A new force structure?

[Clark Griswold]

As to  our current force structure, are we built to win the next fight(s) against China / Russia?

I've been thinking a bit on this lately and a few articles I've read are making me believe we need a change.  Peer competitors will not allow us to build up and then operate with impunity from MOBs near their territory or newly captured territory or areas they now assert control over in conflicts or high tension periods. 

One of the articles I read (WHY THE PENTAGON SHOULD FOCUS ON TAIWAN) and for the purposes of this thread's debate I will say we accept it.  One of the arguments from article is that if we use this scenario to primarily prepare for, it will also prepare us for other contingencies (Russian territorial aggression in the Baltic, Iranian actions to close the Staits of Hormuz, etc...), that's probably true.

My two cents:

They have seen that movie and know the ending therefore the Joint Team but specifically for this thread, the Air Force needs capabilities that are less vulnerable to attack at base, less reliant on a vulnerable enabling support capability (AR), capable of penetrating some level of the A2/AD system to deliver effects and with enough mass to absorb losses at least initially.and a more combat oriented and equipped Air Force.

Not a swipe but a respectful critique of the force we currently have but I don't think it can answer all of those requirements when facing the peer threats we say we need to pivot and prepare for.  In fairness, I doubt any platform or system of platforms can fully answer all of those requirements but we probably can build a better portfolio of platforms if we decide that our mission requirements and focus is to be a primarily longer ranged combat focused air force.  

All that said as I think we would have to do this inside of the current and realistic future budgets, like how the USMC is restructuring itself that there will be bill payers inside of the service vice Congress just appropriating more money for the new systems while maintaining legacy systems that while valuable, now fall lower on the priority list.  This is where the long knives come out and potentially nothing gets done.

So all that said, we need an Air Force that has greater range, greater numbers and is more focused on delivering desired effects directly in operations vice enabling other services with support. 

Agree, disagree or Shitter's full Clark?

[raimius]

Generally, yeah.

 

...are we saying a Hi/Low mix might make sense to get capability and capacity?  Not sure that is something we can say these days.

[jazzdude]

What if we write off that we probably can't realistically push back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and not try to meet them force on force there because we'd be at a significant disadvantage? Threaten retaliatory strikes on military/industrial/economic capability using TLAMs, conventional TBMs/ICMBs, cyber. Have a large coalition willing to boycott Chinese trade in the event they invade Taiwan. The name of the game is deterrence, caging China so it believes an invasion wouldn't be with the pain we'd inflict.

All this assumes Taiwan truly is vital to our interests, and not just posturing.

But my gut feeling is that if the only deterrence option on the table is direct force on force to defend Taiwan and just push Chinese forces back into China, that the equation heavily favors China with the home field advantage. Worst case is if it's to get our aircraft carriers involved in conflict, labeled as legitimate military targets, and directly attack strategic US capability, reducing our influence in the region/world

[Clark Griswold]

21 hours ago, raimius said:

Generally, yeah.

...are we saying a Hi/Low mix might make sense to get capability and capacity?  Not sure that is something we can say these days.

Not really a high / low mix per se but a change to a more strategic delivery preference for effects.  It is about capabilities ultimately but at some point that has to translate down into what kind of iron in what proportions of the total fleet so invariably it will be made out to be more bombers at the expense of what?  That's is the 69 billion dollar question but it's not the best way to articulate the question.

Hi / Low could still be made part of a newly balanced air fleet though.  Not every new platform would have to be LO.  Concur with your point on Hi / Low to get the right amount of capacity and capability, less expensive delivery platforms get unfairly tarnished IMHO when the platform may have less capability to afford greater numbers but to close the effects gap we add the capability into the weapons, sensors, equipment it carries for it's mission.

16 hours ago, jazzdude said:

What if we write off that we probably can't realistically push back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and not try to meet them force on force there because we'd be at a significant disadvantage? Threaten retaliatory strikes on military/industrial/economic capability using TLAMs, conventional TBMs/ICMBs, cyber. Have a large coalition willing to boycott Chinese trade in the event they invade Taiwan. The name of the game is deterrence, caging China so it believes an invasion wouldn't be with the pain we'd inflict.

