737 MAX

[brabus]

We can’t be too hard on Huggy, he did do UPT in a Stearman and has spent a lot of time at altitudes with very little oxygen.

[Vito]

757 with the Pratt may be slightly better. And bigger boobs. I fly either one on a daily basis. The Pratts take longer to start, the Rolls have a lot less power for taxiing, but they take 15 sec to start!

Edited February 9 by Vito

[Lord Ratner]

So after watching that video, I'm only reinforced in my view that the airlines have become way too high-speed-abort-phobic.

 

I actually had this problem in a 737 Max a couple weeks ago. At the 80 knot check my airspeed indicator read 65. I was shocked when the captain decided that we were going to continue, but our procedures, unlike a go around, stipulate that a the captain that has sole abort authority. 

 

We got lucky, the problem was gone while straight and level and the airspeed split never exceeded 20 knots. This Captain was in no way competent enough to handle a raw navaid approach with either the stick shaker or the overspeed clacker going off. Anyways, I started asking every captain I fly with what they intend to do in the event of unreliable airspeed at 80 knots, and shockingly about a third of them say that we will continue to take off. 

 

I'm sorry, but if you are more afraid of a aborting at 80 to 90 knots, stop flying airplanes. I think the real problem is that our airline has hammered a fear of high-speed aborts in every Sim for years now, without inserting the nuance. How long is the runway? What exactly is the malfunction? We have a caveat for aborting above 80 knots: "fear the aircraft will not fly." But in 7 years I've never heard a single discussion about what triggers that fear. Personally, having to fly an aircraft with no flight director or autopilot using pitch and power settings that we practice once every few years and *never* look at during normal approaches, is much scarier to me than stopping the plane on a runway when we have an automated braking system for aborts and we know there is enough runway before V1. 

This particular malfunction is just another example of an instance where I would rather perform a high-speed aboard below V1 then go airborne not knowing if I'm going to be able to see the instruments or speak to the other pilot in 30 seconds. 

 

Another Captain I flew with, Junior to me, had the best threshold I've heard yet for whether or not he will abort above 80 knots. "Am I going to declare an emergency for the malfunction? Then I'm aborting"

Be safe out there

[disgruntledemployee]

21 hours ago, TreeA10 said:

I'm not sure how to respond to that other than suggest you seek counseling with a mental health professional because that way of thinking just ain't right.  757 with Rolls Royce engines can best be described as a dream date having long legs with big hooters.  Good luck with the counseling and get well soon!

Does that mean the the Max is 75's older sister that's had more plastic surgery than a Kardashian, stretched skin, bad boob job (they're quite large, tho), and a sagging ass that scrapes the ground?

[TreeA10]

3 hours ago, disgruntledemployee said:

Does that mean the the Max is 75's older sister that's had more plastic surgery than a Kardashian, stretched skin, bad boob job (they're quite large, tho), and a sagging ass that scrapes the ground?

That could very well be the best description ever of the Max.

Edited February 10 by TreeA10

[JeremiahWeed]

On 2/10/2025 at 12:41 PM, Lord Ratner said:

So after watching that video, I'm only reinforced in my view that the airlines have become way too high-speed-abort-phobic.

 

I actually had this problem in a 737 Max a couple weeks ago. At the 80 knot check my airspeed indicator read 65. I was shocked when the captain decided that we were going to continue, but our procedures, unlike a go around, stipulate that a the captain that has sole abort authority. 

 

We got lucky, the problem was gone while straight and level and the airspeed split never exceeded 20 knots. This Captain was in no way competent enough to handle a raw navaid approach with either the stick shaker or the overspeed clacker going off. Anyways, I started asking every captain I fly with what they intend to do in the event of unreliable airspeed at 80 knots, and shockingly about a third of them say that we will continue to take off. 

 

I'm sorry, but if you are more afraid of a aborting at 80 to 90 knots, stop flying airplanes. I think the real problem is that our airline has hammered a fear of high-speed aborts in every Sim for years now, without inserting the nuance. How long is the runway? What exactly is the malfunction? We have a caveat for aborting above 80 knots: "fear the aircraft will not fly." But in 7 years I've never heard a single discussion about what triggers that fear. Personally, having to fly an aircraft with no flight director or autopilot using pitch and power settings that we practice once every few years and *never* look at during normal approaches, is much scarier to me than stopping the plane on a runway when we have an automated braking system for aborts and we know there is enough runway before V1. 

