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Posted
10 hours ago, dream big said:

To other posters talking about the current ops tempo, I got it - but I’m tired of that being an excuse.  What we do in CENTCOM and other commandant commands as MAF dudes is not hard, at all.  You have got to be an average aircraft commander at best to succeed in most operational missions currently. Don’t tell me there isn’t time back home during the workday to get a little smarter on near peer threats or attempt to be more tactically oriented.  Maybe less Christmas party/CGOC planning and more time in the vault might help.

There isn't time back home during the workday to get a little smarter. What gets measured gets managed; OPRs, Christmas parties, bullshit taskers, rejected vouchers, and "insert nonsensical tasks," that's what your boss is going to hassle you about. Not how tactically minded/proficient you are.

Now, if you're saying that "leaders" at the SQ/GP/WG should ensure everyone has time to get better at flying-centric duties, I couldn't agree more. However, at this point, the onus is on the managers, not the squadron line flyer.

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Posted
Posted

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

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Posted
5 minutes ago, Danger41 said:

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

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Posted (edited)
10 minutes ago, Danger41 said:

I think palletized munitions is one of the coolest things out there to help out in A2/AD fights. Just look at JASSM capacity on the bomber/Strike fleet and how you can multiply that many times with mobility assets. Not sure why anyone that actually gives a crap about AirPower would scoff that idea.

I agree, but mainly because of the reasons in this thread...(is it scoffed at!)

Edited by Tonka
words are hard
Posted


it was almost used in Haiti with 130s/17s enroute with 82nd troopers on board until they were recalled. Unlikely? Probably, but not out of the realm of possibility if we decide to kick the doors down of a country. 
 


Dating myself, but those were C-141s. Buddha came online a year or two afterwards...


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Posted
I mean, at one point in history someone asked "what if we put a bunch of miniguns on a cargo plane?"

Yeah let’s be honest but the C-130 is the turboprop timeline version of the same shit we did with the 707.

It wasn’t that there was a perfection of that airframe to do a role, it was that there were literally so many of them nobody cared that somebody wanted to take one and try something with it.

And now because like the 707 series it’s literally doing “all the jobs” nobody is going to replace the damn thing because as an aircraft developer you are trying to replace more a family of systems off one airframe, not just an airframe.

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Posted
55 minutes ago, Lawman said:


Yeah let’s be honest but the C-130 is the turboprop timeline version of the same shit we did with the 707.

It wasn’t that there was a perfection of that airframe to do a role, it was that there were literally so many of them nobody cared that somebody wanted to take one and try something with it.


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BS the C-130 is perfect in every way

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Posted
13 hours ago, Majestik Møøse said:

Airlift and AR are absolutely critical to a peer fight. We will lose without them.

Concur with that but so do our enemies so they will and are planning for ways to deny us them in the way we plan to use them now so we probably need to plan to do them differently to make it harder for them to destroy that critical support and primary mission capability.  

Looking at us now (the AF specifically), we are primarily OT&E'd to deliver the range of Air Mobility missions thru large and manned platforms, making the targeting problem relatively simple for the enemy to plan to eliminate it, maybe not execute it but plan to and threaten that force thereby affecting our planning and training to use that force.  Changing what we have and how we intend to bring those missions to the fight(s) will make the adversary's targeting and denial strategies / tactics more difficult and or more costly, ideally bolstering our deterrence against aggression or if a fight starts a more survivable force for him to contend with.

If we are serious about delivering Air Mobility into contested environments with growth in capes our two likely and capable opponents have now and likely in the future we need to increase the number of mobility platforms to complicate the targeting problem, introduce and field unmanned mobility platforms for some of the high risk and conversely for some of the low risk routine/repetitive missions, develop multi-mission capable manned Air Mobility platforms similar in some ways to tactical platforms now if we want the capability to deliver Air Mobility into some contested environments and for the mass movements of people and cargo into relatively safe MOBs as a contingency happens we probably should rely on CRAF, contractors and military versions of civilian air freighters for maximum efficiency & reliability.