All this assumes Taiwan truly is vital to our interests, and not just posturing.

But my gut feeling is that if the only deterrence option on the table is direct force on force to defend Taiwan and just push Chinese forces back into China, that the equation heavily favors China with the home field advantage. Worst case is if it's to get our aircraft carriers involved in conflict, labeled as legitimate military targets, and directly attack strategic US capability, reducing our influence in the region/world

I hear ya but I think keeping that coalition together would be difficult as China would focus on peeling them off one by one and most nations now are easily intimidated / bought off by them, no judgement against them as we have / still do the same but we are a far more benign hegemon but it's what great powers do.  Other issue is our business community would likely use their vast influence to undercut that threat as they would either have property destroyed or confiscated by the CCP during / after the conflict never to be made whole likely.  Destroying their actively attacking forces with limited Chinese homeland strikes (mil only) is probably the only COA the USG would / does really have to deter aggression.

I think Taiwan does rise to that level for our interests for several reasons but primarily for what it represents.  Like it or not, we have inherited this policy position and walking away from it would be interpreted as capitulation to China; defeat if conflict arises proves their supremacy in the SCS and would likely lead to a far more Chinese oriented world if not outright primary global leadership assumption by them.  For better or worse, unless China becomes something other than totally dominated by the CCP, we must ensure Taiwan is free and independent to maintain out world standing against the rival power.  Same with Russia in the Baltics and Ukraine, it just has to be otherwise we are diminished.

Your right they have a BIG home field advantage but as Taiwan is a well fortified and dug in, China is likely to give pause.  The best way we can assist in giving them assistance in deterring them from attacking is raising the probability that no matter how much they bring to the fight (ships, aircraft, uavs, etc...) it will be completely mauled on the way to Taiwan and when the surviving force arrives there, it will be hit again.  How to do that best in the Pacific theater ruled by the Tyranny of Distance is the question.

***********

Our two big foes have capable air forces and surface to surface fires along with other capabilities (anti-satellite, cyber, etc...) but their ability to project power is limited.  Close to their territory they are a force to be reckoned with, far from home their power diminishes significantly.  By increasing our capability to strike from longer ranges (distant bases) and from greater stand off ranges, we (the AF particularly) accentuate this weakness as our weapons will be launched before their platforms can intercept and our bases will have the maximum warning times if they choose to use very long range strike capabilities, if they can reach that far (AK, HI, Australian bases, etc...).  Longer ranged platforms can also draw the enemy to spread thin his forces by using some portion to draw him with feints and probes to distant quarters allowing for more likely successful attacks on now less well defended main areas.

AR can enable shorter ranged (not short range) platforms but that's a potential vulnerability and that vulnerability only increases with multiple AR events required per sortie or per ATO to accomplish the CFACC'S intent.  Not saying that we should throw out AR and shorter ranged platforms from the team but we need to acknowledge these risks and mitigate with different approaches to delivering effects in a theater(s) where we want our land based aircraft basing further from enemies home turf and needing fewer operational resources to execute a mission when launched .

Rebalancing the fleet to grow deep strike seems the best way to fight capable opponents.  The ugly part is who will be the bill payers if this is not funded via additions to the appropriation.

If the role of the Army diminishes as is likely with the "Pacific Pivot" does the Air Force require as large an Air Mobility capability then?

If more longer ranged platforms are purchased to operate in the vast Indo-Pacific theater, does this reduce the demand for Air Refueling?

If we (the AF) determine that using longer ranged platforms is the better COA, what is the right number of tactical / fighter platforms?

Not spears thrown but questions asked assuming resources are fixed and potentially less in future FYs.

[jazzdude]

The ugly part is who will be the bill payers if this is not funded via additions to the appropriation.
...
Not spears thrown but questions asked assuming resources are fixed and potentially less in future FYs.