This particular malfunction is just another example of an instance where I would rather perform a high-speed aboard below V1 then go airborne not knowing if I'm going to be able to see the instruments or speak to the other pilot in 30 seconds. 

 

Another Captain I flew with, Junior to me, had the best threshold I've heard yet for whether or not he will abort above 80 knots. "Am I going to declare an emergency for the malfunction? Then I'm aborting"

Be safe out there

I agree with you that the 80 knot airspeed call is not just a notification that we're transitioning into the high speed regime but also a cross-check and a great time to catch an an unreliable airspeed situation while still on the ground.  If we catch it in time, I would definitely reject for that and accept that I'm entering the early stage of high speed but hardly bumping right up against V1.  To your other point, there is at least one scenario I can think of that will result in declaring an emergency after takeoff that doesn't warrant the risk of a high speed reject above 80 knots.  Tire failure.  It's definitely not recommended to reject at high speed with limited runway left and reduced stopping ability for that when it would be far safer to takeoff, reduce weight and use the entirety of a long runway to safely get the aircraft stopped.  But, you'll definitely be declaring an emergency when you come back to land.  MD-11s have an aural warning for that malfunction.  Maybe other MD products do as well.  I'm not aware of that warning in any Boeing or Airbus aircraft I've flown but maybe it's an option to buy.  So without that warning, it's possible pilots may not be completely aware of what they have with a blown tire if they're going fast enough and almost ready to rotate.  Depending on audible cues, they might know they have "something" but maybe not exactly what.  That's why it's important to know exactly what you are going to high speed reject for and if it's not one of those then you keep going.  Using a nebulous list of "things I'll eventually have to declare an E for" is really not a good idea, IMO.  Most aircraft inhibit low level alerts and associated master cautions during takeoff roll for that very reason.  So, it's very likely you'll be taking some emergencies into the air and might not be aware of them until you are airborne and the inhibit is lifted.  Just my .02

It's also worthy of note that pilots of smaller aircraft might be able to get away with rejects outside of the normally acceptable region.  But it's unlikely that the FAA or operators are going to publish different guidelines for a mid-weight 737 and a 1-million lb. 747-800.  However, on a 12K' runway, I'd say the pilots in each of those aircraft have completely different decisions to make regarding a high speed reject for "something that requires an emergency" after takeoff.

The "aircraft is unable or unsafe to fly" is a tough call and definitely hard to define.  We don't use "fear of...." in our FOM.  😊  Here's one example:  https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/319913 

 

Edited February 13 by JeremiahWeed

[Lord Ratner]

6 minutes ago, JeremiahWeed said:

Tire failure.

Excellent example, thank you. I'll add it to my brief. 

 

7 minutes ago, JeremiahWeed said:

That's why it's important to know exactly what you are going to high speed reject for and if it's not one of those then you keep going.  Using a nebulous list of "things I'll eventually have to declare an E for" is really not a good idea, IMO.

I think both things end up being true. You should know and have thought about what you're going to abort for. But you're kidding yourself if you think you're going to come up with every scenario, especially considering how low the standard of training is for the airlines compared to the military.

 

To really test the theory, what other things that you would declare an emergency for would you not high speed abort for? I'm always happy to revise a theory, and incorporating tire failure is a great addition. But unless there are a bunch of others, it's probably a pretty good guideline for when you have less time to think than the human brain requires. It's only been a couple weeks since I've had to start digging into this, so I'm perfectly happy to hear better ideas.

10 minutes ago, JeremiahWeed said:

So, it's very likely you'll be taking some emergencies into the air and might not be aware of them until you are airborne and the inhibit is lifted.  Just my .02

You might be taking some malfunctions airborne, but that's not an emergency. Are you going to declare an emergency for a failed generator? The 737 doesn't inhibit a damn thing because it's ancient and Boeing is lazy. What types of inhibited enunciations on the other airplanes generally lead to emergency declarations? That's a real question, I've only flown the 73. 

