rudder out he feels like he needs to put opposite rudder in... This aint no fly-by-wire F-16, it is fully-reversible hydraulically-boosted set of flight controls, those inputs take time to move control surfaces, time to affect the aircraft, take time to give feedback to the pilot, ever hear of Pilot Induced Oscillation (PIO)...even with engine secured, he still doesn't realize how the plane is flying.  I've seen guys get in PIOs, and it sucks the SA out of them because their brain can't make the mental model match what the aircraft is doing, so they spend a lot of time building a new model in their head... time he didn't have, yet he can't control that he is human. Props aren't easy, 4 props with speeder springs/fly weights designed in the early half of the last century are slow to respond, slow to have their inputs "felt", and affect the flying of the aircraft a lot more than any other aircraft out there today.

Sorry... this is not on him, blame his training, blame the aircraft, the maintenance, and the acquisition process.  He gave it everything he could, all his years of flying... his life... don't put this on him.  Could he/they have done better-obviously yes, but my 8-year old can fly a manual 3-engine ILS in the C-17 sim (on her knees with nothing touching the rudders!), there is nothing remotely intuitive in an engine failure/surge at/near rotate for a C-130... I wonder if anyone on the AIB tried it in the sim. (of course we can't use an AIB to provide truth, because that causes litigation.)

[LookieRookie]

1 hour ago, Tonka said:

 

Sorry... this is not on him, blame his training, blame the aircraft, the maintenance, and the acquisition process.  He gave it everything he could, all his years of flying... his life... don't put this on him.  Could he/they have done better-obviously yes, but my 8-year old can fly a manual 3-engine ILS in the C-17 sim (on her knees with nothing touching the rudders!), there is nothing remotely intuitive in an engine failure/surge at/near rotate for a C-130... I wonder if anyone on the AIB tried it in the sim. (of course we can't use an AIB to provide truth, because that causes litigation.)

 

I have an issue with this. If the engine was "secured" and feathered and it says not to turn into a shut engine in the -1 and he did, that's completely on him. If he just flew straight ahead and gained flying airspeed they wouldn't have stalled.

 

The most important part of an any EP is to maintain aircraft control. It was less than 2 minutes to impact. He destroyed a completely flyable airplane.

 

This doesn't mitigate other factors, but that crew crashed the airplane.

Edited November 11, 2018 by LookieRookie

[Guest]

 
I have an issue with this. If the engine was "secured" and feathered and it says not to turn into a shut engine in the -1 and he did, that's completely on him. If he just flew straight ahead and gained flying airspeed they wouldn't have stalled.
 
The most important part of an any EP is to maintain aircraft control. It was less than 2 minutes to impact. He destroyed a completely flyable airplane.
 
This doesn't mitigate other factors, but that crew crashed the airplane.

2.
In a multi engine aircraft, there are very few emergencies (maybe fuselage or wing fire) where turning back for an immediate landing is advisable. Ultimately it was a mx issue that started this chain of events, but the situation was not so severe that the crew should not have been able to break the error chain and safely recover the aircraft.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[brabus]

11 hours ago, viper154 said:

our safety process has become to bound by red tape

What I have never understood is why preliminary info (when known) can't be released via safety channels ASAP (i.e. within hours or days). There should be a process that enables the local safety guy to release known info in a debrief style so other aircrew can learn immediately. Caveat that info is subject to change based on the ongoing investigation. 

Bottom line, there are so many accidents that primary contributing factors or even root causes are essentially known within hours, but said info is withheld from everyone for over a month. Not sharing this info immediately for the purpose of preventing similar mishaps in the near future is assinine.

[pawnman]

1 hour ago, ihtfp06 said:

2.
In a multi engine aircraft, there are very few emergencies (maybe fuselage or wing fire) where turning back for an immediate landing is advisable. Ultimately it was a mx issue that started this chain of events, but the situation was not so severe that the crew should not have been able to break the error chain and safely recover the aircraft.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

3.  He neglected the most basic of multi-engine aircraft emergency procedures, destroyed a flyable aircraft, and killed an entire crew, when he could have easily brought that aircraft around the pattern at the appropriate speeds and made an appropriate landing.

Hell, briefing abort criteria could have kept the plane on the ground in the first place.  Hand it back to maintenance 10 minutes later and tell them to try again while you go visit the bars in Savannah.

[Homestar]

31 minutes ago, pawnman said:

Hell, briefing abort criteria could have kept the plane on the ground

Quoted for truth. 

[arg]

It's really hard to talk about this and not seem like your bashing the crew. The FE did really well in training, DG if I remember right. The pilot was described as "gifted".

