A new force structure?

[pawnman]

6 minutes ago, Negatory said:

This is an easy elephant in the room problem. Make a Mil-STD that will actually work for 50 years from now and allows for growth. Make it include all of the services from submarines to satellites. Then make a joint SPO to manage the US military’s data links. Force everyone to comply to the underlying structure. Stop developing platform specific solutions.

Will never happen because DT/OT/acq is so platform/service specific that we shoot ourselves in the foot.

Part of the problem is that it's difficult to know what will work 50 years from now.  Do you think engineers in the 70s had any inkling how dependent we would be on GPS, internet, VOIP phones, email, and Link-16?

How do you expect to write a Mil-STD that will still work in 2070?

[jazzdude]

This is an easy elephant in the room problem. Make a Mil-STD that will actually work for 50 years from now and allows for growth. Make it include all of the services from submarines to satellites. Then make a joint SPO to manage the US military’s data links. Force everyone to comply to the underlying structure. Stop developing platform specific solutions.
Will never happen because DT/OT/acq is so platform/service specific that we shoot ourselves in the foot.

Sounds easy, but everyone's got their own way of doing things (my way isthe best way...) and things they think they absolutely need, when maybe they don't in reality. It's essentially building a military internet of things for weapon systems.

If you could get all stakeholders on board on how to package info and transmit it, the technical engineering from there should be fairly straightforward.

Then you run into problem 2- who pays for the upgrades to individual platforms, both hardware and software, in a timely manner?

There are people (at least in the air force) wanting to move this way, but it's hard to get funding because networks are intangible (especially compared to getting a shiny new jet or improved weapon). You have to cut a capabilities elsewhere to fund the effort, as well as to get everyone that needs to be on the net on the net, otherwise there's no point in investing in the network in the first place.

[SurelySerious]

5 hours ago, pawnman said:

Part of the problem is that it's difficult to know what will work 50 years from now.  Do you think engineers in the 70s had any inkling how dependent we would be on GPS, internet, VOIP phones, email, and Link-16?

How do you expect to write a Mil-STD that will still work in 2070?

Exactly. Good luck guessing five years down the road, let alone 50. 

[Clark Griswold]

12 hours ago, VMFA187 said:

As a fighter pilot I find it hard to say this, but more funding for the Navy's subsurface fleet would probably be the best spent money for our taxpayers. 

Regarding fighters, I truly think something along the idea of the modern Century series would be worthwhile. Make an aircraft that is good at one or two things and give it connectivity. A large platform with great loiter ability and large internal payload capacity could enable greater standoff and thus less requirement for stealth and tanker capability with an Advanced LRAAM. TPT through other means. Perhaps even the missiles could have loiter capability? 

Who knows, let Skunk Works figure out the details. I'm just a Marine with a social science degree from Florida State. 

Concur.

Limiting roles/missions can lead to savings, which can lead to larger fleet sizes, focus on those particular missions, etc...  in reference to the Century Series, the proposed XF-108 Rapier would be good inspiration for a long range, long endurance escort/patrol interceptor for the Indo-Pacific and another likely theater with the tyranny of distance, the Artic.

Just for a visual:

  

Teamed with a very long range/endurance UCAV, this could be help cover the gaps and deliver fires without taxing the resources needed for shorter ranged assets that will have to also be part of the fight even if the AF fleet is shifted to favor more long range strike.

Question for you @VMFA187 - what do you think of the Commandant's plan to restructure the USMC?

[Breckey]

Then you run into problem 2- who pays for the upgrades to individual platforms, both hardware and software, in a timely manner?

We sort of did this with Mode 5 IFF.

[brabus]

12 hours ago, Negatory said:

This is an easy elephant in the room problem. Make a Mil-STD that will actually work for 50 years from now and allows for growth. Make it include all of the services from submarines to satellites. Then make a joint SPO to manage the US military’s data links. Force everyone to comply to the underlying structure. Stop developing platform specific solutions.

Will never happen because DT/OT/acq is so platform/service specific that we shoot ourselves in the foot.