 

There are a bunch of malfunctions where time is the enemy. Anything with fire or leaking bleed air has the potential to take out systems the longer it persists. Fuel, hydraulic, and oil leaks generally only get worse the longer they go on. Catastrophic electrical malfunctions will not stop you from being able to fly the plane necessarily, but at night or in the weather they can be a hell of a lot worse than jamming on the brakes. 

14 minutes ago, JeremiahWeed said:

Here's one example:  https://asn.flightsafety.org/asndb/319913 

An interesting read, but not particularly useful. An airplane that won't let you rotate kind of takes the decision out of your hands. 

It's also not a good example of a "high-speed abort" for the purposes of this conversation because it was well above V1, which I don't think anybody is advocating for in any but the most dire circumstances. There's a pretty huge difference between aborting above and below V1.

 

 

[JeremiahWeed]

8 hours ago, Lord Ratner said:

I think both things end up being true. You should know and have thought about what you're going to abort for. But you're kidding yourself if you think you're going to come up with every scenario, especially considering how low the standard of training is for the airlines compared to the military.

 

To really test the theory, what other things that you would declare an emergency for would you not high speed abort for? I'm always happy to revise a theory, and incorporating tire failure is a great addition. But unless there are a bunch of others, it's probably a pretty good guideline for when you have less time to think than the human brain requires. It's only been a couple weeks since I've had to start digging into this, so I'm perfectly happy to hear better ideas.

Sorry - Had to go fly.  Good discussion and I had some time to consider my response at cruise.  It's been over 20 years since I flew the 737 or A320 and I've rammed dumped them.  My more recent experience is on the MD-11, 777, 757 and I'm currently in the left seat of the 767.

First, I can already see we're coming at this from very different directions due to the lack of inhibits in your aircraft.  I'd be curious to hear from other 737 operators.  I'm really surprised that some of the newer versions don't have that feature.  So, from my perspective, the inhibits allow me to ignore the failures that have already been determined to be unworthy of a high speed reject.  All I need to know are the ones for which I am going to high speed reject.  The other ones I'm not going to know about (or can be ignored) until 400' on takeoff. 

My company FOM directs a reject in the high speed regime for 4 things:  Fire or Fire Warning, Engine Failure, Any type of windshear alert or warning and if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly.  That's it. 

So I have thought about what I'm going to abort for and it's those items.  Since other possible failures are filtered from my decision process by the inhibits, I don't have to look for all possible cockpit indications of problems and then determine if those are in my pre-thought-out list of high speed rejectable events and then decide to reject.  Barring some kind of runway excusion or other external event, If I don't see one of the 4 things I listed above between 80 knots and V1, then I'm going flying.

Some things I'm probably going to eventually declare an E for that might occur on takeoff (speaking now for the 767):  Most of the ones that the QRH directs a land at nearest suitable and some that don't.  Loss of generator or IDG with a deferred (MELed) APU in the Wx (so only one primary AC source), dual engine fuel filter issues, Anti-skid failure/fault, any single hyd failure since they all come with reduced spoiler panels operating on each wing (potential stopping issues) while in addition, the center system failure requires a higher landing speed and reduced landing flap setting using the alternate flap system, alternate gear extension and use of reserve brakes.  I'm not trying to start a secondary "when to declare" thread.  I realize there are lots of opinions.  Mine is declaring an E doesn't cost anything other than some extra paperwork and if I'm going to be dealing with possible stopping issues, dual engine issues or one more failure putting me on battery power in the wx then I want priority and equipment standing by.

Here are some examples of when inhibits occur during takeoff (FYI, there are also landing inhibits):

MD-11 - Warnings for some fires from V1 to 400' RA or 25 seconds airborne.  Lower priority cautions/alerts and the associated MC lights inhibited at either throttle advance, 80 knots or V1-20 until 400'/25 seconds airborne (some even inhibited until 1000' or 120 seconds airborne).  A couple of exceptions are Engine fire is not inhibited at V1 but the master warning light/aurals from it are until 400' and the tire failure isn't inhibited.