That's a big change from how we do things now but if we don't realize that our enemies pay attention too, they have watched how we do business for the last 25+ years and will never allow us the advantages our last few enemies we actually fought could not threaten, we will regret it.

Posted
4 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

Concur with that but so do our enemies so they will and are planning for ways to deny us them in the way we plan to use them now so we probably need to plan to do them differently to make it harder for them to destroy that critical support and primary mission capability.  

Looking at us now (the AF specifically), we are primarily OT&E'd to deliver the range of Air Mobility missions thru large and manned platforms, making the targeting problem relatively simple for the enemy to plan to eliminate it, maybe not execute it but plan to and threaten that force thereby affecting our planning and training to use that force.  Changing what we have and how we intend to bring those missions to the fight(s) will make the adversary's targeting and denial strategies / tactics more difficult and or more costly, ideally bolstering our deterrence against aggression or if a fight starts a more survivable force for him to contend with.

If we are serious about delivering Air Mobility into contested environments with growth in capes our two likely and capable opponents have now and likely in the future we need to increase the number of mobility platforms to complicate the targeting problem, introduce and field unmanned mobility platforms for some of the high risk and conversely for some of the low risk routine/repetitive missions, develop multi-mission capable manned Air Mobility platforms similar in some ways to tactical platforms now if we want the capability to deliver Air Mobility into some contested environments and for the mass movements of people and cargo into relatively safe MOBs as a contingency happens we probably should rely on CRAF, contractors and military versions of civilian air freighters for maximum efficiency & reliability.

That's a big change from how we do things now but if we don't realize that our enemies pay attention too, they have watched how we do business for the last 25+ years and will never allow us the advantages our last few enemies we actually fought could not threaten, we will regret it.

Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 

The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.

Chuck

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Posted
35 minutes ago, Chuck17 said:

 When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.

Chuck

Spot on for AFSOC as well.  But you’re asking an impossibly difficult organizational task: for its leadership to realize they can’t lead in a new environment.  And what is the mechanism to ID new leaders whose thought processes are compatible with the new environment?  There isn’t one.

When the next high end fight kicks off (which I think is not soon), we’re going to follow the pattern we’ve always followed: get our ass kicked a little bit, then pivot dramatically by firing existing leadership.  That will be our only chance to win…. Assuming those new military leaders are matched by political leaders who also demand victory and enable it.  
 

Our entire approach to war will need to look very different than the last 20 years.

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Posted



Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 
The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.
Chuck


This problem isn't just a MAF problem, or a TACC problem. Put in more general terms: Attacking an AOC or a COCOM headquarters severely impacts our ability to execute C2 of our forces. This is also a problem for the CAF, and the joint force at large.

That's nothing new-headquarters/C2 have been a critical node that affects fighting capability throughout history. What's changed is that it used to be harder to attack headquarters/C2 because those functions tended to be further to the rear of a battlefield and harder to reach, limited only by their ability to communicate with the front lines. Airpower made it easier to reach out and attack a headquarters, but advancements in IADS make it easier to deter air attacks. And now, cyber attacks remove most of the safety that physical distance from the front line brought.

It's easy to say scrap the system and get the combat minded people in the seat to make decisions. But for MAF, you still have to prioritize movements because airlift is limited, and losing the AOC removes efficiencies and effectively decreases available airlift capacity. A fighting force can only move as fast as it's logistical tail.

How does a line squadron decide what needs to be moved and when (unless it gets chopped to support a specific commander)? What takes priority, a M1 Abrams tank, food and water, a MICAP engine for a fighter, or evacuation of a patient in critical condition?
Posted
Taking this one step further, if I’m those bad guys I know there are two things that MAF force can’t operate without - TRANSCOM and The 618th AOC. So to gain advantage in the outset, I’d be turning every cyber ninja bad guy warrior I can toward shutting them down. 
The centralized and efficient processes that developed to support COIN conflicts are akin to those that made the Berlin Airlift hum along. Shooting wars are messy, inefficient, and chaotic. When the next high end fight kicks off, the current processes, organizations, and leadership will all need to be ushered offstage so the innovators, do-ers and combat leaders can get back in the mix. We’ve been in purgatory long enough… Especially in the MAF.
Chuck