The F-35 and its JPO is a textbook example of why this is a horrible idea. It seems good on paper, but it doesn’t work in execution. I can’t wait for the day when the JPO burns to the ground, we tell everyone else to fuck off, and have an AF SPO. The next step is the AF buys the code and we don’t have to rely on Lockheed. I’ll never see it, but I hope the guys in the future do. 

[Negatory]

The F-35 is a good cautionary tale of how letting congress and the marine corps acquire things that they have no expertise in is bad. So maybe you’re right that the military integrates so poorly, currently, that the Air Force would screw up army stuff and the navy would mess up the Air Force and everyone would mess up space/cyber.

Hell, just make a standard that works for 20 years from now and double the bandwidth, # of players, and the data rate. Link 16, on the open source unclassified side, is ~250 MHz and a relatively low data rate (Was decent for its inception). Literally just make that something that would work for multi-service integration for standard hot spots in the world and give it some amount of buffer and you’ll be better off. Maybe 50 years is aggressive, but I firmly believe when it comes to computers you have to do generational upgrades, not incremental. We’re due for a generational upgrade soon, IMO.

[Negatory]

7 hours ago, SurelySerious said:

Exactly. Good luck guessing five years down the road, let alone 50. 

I mean, that’s acquisitions role. And they could do a better job than not trying at all.

I guess my point is that requirements - the first step in the dumb way we do acquisitions - can be done better. Get a more realistic and actually integration focused group from all of the DoD together to come up with how to do this stuff. I’m not hopeless that we couldn’t get close.

[brabus]

The funny thing is it’s 2020 and the navy and AF still can’t even agree on which J-series message to use for some things. Hopefully MESH pans out for the DOD sooner rather than later. 

[jazzdude]

I mean, that’s acquisitions role. And they could do a better job than not trying at all.
I guess my point is that requirements - the first step in the dumb way we do acquisitions - can be done better. Get a more realistic and actually integration focused group from all of the DoD together to come up with how to do this stuff. I’m not hopeless that we couldn’t get close.

Determining requirements is not acquisition's role... It's the role of A5/8.

Not to say acquisitions can't be improved, but they don't steer the ship and set the vision for capability, they play a supporting role in attaining the vision/plan set forth by A5/8.

[Negatory]

1 hour ago, jazzdude said:

 

 

Determining requirements is not acquisition's role... It's the role of A5/8.

Not to say acquisitions can't be improved, but they don't steer the ship and set the vision for capability, they play a supporting role in attaining the vision/plan set forth by A5/8.

 

Yeah, I know generally A5/A8 are the folks that set requirements. For the purposes of this discussion, that makes them an integral part of acquisitions, as the acquisition process starts by saying “I need something.” If you’re concerned I’m saying that DT/OT are the ones coming up with the next force structure, I’m not.

And if we’d like to really dig into it, I think that a lot of the blame for what has happened the last 20 years falls on A5/A8/A9 being run by untrained or unqualified folks that DON’T understand their impact or importance in the acquisitions process. In fact, bump that out to J5/J8/J9.

[VMFA187]

On 11/13/2020 at 9:36 PM, Clark Griswold said:

Concur.

Limiting roles/missions can lead to savings, which can lead to larger fleet sizes, focus on those particular missions, etc...  in reference to the Century Series, the proposed XF-108 Rapier would be good inspiration for a long range, long endurance escort/patrol interceptor for the Indo-Pacific and another likely theater with the tyranny of distance, the Artic.

Just for a visual:

  

Teamed with a very long range/endurance UCAV, this could be help cover the gaps and deliver fires without taxing the resources needed for shorter ranged assets that will have to also be part of the fight even if the AF fleet is shifted to favor more long range strike.

Question for you @VMFA187 - what do you think of the Commandant's plan to restructure the USMC?

I like that XF-108 concept. Large enough to carry extended range A/A missiles and plenty of gas to launch them high and fast to keep the decidedly non-stealthy platform out of range of potential threats. 

I think the move is valid on the part of the Marine Corps. Getting rid of weapon platforms like tanks, for us, is smart in the age of drones and such - Leave those weapon systems to the Army who is the large, occupying force that might be required to fight lesser equipped enemies. Keep us small, agile, and specialized. That being said, I don't pretend to know much about the Marine Corps outside of the aviation element. 