We know the facts but there are a couple of things we'll never know. Where was the FE focused that he didn't see the power fluxes and if he did see it why didn't he say something. Why didn't they abort the takeoff, they had plenty of time. Why did the pilot think he needed to step on the left rudder, in a left turn, with #1 engine shut down. 

Every Sim, refresher or MQ, at some point has this exact scenario. And Iv'e been doing sims since 1983, either as a crewmember or instructor. 

Tonka, as Contract Instructors we still get pushback sometimes with SIBs. It took an email to HQ safety office one time to verify that we do in fact have safety privilege. It all depends on who is in the office at the time.

[Dapper Dan Man]

I'm surprised they have airplanes at all, and I would of said that before this accident.

A point worth noting, as well as LookieRookie’s point about PRANG’s reputation. There is something to be said for a serious culture problem down there. Excerpts from the AIB that highlight this. (pages 33-34).

“Of the senior leadership that were available for interview, including the 156 OG Commander, 198 AS Commander, and the 156 MXS commander, none of them could accurately describe the mission of the unit.”

“Most of the members of the maintenance team who were interviewed could not say whether they had attended Maintenance Resource Management training and/or were not sure what the training included.”

“Additionally, the Propulsion Shop Lead did not know the difference between back shop manuals and on-aircraft manuals, neither MM1 nor MM2 realized there were troubleshooting guides in the on-aircraft manuals and relied on a back-shop manual”

“MM3 could not define his role and responsibilities during a maintenance engine run.”

Food for thought. There seems to be a lot more going on down there other than the mishap crew’s failure to handle an engine-out herk.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

[Tonka]

10 minutes ago, arg said:

Contract Instructors we still get pushback sometimes with SIBs. It took an email to HQ safety office one time to verify that we do in fact have safety privilege. It all depends on who is in the office at the time.

Thanks... I've gone to majcom safety and got rejected, ill try kirtland. 

i think my argument is based on trying to read between the lines of the report.  ive seen channelized attention really get the best of people... take a step back from what we are used to calling pilot error and how we have fixed many things to correct airplane deficiencies because of pilot error... if enough pilots do it wrong, we call it pilot error and then fix the aircraft (safe gaurds on the J). Id rather us look at pilot error from the stand point of gross negligence when all the info is clearly known, time/conditions allowed... maybe not a valid argument here with too much speculation.

I wonder how often do crews screw it up in the sim if it is a "surprise"?

Yeah, they could of done things better... but is this an unique one or have we seen this before and will again?

[arg]

40 minutes ago, Dapper Dan Man said:

 

A point worth noting, as well as LookieRookie’s point about PRANG’s reputation. There is something to be said for a serious culture problem down there. Excerpts from the AIB that highlight this. (pages 33-34).

“Of the senior leadership that were available for interview, including the 156 OG Commander, 198 AS Commander, and the 156 MXS commander, none of them could accurately describe the mission of the unit.”

“Most of the members of the maintenance team who were interviewed could not say whether they had attended Maintenance Resource Management training and/or were not sure what the training included.”

“Additionally, the Propulsion Shop Lead did not know the difference between back shop manuals and on-aircraft manuals, neither MM1 nor MM2 realized there were troubleshooting guides in the on-aircraft manuals and relied on a back-shop manual”

“MM3 could not define his role and responsibilities during a maintenance engine run.”

Food for thought. There seems to be a lot more going on down there other than the mishap crew’s failure to handle an engine-out herk.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

 

A good friend of mine went down there as an adviser when they got their Herks. The stories he came back with, wow! Talked to him after the crash and he said it was amazing it took this long.

 

[arg]

53 minutes ago, Tonka said:

Thanks... I've gone to majcom safety and got rejected, ill try kirtland. 

i think my argument is based on trying to read between the lines of the report.  ive seen channelized attention really get the best of people... take a step back from what we are used to calling pilot error and how we have fixed many things to correct airplane deficiencies because of pilot error... if enough pilots do it wrong, we call it pilot error and then fix the aircraft (safe gaurds on the J). Id rather us look at pilot error from the stand point of gross negligence when all the info is clearly known, time/conditions allowed... maybe not a valid argument here with too much speculation.

I wonder how often do crews screw it up in the sim if it is a "surprise"?

Yeah, they could of done things better... but is this an unique one or have we seen this before and will again?

Extremely rare for a crew to screw this up in the sim. But, it is the sim so they are monitoring closely trying to be on their best game. 

We have seen similar before and unfortunately will probably see it again. 

[Standby]

^ Holy fuck dude, start attaching TLDRs to your posts. Not even sure what the point of that was, but it could just be the copious amounts of water and barley talking. 