I would assume, barring a direct and existential threat to the US, that our budget at best will be flat, if not likely reduced. So I agree that the challenge will be to find what gets cut to find any new capabilities.

Is the answer longer range strike assets? Maybe. But could also be longer range weapons on existing platforms. But that's based on the assumption of direct action, and we continue the current policy. However, keep in mind that policy is just policy, it's not written in stone and can be changed relatively easily, and not having a treaty means we have no formal obligations.

I don't fully buy your business argument with being concerned about american businesses operating in China. If we need to go to war, well, those businesses will likely be a casualty of war, and it's a business risk they took by going to a foreign country. We shouldn't ignore the business concern, but those concerns (for corporate interests) should be secondary to national interest aims/goals. If we as a nation are concerned though, we should be providing incentives to work with our partners and allies, and disincentives for working with China.

What's scary about China is their apparent ability to have a unified national policy, that encompasses their military, economic, and diplomatic goals. Maybe they can't project military power like we can, but they sure have been on a full court press to invest in other countries economically, building relationships and industries, and raising their influence while undercutting ours in the world through non military means.

[Clark Griswold]

12 hours ago, jazzdude said:

IIs the answer longer range strike assets? Maybe. But could also be longer range weapons on existing platforms. 

 

Possibly but the size, shape and volume of the 22 and 35 weapons bays are set and relatively small compared to bomber/arsenal platforms.  Larger bays will allows new, bigger or just different weapons be developed to deliver better effects. 

Article on this idea and advocating for greater deep strike capabilities:  https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/04/america-must-build-bomber-capacity-to-compete-in-the-pacific/

[jazzdude]

Possibly but the size, shape and volume of the 22 and 35 weapons bays are set and relatively small compared to bomber/arsenal platforms.  Larger bays will allows new, bigger or just different weapons be developed to deliver better effects. 
Article on this idea and advocating for greater deep strike capabilities:  https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/04/america-must-build-bomber-capacity-to-compete-in-the-pacific/

Interesting article, but ignores how to pay for it. Buying more B-21s or extending legacy bombers has a cost- so what gets cut? The article also points out the Navy will be retiring SSGNs in the 2030s, so I'm guessing they'll need to recapitalize the submarine force, so it'll be harder to try and take money from the Navy to pay for bombers if we're unwilling to cut anything.

But I agree with the article's premise. We're probably starting to move away from an emphasis on fighters (although kicking and screaming and trying to use the ACE concept as a solution to keep fighters relevant) with the pendulum swinging back towards favoring the long range bomber. Something about SAC will be back...

[Clark Griswold]

13 hours ago, jazzdude said:

Interesting article, but ignores how to pay for it. Buying more B-21s or extending legacy bombers has a cost- so what gets cut? The article also points out the Navy will be retiring SSGNs in the 2030s, so I'm guessing they'll need to recapitalize the submarine force, so it'll be harder to try and take money from the Navy to pay for bombers if we're unwilling to cut anything.

But I agree with the article's premise. We're probably starting to move away from an emphasis on fighters (although kicking and screaming and trying to use the ACE concept as a solution to keep fighters relevant) with the pendulum swinging back towards favoring the long range bomber. Something about SAC will be back...

 

That's the 69 billion dollar question...

The way to start that ugly debate is not which MDS by how much or how many bases but what capabilities / missions are we prioritizing over others and then seeing how far down the to-do list produced based on the funding we are allocated, how we plan to fight with the rest of the Joint Team and what will be our policy on involvement, expectations of Allies in their own defense and our risk tolerance in regards to casualties.

The primary role of the AF IMHO going forward planning for peer conventional conflicts would be to deliver effects at ranges greater than carrier based Naval Aviation or conventional, non-dispersed ops, land based fighters relying heavily on AR  (multiple events on ingress) to enable their missions could deliver, other missions that support or enable that primary mission are important but the optimized size and method of delivering those deep strike effects is the first priority.  Doesn't mean priorities two, three, etc... are resourced far less but we have to realistically look at how to fund with what we have been appropriated.

