Russian Ukraine shenanigans

[Smokin]

With both JHMCS and 9X, I'd imagine they do.  As a bonus, the pilots that survive the war will have life-long neck pain to look forward to...

[StoleIt]

4 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

No idea but would not be surprised
A fighter without the right weapons is pointless


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Further googled:
Dutch and Danish F-16's were donated to Ukraine. Those are AM and BM configured which have been upgraded to have HMD's.

Also this picture from The War Zone helps:

Definitely not an -9X in the picture, but that doesn't mean they do or don't have them.

[ClearedHot]

On 10/14/2024 at 10:53 PM, StoleIt said:

Further googled:
Dutch and Danish F-16's were donated to Ukraine. Those are AM and BM configured which have been upgraded to have HMD's.

Also this picture from The War Zone helps:

Definitely not an -9X in the picture, but that doesn't mean they do or don't have them.

I am more impressed by the ECIPS.

Break break...As previously reported N Korea sent 8,000 troops to Russia to train then on to the front.  The Ukrainians just killed the first batch in  a couple of drone strikes. 

A staggering report just came out of the Institute for The Study of War - They estimate that Russian has lost an average of 30,000 troops (killed or wounded), every month in 2024.  In October alone they lost 57,000 troops.  What a meat grinder.

 

 

[BashiChuni]

I wonder what the Ukraine casualties are?

[tac airlifter]

That is a stunning pace of attrition; my western mind struggles to grasp sustaining that volume of casualties.
 

I’m often thought this war was foolish and unnecessary, but here we are and there’s no turning back.  Curious what threshold of loss is required to get parties at a negotiating table.

[ClearedHot]

25 minutes ago, BashiChuni said:

I wonder what the Ukraine casualties are?

Unknown, but zero active duty American casualties and Russia will be unable to fight a peer/near-peer for a generation.

[Majestik Møøse]

9 hours ago, ClearedHot said:

Unknown, but zero active duty American casualties and Russia will be unable to fight a peer/near-peer for a generation.

Also, like who really gives a shit about Tombstones and Gravestones anymore, you know? Between Ukraine ATACMS and the Israelis there won’t be much left

[Smokin]

Russia has lost twice as many casualties as the US did in WWI.  It looks like Ukraine has casualty rates at about 60% of Russia's if US estimates are accurate.  If Russia keeps at it, a year from now they will have more losses than the US did during WWII.

There are some interesting parallels to WWI:

-Initial estimates were a war that would last weeks, not years

-Russia (and everyone else) overestimated Russia's offensive power

-Everyone else underestimated Ukraine's defense

-Battlefield has become relatively stable without considerable advances by either side and thousands are dying for yards of ground

[Lawman]

Russia has lost twice as many casualties as the US did in WWI.  It looks like Ukraine has casualty rates at about 60% of Russia's if US estimates are accurate.  If Russia keeps at it, a year from now they will have more losses than the US did during WWII.
There are some interesting parallels to WWI:
-Initial estimates were a war that would last weeks, not years
-Russia (and everyone else) overestimated Russia's offensive power
-Everyone else underestimated Ukraine's defense
-Battlefield has become relatively stable without considerable advances by either side and thousands are dying for yards of ground

Offensive power on the ground maneuver is predicated on the same advantage/disadvantage ratios that have existed since the time of Alexander.

Technology can soften those numbers but they never get away from the requirement of say an attacker to employ a 3:1 or better 5:1 advantage to take the ground effectively. What technology does do well is allow you to extend influence over the ground (say as far as indirect fire or drones can range).

The Russian Army is not capable of fighting that way because to effectively maneuver an advantage force you don’t really need a body count to body count, you need an element of size vs an element of size, so when we say 3:1 advantage what that means really is a battalion attacks a company, and better yet 5:1 a Brigade attacks a company. Since the Russians are pretty much inept above the size of a battalion task group, Ukraine can field Company+ size elements with reinforcing enablers like fires and drones, and achieve parity with the attacker which is never something that pans out well for the attacker.

And that is why the Russians adopt positional warfare, it’s not by choice, it’s by their own inept ability to wield what is largely still an army of convicts and peasants with too few competent officers and no NCO corps to effectively train and use them.

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[tac airlifter]

2 hours ago, Lawman said:

And that is why the Russians adopt positional warfare, it’s not by choice, it’s by their own inept ability to wield what is largely still an army of convicts and peasants with too few competent officers and no NCO corps to effectively train and use them.