[hindsight2020]

3 hours ago, Standby said:

^ Holy fuck dude, start attaching TLDRs to your posts. Not even sure what the point of that was, but it could just be the copious amounts of water and barley talking. 

valid. Not the right forum for this discussion. 

Edited November 12, 2018 by hindsight2020

[herkbum]

A point worth noting, as well as LookieRookie’s point about PRANG’s reputation. There is something to be said for a serious culture problem down there. Excerpts from the AIB that highlight this. (pages 33-34).

“Of the senior leadership that were available for interview, including the 156 OG Commander, 198 AS Commander, and the 156 MXS commander, none of them could accurately describe the mission of the unit.”

“Most of the members of the maintenance team who were interviewed could not say whether they had attended Maintenance Resource Management training and/or were not sure what the training included.”

“Additionally, the Propulsion Shop Lead did not know the difference between back shop manuals and on-aircraft manuals, neither MM1 nor MM2 realized there were troubleshooting guides in the on-aircraft manuals and relied on a back-shop manual”

“MM3 could not define his role and responsibilities during a maintenance engine run.”

Food for thought. There seems to be a lot more going on down there other than the mishap crew’s failure to handle an engine-out herk.


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

I also thought it was odd when they said the WG/CC and WG/CV were not available when the board was asking questions. Is that unusual?



Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

[BashiChuni]

1 hour ago, hindsight2020 said:

*****TL;DR WARNING*******

"Food for thought" huh?

Perhaps this IS what is needed for mainlanders to finally internalize and take ownership over the vestiges of colonialism and double standards that have created such a deficit in outcomes for the last 25 years. You better have something better than "a buddy of mine went to PR and.." bar stories if you're going to discuss this topic with any modicum of seriousness or credibility.

This forum can be a bit of a right wing echo chamber so I know I'm outnumbered. But it has to be said.

That AIB hit it on the head wrt the improper actions. I find it an egregious lapse in performance and a case study in complacency, and the AIB/SIB were on point there.  But otherwise, it was a horrid piece of propaganda on the macro level accusations. To the point, the cultural piece was a hatchet job straight from something out of the Insular Cases. I'm sick and tired of that goddamned dogwhistle.

You can't just go down there with the typical CONUS bullshit AF white hat "one standard of safety" self-righteousness, and fail to take ownership of the political (thence budgetary) reasons those outcomes exist in the first place. This is a Constitutional dereliction that has been allowed to fester for 120 years; you can't just redux the dynamic to anglo-pleasing tropes just because it's merely politically convenient to scapegoat the victims here.

When it comes to democracy peddling across the globe, we're hypocrites of the highest order. But when it's not your family being personally disenfranchised, there's nothing to see here. Copy. We disenfranchise a territory that if it were a state, would have higher congressional representation in the House than 21 of the "bona fide" states. 

A complete stack-the-deck, representative disenfranchisement from where I stand. But you want to offer up cryptic "food for thought" as to why a USAF Wing organization of uniformed service members stripped of their vote and congressional representation are to blame for a culture of underfunded half-assery, while playing coy around the dogwhistle of their ethnic minority plurality status? Please, by all means dispense with the platitudes, say what you mean about Puerto Rico and the 156AW.

 

 

what in the fuck? got enough buzz words in there?

 

[Bender]

I asked to see the SIB report and was told no, since I'm "currently" not flying that platform...

That is highly unacceptable (although surprisingly common). Your safety officer is either lazy, incompetent, misguided, or all of them combined. Pulling that report/presentation is merely a few mouse clicks away...

Any descent squadron commander would square that up in seconds...


~Bendy

[arg]

3 hours ago, Standby said:

^ Holy fuck dude, start attaching TLDRs to your posts. Not even sure what the point of that was, but it could just be the copious amounts of water and barley talking. 

Are you talking to me? I don't know what TLDR is

[BashiChuni]

He wasn’t talking to you 

[Bender]

Are you talking to me? I don't know what TLDR is

41 words, oh shIt I'm out. Ain't no one have that kinda time.

*Too Long, Didn't Read*

~Bendy

[SocialD]

17 hours ago, hindsight2020 said:

valid. Not the right forum for this discussion. 

The forum for Academics is down the hallway on the left.

[matmacwc]

On 11/11/2018 at 10:52 AM, brabus said:

What I have never understood is why preliminary info (when known) can't be released via safety channels ASAP (i.e. within hours or days). There should be a process that enables the local safety guy to release known info in a debrief style so other aircrew can learn immediately. Caveat that info is subject to change based on the ongoing investigation. 

Bottom line, there are so many accidents that primary contributing factors or even root causes are essentially known within hours, but said info is withheld from everyone for over a month. Not sharing this info immediately for the purpose of preventing similar mishaps in the near future is assinine.

Blue 4 News is supposed to do this