Edited November 6, 2020 by Clark Griswold

[jazzdude]

I agree with most of what you said, though when you're talking capabilities, it quickly becomes a discussion about MWS's, and turns into the A-10 debacle.

Doesn't mean priorities two, three, etc... are resourced far less but we have to realistically look at how to fund with what we have been appropriated.

No matter what Generals may say in public about priorities, priorities are truly set by budget. If something is an important, it'll get fully funded. If it's important but less of a priority, it'll get at least partial funding. Things that don't get funded? Well, it's not really a priority, despite whatever rhetoric surrounds it.

And it's not just the AF that sets the priorities, but Congress gets to weigh in with the defense authorisation and appropriations bills, and can adjust funding (aka priority) as well. And the AF can only spend money on what Congress both authorizes and appropriates, with little ability to move money around without asking Congress for permission first.

[Clark Griswold]

13 hours ago, jazzdude said:

I agree with most of what you said, though when you're talking capabilities, it quickly becomes a discussion about MWS's, and turns into the A-10 debacle.

No matter what Generals may say in public about priorities, priorities are truly set by budget. If something is an important, it'll get fully funded. If it's important but less of a priority, it'll get at least partial funding. Things that don't get funded? Well, it's not really a priority, despite whatever rhetoric surrounds it.

And it's not just the AF that sets the priorities, but Congress gets to weigh in with the defense authorization and appropriations bills, and can adjust funding (aka priority) as well. And the AF can only spend money on what Congress both authorizes and appropriates, with little ability to move money around without asking Congress for permission first.

No disagreement the when the operational environment changes and the AF needs to reconfigure itself, the reasonable discussion about requirements, capabilities and priorities quickly degenerates into food fights of don't kill my MDS, kill the other guy's MDS but it must be had.  It will come to that after a formal declaration of requirements, assigned missions and then material requirements to accomplish those comes out.

I've not thrown around what I think needs to be cut as it is more important to say what is it we want the military to do, the AF to do and then what do we need to do that so...

We want the US military to primarily (in regards to major conventional conflict with peer and militarily capable opponents) deter conflict and conclude conflicts on our terms with minimal US & Allied casualties and minimal collateral damage.  The AF's primary role now is to deliver decisive long range strikes destroying aggressing enemy forces and enemy defenses that could impede conflict termination on US terms.  To accomplish this the fleet of aircraft, manned and unmanned, will be focused around long range strike platforms, protecting and enabling those platforms and supporting our Joint and Allied partners with Mobility, Attack, SOF, C2 and ISR platforms.

Now comes the nitty gritty...  grow bombers, design / build arsenal platforms, divest 4th gen fighters to grow / sustain 5th gen fighters, fix the KC-46 whatever it takes, focus on Strategic Air Mobility at the expense of Tactical Air Mobility if required, retain an Attack capability, asses SOF requirements and build out a fleet to support SOF in grey zone to medium threat environments, look at the feasibility of consolidating C2 & ISR to one modular type.  Much more would follow but I'm only one dude on the internet.

As to whether or not something gets fully funded if it is important I would say maybe, reference the B-2 and F-22.  Sometimes you can lead the horse to water but it just won't drink.

True Congress has the ultimate authority and should but it will likely take its cues from the AF, unless it means that something won't get built in a district of the Chairmen then just shut up.

[Chuck17]

What if I told you that the economy is so f’ed and the national debt is so immense that the future of austerity is going to drive force structure and mission changes anyway, as all the services and our Executive/Legislative Branch leaders face the choice of destroying the country with debt (not to mention entitlements), or remaining in far flung missions around the globe?

If that doesn’t get you thinking, what if I instead told you that everyone else’s economy is also as f’ed as ours was by the ‘Rona, so nobody (not even China) is any better or worse off respectfully, and everything will go on as before...? 