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Good analysis, but reconcile for me the idea that Russia is incapable of taking a sliver of Ukrainian territory with the idea they are an aggressive near-peer and threat to Europe?  It seems they can't be simultaneously so dangerous we're doing containment by attrition but also too retarded to field a capable force even short distances outside their borders.  As mentioned, I acknowledge we're in it now with no turning back, so am genuinely curious what we're really dealing with regarding RUS threat potential.

[Lawman]

Good analysis, but reconcile for me the idea that Russia is incapable of taking a sliver of Ukrainian territory with the idea they are an aggressive near-peer and threat to Europe?  It seems they can't be simultaneously so dangerous we're doing containment by attrition but also too retarded to field a capable force even short distances outside their borders.  As mentioned, I acknowledge we're in it now with no turning back, so am genuinely curious what we're really dealing with regarding RUS threat potential.

Having just done work with some of our Euro partners, they are absolutely still a threat because while they can’t stand offsides against a US division, they don’t have to. We can’t protect all the frontage.

We only have so many units and we simply can’t be everywhere at once. Most of the border spaces have no real strategic terrain so it doesn’t favor the defender except for the occasional water crossing. The only real terrain to split them affects their ability to threaten Czech, but Poland is a parking lot. Our Euro partners are neither unified in what they think is the proper course of action (for instance the Poles will die for every inch of Warsaw because they already had it leveled in memory vs Lithuania which understands Vilnius is gonna be moonscaped if they try to defend it). They (NATO) can’t field large formations of any size, save for a few brigades which aren’t the same size as our idea of a Brigade. For the next decade France is the 2nd most powerful land force in NATO on the wrong end of the Continent to be useful, and with most of our forces still being rotational at best it’s not that we are massively ahead or positioned. You take that one rotational division out of theatre and suddenly the French have more combat capacity than we do by a good bit. 2ACR and 173rd are incomplete units, they are designed to function as a V Corps enabler, not the main body of the Corps. You need 2-3 mech/Armor division for that purpose and without the rotations we don’t even have one.

It would take weeks-months to get sufficient ground forces in theatre to recapture and retake whatever ground the Russians were to stumble across and seize. You’ll need to port multiple divisions out of railheads and ports and ship them across an ocean to an ISB. Unless we (NATO)are both equipped and prepared (militarily and politically) to annihilate those ground formations with fires and aviation they would be able to come swinging out of their borders and simply occupy what is largely unprotected. I don’t think for a second somebody like Germany is going to accept the trade of destroying mech formations on the road to Warsaw or Talin for having to absorb Iskander/Kalibr strikes (or worse) in its territory.

So we don’t kill them as they swarm out…. Now you’ve gotta be willing to dislodge them once sufficient ground forces (mostly entirely ours) are set, which means shaping their deep (ie bombing into Russia/Kgrad/Belarus proper). Now we’re gonna put a ground force we know they can’t stand against marching in the general direction of their capital. Tell me that’s a less dangerous scenario than allowing them to attrition themselves into oblivion in Ukraine let alone one that doesn’t involve US casualties. The Russians are not a US peer, they are a NATO peer, because frankly non of our NATO partner ground forces can keep pace with our ground maneuver so they can’t be part of any Corps/Army frontage in any offensive action.


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[Boomer6]

So, if Russia is a NATO peer, and would be able to take what you're suggesting is large swaths of land. Then is NATO (minus US) only a neer-peer to Ukraine? Based on Ukraine's ability thus-far to stop Russia from taking much of their country, and in some places pushing them back since the start of the war?

[Lawman]

So, if Russia is a NATO peer, and would be able to take what you're suggesting is large swaths of land. Then is NATO (minus US) only a neer-peer to Ukraine? Based on Ukraine's ability thus-far to stop Russia from taking much of their country, and in some places pushing them back since the start of the war?

Ukraine has done in 2 years more collective training and maturing of its officer cadre than the rest of NATO combined (including a good chunk of our commands). I mean what did you reference in Kursk… that was a Ukrainian Brigade+ operating under a single unified commanders intent and attacking what were a series of Company and smaller elements acting in a fragmented scheme of defense. That is text book application of offensive ground maneuver.

The Ukrainian military from a staff and orders capability right now is head and shoulders above any of our standing NATO partners who may have the kit but lack any of the collective experience employing it. The one place that gets funny is employing enabling capes that they simply don’t have or we won’t give them because we save it for ourselves cough*offensive cyber*cough.