777 - All EICAS advisory messages and MC light w/ new EICAS caution level messages inhibited from 80 knots to 400'/20 seconds airborne, Master warning lights/fire bell from the first of V1 or rotation to 400'/25 seconds airborne

767 - Advisory messages inhibited from t/o thrust application to 400'/20 seconds airborne, MC lights and EICAS caution aurals from 80 knots to 400'/20 seconds after rotation (actual EICAS cautions not inhibited - just the sound), Master Warning lights/fire bells from rotation to 400' or 20 seconds elapsed.  A fire during inhibit will show an EICAS warning but no aurals until inhibit ends.

I agree with your "time is the enemy" comments to a degree.  But in some cases it depends on the aircraft.  None of the bleed air malfunctions in the 767 require land at nearest suitable.  All fuel related EICAS messages with the exception of L/R system pressure are advisory and I'll never even see them in the high speed regime.  So, to a large majority of today's pilots, many of those malfunctions you mention are not going to be evident or if they are, only a partial, inaudible caution during the critical time between 80 knots and V1.  That obviously excludes you and others flying 737s that don't inhibit cautions and advisories.  On my flight today with a medium TOW (322K out of 408K max), I had 18 seconds from 80 knots to V1.  I was PF.  Bleed, fuel, oil and hyd leaks or a bad generator were probably not going to manifest themselves in such a way that they would have been recognized in the early half of that 18 seconds for the FO to let me know in time.  No aurals and no MC lights while I'm looking outside through the HUD with a "go" mentality listening for only what I know can audibly warn me about 3 out of the 4 reasons I'm trained to reject at high speed.  We're simply not conditioned and trained to bring a silent EICAS message into the decision process between 80 knots and V1.

Yes, the non-rotating aircraft is an outlier.  I wasn't using it as an example of a high speed reject, but more to offer an example of an aircraft that is unsafe or isn't going to fly.  But, not really adding much to the discussion, I agree.

[Lord Ratner]

2 hours ago, JeremiahWeed said:

Sorry - Had to go fly.  Good discussion and I had some time to consider my response at cruise.  It's been over 20 years since I flew the 737 or A320 and I've rammed dumped them.  My more recent experience is on the MD-11, 777, 757 and I'm currently in the left seat of the 767.

First, I can already see we're coming at this from very different directions due to the lack of inhibits in your aircraft.  I'd be curious to hear from other 737 operators.  I'm really surprised that some of the newer versions don't have that feature.  So, from my perspective, the inhibits allow me to ignore the failures that have already been determined to be unworthy of a high speed reject.  All I need to know are the ones for which I am going to high speed reject.  The other ones I'm not going to know about (or can be ignored) until 400' on takeoff. 

My company FOM directs a reject in the high speed regime for 4 things:  Fire or Fire Warning, Engine Failure, Any type of windshear alert or warning and if the aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly.  That's it. 

So I have thought about what I'm going to abort for and it's those items.  Since other possible failures are filtered from my decision process by the inhibits, I don't have to look for all possible cockpit indications of problems and then determine if those are in my pre-thought-out list of high speed rejectable events and then decide to reject.  Barring some kind of runway excusion or other external event, If I don't see one of the 4 things I listed above between 80 knots and V1, then I'm going flying.

Some things I'm probably going to eventually declare an E for that might occur on takeoff (speaking now for the 767):  Most of the ones that the QRH directs a land at nearest suitable and some that don't.  Loss of generator or IDG with a deferred (MELed) APU in the Wx (so only one primary AC source), dual engine fuel filter issues, Anti-skid failure/fault, any single hyd failure since they all come with reduced spoiler panels operating on each wing (potential stopping issues) while in addition, the center system failure requires a higher landing speed and reduced landing flap setting using the alternate flap system, alternate gear extension and use of reserve brakes.  I'm not trying to start a secondary "when to declare" thread.  I realize there are lots of opinions.  Mine is declaring an E doesn't cost anything other than some extra paperwork and if I'm going to be dealing with possible stopping issues, dual engine issues or one more failure putting me on battery power in the wx then I want priority and equipment standing by.