We don’t know which is true yet, but I’d offer that regardless of who wins the WH, there are massive cuts coming to the DoD - either as a second term “look how efficient I am” win, or as a matter of policy to pay for entitlements. Either way, a new force structure is coming, and not just in the service... I think the legacy of Goldwater-Nichols and the Combatant Commands are on the block too.

Churchill said it first: “we are out of money, time to think...”

Chuck

 

Edited November 7, 2020 by Chuck17

[pbar]

The sad thing is everybody are so emotionally invested in programs, we can't even have the discussion about what to cut.  People just lose their minds when you bring up their pet thing and refuse to even consider it.  For example, Service Academies, two ground branches, EUCOM, etc.  Just watch how much flak I will draw for mentioning those few items.  I personally think DoD could take a massive cut without significantly endangering our national security IF AND ONLY IF we were willing to make the hard choices. 

[jazzdude]

[Negatory]

The question really comes down to what is national security? It’s less and less an ability to act, and more an ability to have influence and deter.

I agree we have to pick our influence and we’re spread out too thin. If I was king for a day I would slash the vast majority (talking 70%+) of operational funding for CENTCOM/EUCOM and tell them to figure it out. COCOMs are a DISASTER, where they request the world every time and have literally no incentive to be efficient with their resources. Instead, MAJCOMs are supposed to “push back,” which basically never happens in a meaningful way.

This leads to Russia getting almost the same foreign policy effects as us by flying 2 flankers twice a day around in circles with a couple of S-400s on the ground. In comparison, we’ll fly 20-30 airplanes at a time 24/7 in those theaters. Now that’s a waste of money and time.
 

We need to focus on credible deterrence, so take the vast majority of that money and funnel it into acquisitions - which needs to be unified at the SECDEF level so we aren’t all simultaneously working on the same thing. Improve our networks, cyber, space, and weapons for common integration. The rest of the repatriated money can go to training. I hate to say it, but we probably also need drones that can do the low end A-A mission so that we don’t have F-22s and F-35s bleeding money and longevity by intercepting airliners over Baghdad during 8 hour missions. The MQ-9 can basically already do 90% what the F-15E/F-16 would be tasked for in these theaters.

Same thing goes for all the ground troops we have deployed to the theater over the last few years. Its almost a pointless expense when it comes to national influence. Downsize the army/marine AD side significantly, bring them into the reserves, save money with a loss of combat power - but it’s combat power that we likely won’t need in the extreme short term, so hopefully the gamble will work out. 
 

Tough decisions. But we have to stop wasting our time in theaters that net us nothing other than debt. Focus back up on credible deterrence and technology or else we are doomed to lose the long game to China.

 

Edited November 7, 2020 by Negatory

[Clark Griswold]

15 hours ago, Chuck17 said:

What if I told you that the economy is so f’ed and the national debt is so immense that the future of austerity is going to drive force structure and mission changes anyway, as all the services and our Executive/Legislative Branch leaders face the choice of destroying the country with debt (not to mention entitlements), or remaining in far flung missions around the globe?

If that doesn’t get you thinking, what if I instead told you that everyone else’s economy is also as f’ed as ours was by the ‘Rona, so nobody (not even China) is any better or worse off respectfully, and everything will go on as before...? 

We don’t know which is true yet, but I’d offer that regardless of who wins the WH, there are massive cuts coming to the DoD - either as a second term “look how efficient I am” win, or as a matter of policy to pay for entitlements. Either way, a new force structure is coming, and not just in the service... I think the legacy of Goldwater-Nichols and the Combatant Commands are on the block too.

Churchill said it first: “we are out of money, time to think...”

Chuck

I would tell you that I agree our debt is looming and in 2024 I believe it was reported considering our current financial vector that interest on the debt will be greater than the currently projected DoD appropriation but it seems like the incoming (assuming no states are changed in recounts) leadership cadre still believe deficits don't matter.  That's not my opinion mind you but not what they apparently thing.