The secret to our success over peers on the ground isn’t going to be measured in simple tangible comparisons like tank armor or Rmax of specific artillery systems. It’s going to be in the fact we can execute the MDMP at echelon faster than whoever is sitting in the opponent seat. We didn’t figure out something new, we just got back to the understanding that the Corps is the unit of action in LSCO and the Division is the staff that has to execute that action. We aren’t even that good at it, but everybody else is just really terrible if they’ve even begun considering to think that way. And that’s great and all…. But we only have so much Division frontage and Europe is hella big. We can’t simply sprinkle the US elements piecemeal across Europe, and Europe cant defend all the spaces in between if we mass. That’s the same problem the Ukrainians have, how do you take the stuff you’ve learned the hard way and transfer that experience to the 60k plus troops and elements you’ve got in the pipeline without diluting it too much to keep its effect.


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[ViperMan]

5 hours ago, tac airlifter said:

Good analysis, but reconcile for me the idea that Russia is incapable of taking a sliver of Ukrainian territory with the idea they are an aggressive near-peer and threat to Europe?

Nukes. It doesn't go beyond that.

[Boomer6]

3 hours ago, Lawman said:

Ukraine has done in 2 years more collective training and maturing of its officer cadre than the rest of NATO combined (including a good chunk of our commands). I mean what did you reference in Kursk… that was a Ukrainian Brigade+ operating under a single unified commanders intent and attacking what were a series of Company and smaller elements acting in a fragmented scheme of defense. That is text book application of offensive ground maneuver.

The Ukrainian military from a staff and orders capability right now is head and shoulders above any of our standing NATO partners who may have the kit but lack any of the collective experience employing it. The one place that gets funny is employing enabling capes that they simply don’t have or we won’t give them because we save it for ourselves cough*offensive cyber*cough.

The secret to our success over peers on the ground isn’t going to be measured in simple tangible comparisons like tank armor or Rmax of specific artillery systems. It’s going to be in the fact we can execute the MDMP at echelon faster than whoever is sitting in the opponent seat. We didn’t figure out something new, we just got back to the understanding that the Corps is the unit of action in LSCO and the Division is the staff that has to execute that action. We aren’t even that good at it, but everybody else is just really terrible if they’ve even begun considering to think that way. And that’s great and all…. But we only have so much Division frontage and Europe is hella big. We can’t simply sprinkle the US elements piecemeal across Europe, and Europe cant defend all the spaces in between if we mass. That’s the same problem the Ukrainians have, how do you take the stuff you’ve learned the hard way and transfer that experience to the 60k plus troops and elements you’ve got in the pipeline without diluting it too much to keep its effect.


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So is that a yes, NATO is only a near peer to Ukraine?

[Lawman]

So is that a yes, NATO is only a near peer to Ukraine?

Countries don’t fight ground wars, formations do.

Ukraine has parity above most of NATO in that manner, but they don’t possess the number of formations needed to achieve some decisive breakout. The old “quantity has a quality all its own” mantra. 92nd can’t win a war on its own, and ground maneuver culminates over distance meaning it won’t matter how good or bad they are because they will be spent either way.

Russia also achieves near-to-peer parity with a whole lot of NATO in that manner, because while they may be a half dozen regiments full of ass clowns in regards to quality, the formation of the other side of the border is a series of Company’s of Lithuanian professional with about 6 kilometers of strategic depth to give before they are fighting in their capital.


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[Boomer6]

If those "ass clowns" can't push through Ukraine, then how are they a threat to push through Europe? Would that not spread their formations more thinly than they are in Ukraine? Would it not also move them further from their base increasing their logistical issues? Are the Russians holding a massive amount of formations back that could overwhelm Eastern Europe, but who are not currently being employed against Ukraine?

[Lawman]

If those "ass clowns" can't push through Ukraine, then how are they a threat to push through Europe? Would that not spread their formations more thinly than they are in Ukraine? Would it not also move them further from their base increasing their logistical issues? Are the Russians holding a massive amount of formations back that could overwhelm Eastern Europe, but who are not currently being employed against Ukraine?

Go look at a map of the Baltics and compare it to Ukraine. Also factor in that time thing you’ve left out of any discussion. How many towns and cities can the Russians fumble into ownership of on their worst day while we get V corps ready to go in a fight to take them back. The Russians are not our peers on the ground but that means nothing because our ground forces aren’t in a position to make the argument on day 1 of any conflict.