Here are some examples of when inhibits occur during takeoff (FYI, there are also landing inhibits):

MD-11 - Warnings for some fires from V1 to 400' RA or 25 seconds airborne.  Lower priority cautions/alerts and the associated MC lights inhibited at either throttle advance, 80 knots or V1-20 until 400'/25 seconds airborne (some even inhibited until 1000' or 120 seconds airborne).  A couple of exceptions are Engine fire is not inhibited at V1 but the master warning light/aurals from it are until 400' and the tire failure isn't inhibited.

777 - All EICAS advisory messages and MC light w/ new EICAS caution level messages inhibited from 80 knots to 400'/20 seconds airborne, Master warning lights/fire bell from the first of V1 or rotation to 400'/25 seconds airborne

767 - Advisory messages inhibited from t/o thrust application to 400'/20 seconds airborne, MC lights and EICAS caution aurals from 80 knots to 400'/20 seconds after rotation (actual EICAS cautions not inhibited - just the sound), Master Warning lights/fire bells from rotation to 400' or 20 seconds elapsed.  A fire during inhibit will show an EICAS warning but no aurals until inhibit ends.

I agree with your "time is the enemy" comments to a degree.  But in some cases it depends on the aircraft.  None of the bleed air malfunctions in the 767 require land at nearest suitable.  All fuel related EICAS messages with the exception of L/R system pressure are advisory and I'll never even see them in the high speed regime.  So, to a large majority of today's pilots, many of those malfunctions you mention are not going to be evident or if they are, only a partial, inaudible caution during the critical time between 80 knots and V1.  That obviously excludes you and others flying 737s that don't inhibit cautions and advisories.  On my flight today with a medium TOW (322K out of 408K max), I had 18 seconds from 80 knots to V1.  I was PF.  Bleed, fuel, oil and hyd leaks or a bad generator were probably not going to manifest themselves in such a way that they would have been recognized in the early half of that 18 seconds for the FO to let me know in time.  No aurals and no MC lights while I'm looking outside through the HUD with a "go" mentality listening for only what I know can audibly warn me about 3 out of the 4 reasons I'm trained to reject at high speed.  We're simply not conditioned and trained to bring a silent EICAS message into the decision process between 80 knots and V1.

Yes, the non-rotating aircraft is an outlier.  I wasn't using it as an example of a high speed reject, but more to offer an example of an aircraft that is unsafe or isn't going to fly.  But, not really adding much to the discussion, I agree.

Dude the 737 is trash 😂🤣.

 

We don't have an aural warning for MC, something that always seemed crazy to me. Nothing is inhibited at any phase of flight other than a couple rare maintenance lights on the MAX. 

 

I think a big differentiator in the discussion is exactly related: the newer planes are just easier to fly broken than the 737, and much heavier making a high speed abort a bigger threat. Especially now that everything is carbon brakes. 

 

We have the same FOM abort criteria, and obviously it all comes down to "unsafe to fly." We don't have much of a definition for that. If you are declaring an emergency and landing at an unplanned airport, is it because the plane is safe to fly? Are we going to have "safety vehicles and equipment meeting us on the runway" because we are happy with the safety of the aircraft? 

 

Personally I agree that the right answer is to spend the time thinking about every EP or annunciation to decide what qualifies for a high speed abort. I'm also honest enough to admit that almost no one is doing that, and until my unreliable airspeed, neither was I.

 

I've asked about two dozen captains what they plan to do with unmatched airspeed at 80 knots. 1/3 have said "continue," 2/3 have said "abort." But only two were able to give their answer in less than 5 seconds. This is something we call out on every single flight. 

 

Apparently the training at AA used to be rigorous, similar to the Air Force. But it sure isn't now, and I've seen some captains positively flummoxed by some pretty simple malfunctions. That's not a critique of their ability, but of their preparation. There are second and third order effects to policies such as "we don't do high speed aborts," or in another version of this conversation, "the autopilot is better at flying than you." 