Reference this article on what is believed to be what a Democrat administration's defense and force structure outlook will possibly be:

What Clinton’s Foreign Affairs Article May Mean for the Defense Budget

From the article:

Clinton notes that “critics will no doubt warn that running up the national debt is itself a national security risk,” but then goes on to assert that “there is a growing consensus among economists that Washington need not be paralyzed by fears of debt.” 

I think that is wishful thinking at best and lunacy at worst as the more debt you take on the higher risk you become the greater the interest rates your creditors demand, rinse lather repeat and the debt spiral tightens up but if you take this article as most likely what they are thinking, we will probably see DoD budgets around the same size with some significant trimming but not cataclysmic cuts.

Going back to the above linked article which touches on force structure, base closures, political ramifications, etc... HRC in her FP article (locked behind a paywall) seems to favor the Deep Strike shift for the AF at the expense/tradeoff of the F-35:

From the article:

In terms of specific cuts, the program she takes on most directly is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, citing its dependence on vulnerable close-in bases due to its short range.

She's not a decision maker but influential in their circles, this shift could happen.  IMHO should happen but in a way that keeps the shift towards 5th gen in the fighter enterprise on track.  I would revise my earlier statement on 4th gen divestment and say the the USAF should consider 4th gen divestment if it allowed for a best mix acquisition of 4th+ gen and 5th gen, then with the changes/focus listed above.

The Indo-Pacific and with a reduced Euro footprint will require more strategic platforms to respond to crisis from the CONUS or well distant from the threat forward bases in theater.  Larger payloads, range and with the emphasis on sudden rapid reaction to large conventional aggressions vice sustained support to a COIN-LIC operation.

Not exactly paradoxically, an austere field/dispersed ops capability in the AF inventory would probably be worth studying.  Another problem for the enemy to solve and likely affordable to give the capability to respond to less than peer conflicts if needed in theater.  Insurgency suppression, localized deterrence, etc... probably a combo team of manned and unmanned systems.  

11 hours ago, Negatory said:

The question really comes down to what is national security? It’s less and less an ability to act, and more an ability to have influence and deter.

I agree we have to pick our influence and we’re spread out too thin. If I was king for a day I would slash the vast majority (talking 70%+) of operational funding for CENTCOM/EUCOM and tell them to figure it out. COCOMs are a DISASTER, where they request the world every time and have literally no incentive to be efficient with their resources. Instead, MAJCOMs are supposed to “push back,” which basically never happens in a meaningful way.

This leads to Russia getting almost the same foreign policy effects as us by flying 2 flankers twice a day around in circles with a couple of S-400s on the ground. In comparison, we’ll fly 20-30 airplanes at a time 24/7 in those theaters. Now that’s a waste of money and time.

We need to focus on credible deterrence, so take the vast majority of that money and funnel it into acquisitions - which needs to be unified at the SECDEF level so we aren’t all simultaneously working on the same thing. Improve our networks, cyber, space, and weapons for common integration. The rest of the repatriated money can go to training. I hate to say it, but we probably also need drones that can do the low end A-A mission so that we don’t have F-22s and F-35s bleeding money and longevity by intercepting airliners over Baghdad during 8 hour missions. The MQ-9 can basically already do 90% what the F-15E/F-16 would be tasked for in these theaters.

Same thing goes for all the ground troops we have deployed to the theater over the last few years. Its almost a pointless expense when it comes to national influence. Downsize the army/marine AD side significantly, bring them into the reserves, save money with a loss of combat power - but it’s combat power that we likely won’t need in the extreme short term, so hopefully the gamble will work out. 

Tough decisions. But we have to stop wasting our time in theaters that net us nothing other than debt. Focus back up on credible deterrence and technology or else we are doomed to lose the long game to China.

This.

[Clark Griswold]

Good discussion on Force Structure change and the need for it, resistance to it, etc... worth the time:

https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/change-or-die/

[panchbarnes]

On 11/7/2020 at 7:42 AM, pbar said:

The sad thing is everybody are so emotionally invested in programs, we can't even have the discussion about what to cut.  People just lose their minds when you bring up their pet thing and refuse to even consider it.  For example, Service Academies, two ground branches, EUCOM, etc.  Just watch how much flak I will draw for mentioning those few items.  I personally think DoD could take a massive cut without significantly endangering our national security IF AND ONLY IF we were willing to make the hard choices. 