You (and others) seem to be trying to make the conversation about how Russia is somehow this toothless made up boogieman and that’s simply not what any of the rest of us criticizing them are saying. Albeit I was mistaken, your intent wasn’t necessarily that. The Russian Army is the same threat to us as it is to Portugal from the standpoint of actual arms and effects, but we are part of NATO and only as good as our strength to honor our commitments. And one of the ways we (and arguably more importantly the rest of the alliance) don’t have to answer that commitment is to get to keep them at proxy arms length in Ukraine.

As to combat effectiveness, An army of peasants and numbskulls with rifles are still fully capable of taking over a swaths of territory, Africa and the Middle East are proof of that. They can be dipshits, but they still have tanks. Dipshits organized into Battalion Tactical Groups which they can manage and equipped with tanks can accomplish a lot when they are left to pick where they seek battle. Right now so long as they don’t take Ukraine and want to stay involved in Ukraine they don’t have that option to seek battle elsewhere.

The Russians may not be able to form their ranks into what we would call a reinforced armor division and punch a 300 km whole in the Ukrainian lines, that doesn’t mean they can’t orchestrate the seizure of territory in the Baltics or Poland and upend 70 years of NATO because it is collectively decided that such an event isnt our problem. Not to mention the message it sends to the other hemispheres geopolitical foe.


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[Boomer6]

39 minutes ago, Lawman said:

You (and others) seem to be trying to make the conversation about how Russia is somehow this toothless made up boogieman and that’s simply not what any of the rest of us criticizing them are saying. 

As much as I've enjoyed reading US army field manual dissertations on ground warfare, you may want to refrain from getting triggered here. I have made no arguments. I have asked what I thought were logical questions to your previous comments. I asked these questions because I'm curious how Russia could feasibly invade the rest of Eastern Europe (not just the Baltics) after conquerimg Ukraine based on their causulty rate.

I understand they wouldn't necessarily go to plaid and line up the ass clowns along the borders from Estonia to Romania and sound the bugle.

A more succint way to phrase my questions would be; if russia conquers Ukraine, taking into account current casualties/km of ground seized, how will they have enough ass clowns/or equipment left to to push into eastern Europe?

Anti-Trigger Warning: I'm very pro Ukraine.

[Lawman]

As much as I've enjoyed reading US army field manual dissertations on ground warfare, you may want to refrain from getting triggered here. I have made no arguments. I have asked what I thought were logical questions to your previous comments. I asked these questions because I'm curious how Russia could feasibly invade the rest of Eastern Europe (not just the Baltics) after conquerimg Ukraine based on their causulty rate.
I understand they wouldn't necessarily go to plaid and line up the ass clowns along the borders from Estonia to Romania and sound the bugle.
A more succint way to phrase my questions would be; if russia conquers Ukraine, taking into account current casualties/km of ground seized, how will they have enough ass clowns/or equipment left to to push into eastern Europe?
Anti-Trigger Warning: I'm very pro Ukraine.

Neither the Russians or then Ukrainians have executed a general mobilization.

They still have chips to play in the form of people even with the casualty rates they have taken. What they won’t have is the industrial capacity combined with the personnel necessary to execute any kind of sustained positional warfare. So should they want to execute follow on seizures of land post “Victory” in Ukraine, they will not only need to solve those problems, they will likely need to make an entire shift to their military culture to execute a Decisive maneuver victory over whoever they choose to go after next. While that’s easier to do against the Moldovans or Latvians than say Poland. They are still European.

Or even scarier, they could just go sit and wait until we find ourselves occupied in the other side of the world and then pick their moment. Seize parts of NATO territories with minimal fight then wait for the Spanish and Italian forces to dither about whether they are willing to fight Russia over some Baltic farmlands…. Prove the alliance hallow without us making up its main body, then carve off chunks at a time.


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[DirkDiggler]

1 hour ago, Lawman said:

Neither the Russians or then Ukrainians have executed a general mobilization.

They still have chips to play in the form of people even with the casualty rates they have taken. What they won’t have is the industrial capacity combined with the personnel necessary to execute any kind of sustained positional warfare. So should they want to execute follow on seizures of land post “Victory” in Ukraine, they will not only need to solve those problems, they will likely need to make an entire shift to their military culture to execute a Decisive maneuver victory over whoever they choose to go after next. While that’s easier to do against the Moldovans or Latvians than say Poland. They are still European.