[VMFA187]

On 11/14/2020 at 3:34 AM, Negatory said:

The F-35 is a good cautionary tale of how letting congress and the marine corps acquire things that they have no expertise in is bad. So maybe you’re right that the military integrates so poorly, currently, that the Air Force would screw up army stuff and the navy would mess up the Air Force and everyone would mess up space/cyber.

 

Concur. We should have bought a mix of As and Cs. I can only think of a few limited scenarios where having Bs might provide an advantage. 

[Clark Griswold]

4 hours ago, VMFA187 said:

I like that XF-108 concept. Large enough to carry extended range A/A missiles and plenty of gas to launch them high and fast to keep the decidedly non-stealthy platform out of range of potential threats. 

I think the move is valid on the part of the Marine Corps. Getting rid of weapon platforms like tanks, for us, is smart in the age of drones and such - Leave those weapon systems to the Army who is the large, occupying force that might be required to fight lesser equipped enemies. Keep us small, agile, and specialized. That being said, I don't pretend to know much about the Marine Corps outside of the aviation element. 

Yup - Interceptor not fighter.  With the capability of technology (Combat ID, Cross cue, Datalink, Sensor Fusion, etc...) and the capability of modern weapons, this platform would fight with those in mind and eschew situations where it would be kinematically at a disadvantage and avoid the knife fight in a phone booth.  

Range, Weapons Capacity, Sensors, Speed - in that order.  Just my idea on what they need to bring to enable/support the LO deep strike platforms and defend HVAAs over large AORs.  Now keeping the cost to something reasonable is the really tall order but likely not insurmountable if good idea fairy is kept at arm's length.

Copy on USMC plans.  From what I've gathered and my little knowledge of amphibious warfare, it sounds like a good idea for the likely next fight(s) in the SCS and Scandinavian/Baltic scenarios.

Edited November 16, 2020 by Clark Griswold

[Clark Griswold]

Related to Force Structure:

US Air Force chief’s top modernization priorities aren’t what you think they are

BLUF:  Nuclear Enterprise, Joint C2 system(s) and Better / Faster Acquisitions.

How to pay for that though and what will be divested is the question I have, just to be a broken record there is likely no extra check in the mail so something's gotta give...

[Clark Griswold]

Restart

Read this this morning and been thinking a bit on what comes next in the world:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/21/ukraine-invasion-putin-goals-what-expect/

So the old order goes away and we have a new order or a return to something like the old order, great power rivalry, overt spheres of influence and high tension areas occasionally going hot.

What do we do or propose to do militarily to prepare for this?  I got asked this question by a family member interested in military/current events/strategy and discussed, he asked what do we need?  10, 20% more military funding, that was what he thought would be a start and I was kinda negative on that idea as I told him that would only get 10-20% more military as we have it now which is to say increasing the military budget by X doesn't translate to a corresponding X increase in military capability due to bloat in non military capabilities inherent to the modern military for various reasons that have always been within the DoD but of late seem worse.

So how do you get more tooth than tail if you get an increase in DoD appropriation?

Do we use that to return to a 2 major conflicts or a 2 plus 2 major / minor conflict strategy?  

Is conscription a necessary evil to put 69,000 boots on the ground where necessary?

Just rhetorical questions but as presence in theater is likely to be part of the strategy, things have to get cheaper to afford more of them - what should that mean for us as our costs and preferences have gone further to the idea of few and exquisite vs the many and cheap?  Would this idea or strategy apply to personnel (junior and likely short term on service)?  Restrictions on number of dependents claimed, limits on the growth of pay / benefits, further pension & veteran benefit reforms, etc...

That is assuming a Russian victory in Ukraine and aggressive posturing and pressuring in Europe requiring a renewed American military footprint to reinforce allies, to deter further aggression, likewise in the Indo-Pacific, in the ME at strategic points (Straits of Hormuz for ex)… how to afford it?  

That is to be good and capable of being everywhere (albeit at various levels of presence for each theater) but still affordable and creditable?

Edited March 6, 2022 by Clark Griswold

[12xu2a3x3]

it's important to remember that a lot of the century series fighters were designed for one thing and ended up doing another. we could easily find ourselves in the same situation if we're not much more deliberate and cautious. obviously, the conditions of needing to rapidly field aircraft, a lack of computing power and other problems of the era contributed, but it's still pretty damning.