In the run-up to the election, there were speculations of the new Space Force going away under the Biden administration.  Wouldn't surprise me as it's an easy target.

Just like the  previous Democrat administrations, the Biden administration will be face significant pressure from the Left to reallocate DOD funding to social programs.  This administration will face bigger internal pressure than previous Presidents because of the recent civil unrest, the economy, and the proliferation of "social media as a weapon system©".

I think we will see an amplified version of the Obama era foreign policy to contain our "adversaries" (JCPOA), lots of coalition building around the world.

Pure speculation on my part.

[FLEA]

2 hours ago, panchbarnes said:

In the run-up to the election, there were speculations of the new Space Force going away under the Biden administration.  Wouldn't surprise me as it's an easy target.

Just like the  previous Democrat administrations, the Biden administration will be face significant pressure from the Left to reallocate DOD funding to social programs.  This administration will face bigger internal pressure than previous Presidents because of the recent civil unrest, the economy, and the proliferation of "social media as a weapon system©".

I think we will see an amplified version of the Obama era foreign policy to contain our "adversaries" (JCPOA), lots of coalition building around the world.

Pure speculation on my part.

I don't think they can. Space Force was signed into law and is now under title 10 correct? They would need to pass a bill through both houses again to get rid of it. 

[pawnman]

4 hours ago, panchbarnes said:

In the run-up to the election, there were speculations of the new Space Force going away under the Biden administration.  Wouldn't surprise me as it's an easy target.

Just like the  previous Democrat administrations, the Biden administration will be face significant pressure from the Left to reallocate DOD funding to social programs.  This administration will face bigger internal pressure than previous Presidents because of the recent civil unrest, the economy, and the proliferation of "social media as a weapon system©".

I think we will see an amplified version of the Obama era foreign policy to contain our "adversaries" (JCPOA), lots of coalition building around the world.

Pure speculation on my part.

If it's a return to Obama-era foreign policy, I'm not sure how you could afford to make cuts to the military.  For a guy who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama sure did like to commit the US to new conflicts.

[panchbarnes]

49 minutes ago, pawnman said:

If it's a return to Obama-era foreign policy, I'm not sure how you could afford to make cuts to the military.  For a guy who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama sure did like to commit the US to new conflicts.

Don't worry, the GOs believe AI, 5G, Cloud, IoT, UPT Next, optionally-manned and other buzzwords will enhance warfighters lethality and efficiency, while allowing the DoD to right size manning structure and reduce financial obligations.

I wouldn't be surprised if A1 is searching on the shared drive for the 2014 Force Shaping AFSC/YG matrix spreadsheet as we speak...

/s

Edited November 11, 2020 by panchbarnes

[panchbarnes]

3 hours ago, FLEA said:

I don't think they can. Space Force was signed into law and is now under title 10 correct? They would need to pass a bill through both houses again to get rid of it. 

You may be right, I don't have the answer to your question.  I did find the below article just now...

'“For the Air Force, I would expect trims in the F-35 buy in the outyears, slower bomber progress, [intercontinental ballistic missile] cuts,” he said. It’s also possible Democrats could try to scale back ambitious plans for the Space Force, such as growing it into a separate department like the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Harrison cautioned against pulling back investment in military space as a “knee-jerk reaction” to undo the Trump administration’s work. He expects the Space Force is here to stay, but that other pieces of the military space enterprise could face more scrutiny.'

Overall, an interesting article.

https://www.airforcemag.com/what-a-biden-administration-means-for-defense/

 

Edited November 11, 2020 by panchbarnes

[Clark Griswold]

4 hours ago, panchbarnes said:

In the run-up to the election, there were speculations of the new Space Force going away under the Biden administration.  Wouldn't surprise me as it's an easy target.