Or even scarier, they could just go sit and wait until we find ourselves occupied in the other side of the world and then pick their moment. Seize parts of NATO territories with minimal fight then wait for the Spanish and Italian forces to dither about whether they are willing to fight Russia over some Baltic farmlands…. Prove the alliance hallow without us making up its main body, then carve off chunks at a time.


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Random question since you've worked over there much more recently than I have.  Poland seems to be buying every piece of ground military kit they can get their hands on.  Is their Army making parallel efforts to improve the abilities of their soldiers, NCOs, and officer corps?

[Lawman]

Random question since you've worked over there much more recently than I have.  Poland seems to be buying every piece of ground military kit they can get their hands on.  Is their Army making parallel efforts to improve the abilities of their soldiers, NCOs, and officer corps?

It’s absolutely in all the theatre commanders “top 3.” And I’ll say they are absolutely motivated and aware of how far they have to go to be what they need to be. Like lines of effort it is directly discussed not “NATO” interop but Poland specifically and it makes sense when you look at potential and demonstrated commitment. They also have economics to take advantage of that most of the legacy Euro partners don’t.

Poland has the potential to become the most powerful land force in Europe and potentially a joint force though id argue that takes a second decade to achieve and doesn’t run concurrently.

Problem is they’ve got a decade of culture shift to do to train and equip that force, and until then they really aren’t any better prepared to do anything against a flood of tactical groups coming across their border than the Ukrainians were those first few weeks.


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[ClearedHot]

15 hours ago, Boomer6 said:

As much as I've enjoyed reading US army field manual dissertations on ground warfare, you may want to refrain from getting triggered here. I have made no arguments. I have asked what I thought were logical questions to your previous comments. I asked these questions because I'm curious how Russia could feasibly invade the rest of Eastern Europe (not just the Baltics) after conquerimg Ukraine based on their causulty rate.

I understand they wouldn't necessarily go to plaid and line up the ass clowns along the borders from Estonia to Romania and sound the bugle.

A more succint way to phrase my questions would be; if russia conquers Ukraine, taking into account current casualties/km of ground seized, how will they have enough ass clowns/or equipment left to to push into eastern Europe?

Anti-Trigger Warning: I'm very pro Ukraine.

You have very valid questions and observations.  Obviously Putin horribly underestimated Ukraine and world resolve to help them and Russia has paid a horrific price for his decisions.  That being said I don't think his entire play on Ukraine was to have a launching pad for the rest of Europe.  If Putin gets Ukraine he will own the bread basket of Europe and have another major bargaining ship to shape the behavior of other countries.  He is already doing that with energy, control the food supply as well and he has some big sticks to get his way.

[Majestik Møøse]

Russia is no longer a conventional near-peer to anyone because Ukraine has pushed their shit in with tenacity and western weapons. If Russia ends up being able to take Ukraine because America (once again) turns its back on an ally due to Idiocracy politics, they’ll have control of Europe’s breadbasket and gas supply while they rebuild themselves to conventional near-peer status by selling resources to the rest of the Axis of Assholes. Since the same douchebag will be in charge, he’ll continue blaming Russia’s problems on The West, and most of Russia and our own MAGAs will agree because their mushy minds are easy to shape with TikTok.

Taking nukes into account, Russia’s potential military power still exceeds Europe, assuming the warheads and missiles still work, which no one wants to find out.

[gearhog]

Jeffrey Sachs answers questions about Ukraine and Russia at the Cambridge Union at the 1:05 mark.

Nails it.

The rest of his talk is good, also.

The draft treaty he references that was put forth by Moscow (I hadn't seen this before):

17 December 2021 13:26

Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Russian Federation and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

reaffirming their aspiration to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding,

acknowledging that an effective response to contemporary challenges and threats to security in our interdependent world requires joint efforts of all the Parties,

determined to prevent dangerous military activity and therefore reduce the possibility of incidents between their armed forces,

noting that the security interests of each Party require better multilateral cooperation, more political and military stability, predictability, and transparency,

reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the Rome Declaration “Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality” signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO member States in 2002,

have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Parties shall guide in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties.

The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties.

The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

Article 2

In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council.

The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities.

Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties.

Article 3

The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries.

The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region).

Article 4

The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

Article 5

The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.

Article 6

All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.

Article 7

The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia.

In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article 8

This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations
of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit.

Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of …

Done in [the city of …] this [XX] day of [XX] two thousand and [XX].

https://medium.com/@felixabt/newly-released-documents-prove-that-russia-preferred-peace-and-stability-over-war-73b9dde694fb

Edited November 3 by gearhog