F-100: built as a replacement for the non-interceptor versions of the F-86, ended up doing CAS/BAI in RVN because it was too slow to fly in NVN, flew in the guard basically as a fast jet placeholder

F-101: built as a both a tactical nuke delivery system and and interceptor, did both jobs but was most useful doing Tac Recce over NVN, flew in the guard as an interceptor for ADC but was basically a placeholder

F-102: built as an interceptor, flew as an interceptor, did limited CAS/BAI

F-104: build as an interceptor, impressive performance but lackluster in many other ways, became a lackluster, notionally multi-role aircraft like the F-100

F-105: built as a tactical nuke delivery, did the job, pressed into service dropping M-117s on innocent people, lot good people ended up dead or in hoa lo prision.

F-106: built as an interceptor, flew as one, not utilized despite of it's obvious potential as an air superiority fighter, probably due to ADC owning them, lots of proprietary equipment like SAGE, and TAC being fulling in on the F-4

F-4: build to pick up the slack, essentially the genesis of multirole

not telling anyone anything they don't already know, just reminding

[Clark Griswold]

On 3/13/2022 at 12:30 PM, 12xu2a3x3 said:

it's important to remember that a lot of the century series fighters were designed for one thing and ended up doing another. we could easily find ourselves in the same situation if we're not much more deliberate and cautious. 

True and critiques of the Century Series are legitimate, I think they (the Centuries) get a harsher debrief than they really deserved but ce la vie

There is a point to being deliberate and cautious in acquisition and development but there is a point to going Leroy Jenkins sometimes and just trying something new.  I think the key is to not bet too much of the farm on it so that if it does go tango uniform that it is not catastrophic.  That was one of the good points of the Centuries, they were relatively affordable (not cheap but not one in a generation expensive) that enabled their quick evolution, reset and next model acquisition. 

Anyway, I wanna see us develop new iron that doesn't take 20 years and 69 bazillion before the first flight, to answer the CASF's call for a new, affordable 4.5 or 5 minus gen fighter

[brabus]

Stealing partially from the century series method is an idea out there, and probably not a bad one. We paralyze ourselves by seeking the 100% gold plated solution (with constant moving goalposts). Make a 69% solution A-model and buy 30, make the 80% solution B-model and by 50, etc. Expect models to be valid on the peer level for a few years, then you need the next one (and old ones are now night 8 instead of 1, adapted into wingman UAVs, etc). 

[12xu2a3x3]

determining what capabilities can be grouped together could help whittle the total number of overall aircraft needing to be fielded. example:

Second Century Fighter One: has Speed, Payload, and Range therefore it is suitable for Tac Recce, Standoff Jammer, (maybe ARM shooter), BACN, Air Sovereignty Alert Interceptor

Second Century Fighter Two: has lightweight maneuverability (sounds familiar) without loading it with 10 tons of shit, suitable for maybe traditional OCA/DCA in a high/low mix and maybe so BAI

Second Century Fighter Three: is the compromise a multirole, medium weight aircraft, as a powerful AESA, EO/IR etc etc

Edited March 16, 2022 by 12xu2a3x3

[Clark Griswold]

14 hours ago, brabus said:

Stealing partially from the century series method is an idea out there, and probably not a bad one. We paralyze ourselves by seeking the 100% gold plated solution (with constant moving goalposts). Make a 69% solution A-model and buy 30, make the 80% solution B-model and by 50, etc. Expect models to be valid on the peer level for a few years, then you need the next one (and old ones are now night 8 instead of 1, adapted into wingman UAVs, etc). 

Bingo, modular or a design that's easy to modify in subsequent models.  Not sure how feasible this is but if the prime contractor could work with the subs for the systems to go into this platform(s) and build space, power, cooling and a generally flexible arrangement (this bay can be weapons, sensors, fuel... all hard points are wired for data/power/fuel, etc...) 

I might even go a step further and the first A model this F 200 series might not even have mission systems at first development and ask the vendors of radars, EO/IRs, ECM, etc... to come up with proposals for the blank slate platform.

Has an open architecture and built intentionally with extra room, see what they offer...