Just like the  previous Democrat administrations, the Biden administration will be face significant pressure from the Left to reallocate DOD funding to social programs.  This administration will face bigger internal pressure than previous Presidents because of the recent civil unrest, the economy, and the proliferation of "social media as a weapon system©".

I think we will see an amplified version of the Obama era foreign policy to contain our "adversaries" (JCPOA), lots of coalition building around the world.

Pure speculation on my part.

Maybe as to defense cuts or really more likely IMHO reductions in the budget increment FY to FY, maybe zero increment. 

Biden if he becomes POTUS (the most likely thing to happen but he's not yet officially POTUS-elect) will survey the security environment and see we have to pull back or reduce where it's really just because we've been there forever (Germany, UK, Spain, SK) and divest what we really don't need in current quantities or at all.  This is not a peace dividend but a reallocation to a combat oriented force capable of defeating peer competitors that have been building systems and tactics to asymmetrically destroy or deny what the US has grown accustomed to having in recent combat operations.

31 minutes ago, pawnman said:

If it's a return to Obama-era foreign policy, I'm not sure how you could afford to make cuts to the military.  For a guy who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, Obama sure did like to commit the US to new conflicts.

True but the appetite is just not there and the Globalist / Neo-cons know this, rather than stir the populist pot again I think they will eschew long term military missions to "fix" things in areas of the world not in our interests (hopefully).  A Republican Senate and shrunken Democrat House majority also reduce the chance of pointless missions I hope.

This idea of Force Structure change is not just for the AF, all of the branches are going to have change to deter, defeat and shape the missions that we have to and will be sent on by the pols.  Holding on to MDSs that were designed to support large scale ground maneuver warfare or the mass movement of ground forces to respond to crises in distant theaters is not where we need to spend finite resources as we would not intervene in those conflicts in that manner (likely after 20+ years of large scale ground operations with mixed results).  Our allies and partners can expect warheads on foreheads in support if we deem it necessary but not boots on the ground for the most part in defeating aggression against them, we should configure accordingly. 

[VMFA187]

As a fighter pilot I find it hard to say this, but more funding for the Navy's subsurface fleet would probably be the best spent money for our taxpayers. 

Regarding fighters, I truly think something along the idea of the modern Century series would be worthwhile. Make an aircraft that is good at one or two things and give it connectivity. A large platform with great loiter ability and large internal payload capacity could enable greater standoff and thus less requirement for stealth and tanker capability with an Advanced LRAAM. TPT through other means. Perhaps even the missiles could have loiter capability? 

Who knows, let Skunk Works figure out the details. I'm just a Marine with a social science degree from Florida State. 

[jazzdude]

and give it connectivity.

This is the challenge. Network protocols and the underlying standards and infrastructure isn't sexy or really all that tangible to most, making it hard to justify/defend funding for it. It also doesn't really fit how we budget for programs, as it's something that goes across multiple platforms. Each vendor/contractor/program office pushed their own solution, and you end up with:

https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/standards.png

Which is why F-22s can't talk to F-35s can't talk to Gen 4 aircraft.

[Negatory]

4 hours ago, jazzdude said:

 

 

This is the challenge. Network protocols and the underlying standards and infrastructure isn't sexy or really all that tangible to most, making it hard to justify/defend funding for it. It also doesn't really fit how we budget for programs, as it's something that goes across multiple platforms. Each vendor/contractor/program office pushed their own solution, and you end up with:

https://imgs.xkcd.com/comics/standards.png

Which is why F-22s can't talk to F-35s can't talk to Gen 4 aircraft.

 

This is an easy elephant in the room problem. Make a Mil-STD that will actually work for 50 years from now and allows for growth. Make it include all of the services from submarines to satellites. Then make a joint SPO to manage the US military’s data links. Force everyone to comply to the underlying structure. Stop developing platform specific solutions.

Will never happen because DT/OT/acq is so platform/service specific that we shoot ourselves in the foot.