True
We’re in a business / operations model likely to not work in the cyber environment we’re seeing develop now with also the threat of long range non nuclear (fingers crossed) ballistic and cruise missile capes
Also to your point of the leadership being selected for process efficiency optimization skills vs strategic & operational military judgement I concur
25+ years of steady state operations in CENTCOM have put us into a cultural rut that is not easy to escape


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Posted
On 6/10/2021 at 5:35 PM, FlyingWolf said:

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

I truly hope you have both at least ACAD level C-17 AD experience as well as at least FLUG level JASSM employment experience before blasting out a statement like that… 

Posted
On 6/11/2021 at 7:00 AM, jazzdude said:

How does a line squadron decide what needs to be moved and when (unless it gets chopped to support a specific commander)? What takes priority, a M1 Abrams tank, food and water, a MICAP engine for a fighter, or evacuation of a patient in critical condition?

This is the problem set, but the sad part is that it already happens on occasion these days in the C-130 world.  I watched a single Det run by a detco, a sup, a duty load, and an arms troop run airlift for four months at a time supporting multiple users at multiple bases without so much as a single complaint.  Heck, I think their MX section was all of 20 people total.  All they needed was reliable periodic comms with the users.  No-one hears about it because they got the job done.  But C-17s are involved so clearly it's not really happening or worthy of acknowledging.

Granted that's on a small scale, but ACE, distributed ops, or whatever else you want to call it can work great if we identify the mission, the users, and let the tactical leaders on the line sort out the best way to meet user requirements.  The most important step is making sure TACC/AMD provides support (not C2) and is not involved in daily operations.  The second is localizing the operation and providing a clear scope, and objectives.

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Posted
23 hours ago, FourFans130 said:

The most important step is making sure TACC/AMD provides support (not C2) and is not involved in daily operations.  The second is localizing the operation and providing a clear scope, and objectives.

Would that lead to or how would you prevent hoarding?

Posted
On 6/10/2021 at 4:35 PM, FlyingWolf said:

Yep, and it requires little-to-no additional training for airdrop qualified crews.

I can see very little reason not to have this as a hip-pocket cape.

 

You gonna plan those shots, too?  Because if you’ve ever done any JASSM planning for a contested environment you should know how much of a bullshit statement that is. 

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Posted
14 hours ago, 08Dawg said:

You gonna plan those shots, too?  Because if you’ve ever done any JASSM planning for a contested environment you should know how much of a bullshit statement that is. 

My assumption is they’d have zero play in the planning/weapons loading part, just in the “throw that shit out that back at this point/time” part.

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Posted
3 hours ago, brabus said:

My assumption is they’d have zero play in the planning/weapons loading part, just in the “throw that shit out that back at this point/time” part.

It's a good thing JASSM shooters don't have to worry about LARs, timing, shot containers, spacing between shots, retargeting in flight...just push the pickle button and the weapon does the rest.

🙄

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Posted (edited)

I’m well aware of how JASSM works and is employed. Are you implying AMC guys can’t hit a release point on time at a specified altitude and heading?

I support outside the container thinking - this is worth pursuing. 

Edited by brabus
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Posted

As with everything else, the calculus is based on “is this worth the money and time we’re spending on it?” In this case, it’s costing $25m, which is of course being paid directly to LM. Are there bigger problems that could be solved with this money? I bet any PEM would say absolutely.

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Posted

Yeah it is - do you know how many bombers I want to have available to shoot JASSM vs. how many there are actually available? I don’t see an issue with trying to expand the ability to mass stand off muns. Doesn’t mean it has to be the primary plan, but it’d be nice to have the capability in a scenario where you want as many weapons flying down range as possible. Also, not saying this should be the #1 priority. 

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Posted

JASSM is already the weapon of the last war because of how long the TOF is versus how quickly threats move…on a warm launched platform that can retarget in flight. Cold launched from a cargo a/c? Might as well throw $100M on a burn pit fire.

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Posted

Haha, I like the joke, and I get it, but this concept can be applied to future SOMs. So, still worth looking into. 

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