12 hours ago, 12xu2a3x3 said:

determining what capabilities can be grouped together could help whittle the total number of overall aircraft needing to be fielded. example:

Second Century Fighter One: has Speed, Payload, and Range therefore it is suitable for Tac Recce, Standoff Jammer, (maybe ARM shooter), BACN, Air Sovereignty Alert Interceptor

Second Century Fighter Two: has lightweight maneuverability (sounds familiar) without loading it with 10 tons of shit, suitable for maybe traditional OCA/DCA in a high/low mix and maybe so BAI

Second Century Fighter Three: is the compromise a multirole, medium weight aircraft, as a powerful AESA, EO/IR etc etc

Like it

An F-106-like platform for Fighter One (bigger than the 106 for all the extra capes), a successor to the F-20 for Fighter Two (I would add affordability / sustainability as requirements for this one) and for Fighter Three I might say go in with the Koreans on KF-X if the money is running out and I would make as a requirement a focus for interoperability with the F-35 as a tag team 

 

F-106X concept for a visual for perhaps the Blank Slate concept platform or Fighter One of the 200s

 

 

[brabus]

Yep, and if a vendor complains about not wanting to play with another IRT to mission systems functioning together, then get fucked, next! OA and modularity can make this a reality. The gov must remain the prime or else it will fail. 

[jazzdude]

Bingo, modular or a design that's easy to modify in subsequent models.  Not sure how feasible this is but if the prime contractor could work with the subs for the systems to go into this platform(s) and build space, power, cooling and a generally flexible arrangement (this bay can be weapons, sensors, fuel... all hard points are wired for data/power/fuel, etc...) 

This wouldn't work as you have it, since there's no real incentive for primes to do it without being forced to. Best way to make money is not selling the jet, but by achieving vendor lock on sustainment and future modification (looking at you, F-35).

AF has to make open architecture and room for capability growth requirements for the aircraft. This often will show up as a penalty in overall (initial) performance, since you're likely adding weight and unused space to allow for future growth in, and that's something the AF has to be okay with. There's also a cost penalty of the of AF wants to buy the data to be able to go straight to OEMs for mods rather than rely on the original prime.

On top of the open architecture, the AF also has to own the tech/data rights for the jet. This allows the AF to go direct to other contractors that offer capability, rather than being locked into dealing with traditional primes that add overhead/passthrough costs.

There's a big push by the AF to move in this direction: owning the tech data stack/models, open architectures, move towards organic AF sustainment vs relying on contractor led support, etc. The little information that has been released on NGAD points to the AF trying to implement these ideas for the 6th gen fighter.

[Clark Griswold]

15 minutes ago, jazzdude said:

AF has to make open architecture and room for capability growth requirements for the aircraft. This often will show up as a penalty in overall (initial) performance, since you're likely adding weight and unused space to allow for future growth in, and that's something the AF has to be okay with. There's also a cost penalty of the of AF wants to buy the data to be able to go straight to OEMs for mods rather than rely on the original prime.

On top of the open architecture, the AF also has to own the tech/data rights for the jet. This allows the AF to go direct to other contractors that offer capability, rather than being locked into dealing with traditional primes that add overhead/passthrough costs.

Copy and concur - question though, the contractors must know those two things (OA and owning the tech), will they drive Congress thru their "means" to deny that so the traditional expensive acquisition model sticks?

[jazzdude]

Copy and concur - question though, the contractors must know those two things (OA and owning the tech), will they drive Congress thru their "means" to deny that so the traditional expensive acquisition model sticks?

Yes, as well as argue that portions of the data are proprietary and not deliverable as part of the contract. Cases already going to court on data rights issues. They'll also lobby Congress that the AF should use the traditional primes due to their experience in defense contracting and the number of jobs they bring to congressional districts, rather than using smaller companies that may have traditionally been subcontractors.

The other piece to making this work is that the AF has to invest in it's engineering capabilities if we want to be the lead on integrating technology/capability on our jets rather than contracting it out. A challenge is how to recruit and retain the AF (or GS) engineering talent, when the party is better working in industry. I know I made more as an engineering intern at a defense contractor than I did as an LT, and didn't achieve pay parity on the job offer I got at the end of my internship until I was a major.