 

Good chat. I'd also like to hear what others are seeing. It's kind of funny, when you think about it, because now that all of these airplanes are monitoring how much runway is remaining and how far down they are, even the 737, you would think you could automate the process of "high speed abort" by doing some computer-speed math looking at the weight, runway condition, and runway remaining to give some sort of variable go/no-go speed and adjust the holy-shit-stomp-on-the-brakes pressure of the auto brakes. Aborting at 120 knots on a 13,000 foot runway is only scary because the plane absolutely mashes the brakes. But in Burbank, no thank you sir, we're taking off.

[TreeA10]

1960s design and technology has upgrade limits.  Too bad Boeing didn't do a clean sheet narrow body with design and tech features of the 78.

[Inertia17]

41 minutes ago, TreeA10 said:

1960s design and technology has upgrade limits.  Too bad Boeing didn't do a clean sheet narrow body with design and tech features of the 78.

Thanks Southwest...

[SurelySerious]

Thanks Southwest...

Don’t forget American’s large order for Max 8, and they didn’t volunteer for more training by equipping it with modern features such as the EICAS it already has screens (and all the computer data behind the scenes) for.

[JeremiahWeed]

6 hours ago, Lord Ratner said:

We have the same FOM abort criteria, and obviously it all comes down to "unsafe to fly." We don't have much of a definition for that. If you are declaring an emergency and landing at an unplanned airport, is it because the plane is safe to fly? Are we going to have "safety vehicles and equipment meeting us on the runway" because we are happy with the safety of the aircraft?

Ok.  If we have the same FOM reject criteria, then aside from the ambiguous "unable or unsafe to fly", then we're on the same page. I guess I feel like the industry statistics leading to us going into the air versus accepting a high speed reject are valid. In the high speed reject regime up to airborne, I can deal with the typical engine, oil, bleed air, hyd, etc. that might manifest during takeoff by 1) avoiding the risk of a high speed reject by not doing that and 2) mitigating the same issue with a lower speed, longer runway, lighter weight landing solution after takeoff and after checklist completion.

[Smokin]

The way I understand the development of the Max, is that if an airline is to blame, then it's American, not Southwest.  Apparently they went to Boeing looking for a big new order they wanted quick.  Boeing had a new airplane on the design sheets and said it would be X years until ready.  American said, thanks, guess we'll talk to Airbus.  Boeing said, wait, how bout an updated 737?  Now we're all stuck with the Max.

[uhhello]

38 minutes ago, Smokin said:

The way I understand the development of the Max, is that if an airline is to blame, then it's American, not Southwest.  Apparently they went to Boeing looking for a big new order they wanted quick.  Boeing had a new airplane on the design sheets and said it would be X years until ready.  American said, thanks, guess we'll talk to Airbus.  Boeing said, wait, how bout an updated 737?  Now we're all stuck with the Max.

And American would only sign the deal if it didn't require additional training.  

[TreeA10]

I only flew the 737-800 for 5 years and thought "WTF were they thinking building a brand new 30 year old jet." My personality favorite was leaving the brackets on the overhead panel that held CSD temperature gages that weren't there.

[HuggyU2]

On 2/9/2025 at 12:22 PM, brabus said:

We can’t be too hard on Huggy, he did do UPT in a Stearman and has spent a lot of time at altitudes with very little oxygen.

[Day Man]

honest question with no disrespect intended: are you the oldest dude to fly the U-2?

[nsplayr]

This, but Huggy has to look down to yell at the clouds 😎

[HuggyU2]

3 hours ago, Day Man said:

honest question with no disrespect intended: are you the oldest dude to fly the U-2?

No offense taken!  

I am 61. 

There are currently 2 guys flying that are 64:  One sits next to me and has about 3,500 hours and 1,000 - 1,100 sorties in The Deuce. 
The other flies the ER-2 for NASA out of Edwards, is a TPS grad and has a boatload of hours too. 

I believe that many moons ago, NASA allowed pilots older than 65 to fly and a few did. 
 

As an AF civilian pilot, I don't do anything "operational". But if you want to learn how to land her, do EP patterns, or fly in a spacesuit, then I'm your Huckleberry.