USAF Finally found a way to get rid of the A-10

[Danger41]

2 hours ago, VMFA187 said:

Concur. CAS is a hell of a lot less effective when you're ingressing from a CP/IP at 480KGS, popping, attempting to slew the TPOD as you establish 30* NH only to roll in 2-3" later, and have <6" in the dive to locate the target. 

Pretty easy when all you have to say is "captured, strike posture set" and hear "push when able."

But I have thousands of hours of combat time and a bunch of deployments! Surely all that Afghanistan/Iraq experience will help!

[Buddy Spike]

20 hours ago, VMFA187 said:

The Hornet is a great CAS platform, but I wouldn't want to operate one over there. 

 

Concur. CAS is a hell of a lot less effective when you're ingressing from a CP/IP at 480KGS, popping, attempting to slew the TPOD as you establish 30* NH only to roll in 2-3" later, and have <6" in the dive to locate the target. 

Pretty easy when all you have to say is "captured, strike posture set" and hear "push when able."

 

Maverick did it at age 60, so can you.   

[ClearedHot]

20 hours ago, VMFA187 said:

The Hornet is a great CAS platform, but I wouldn't want to operate one over there.

Come on brother, man up.

[VMFA187]

24 minutes ago, ClearedHot said:

Come on brother, man up.

 

34 minutes ago, Buddy Spike said:

 

Maverick did it at age 60, so can you.   

You guys are right, I've been instructing studs in the Battle Penguin for too long. 

"Time to do some of that pilot shit!"

[Clark Griswold]

1945 not too keen on the idea…

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/why-sending-the-a-10-warthog-to-fight-in-ukraine-is-a-bad-idea/?fbclid=IwAR0471vkKHIIZGTPLQyM4T8YK32fp7Flry4Wx24TbsLK-pG-DAJ1KTBNkCY


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[Zero]

Alright... I'll come out of retirement for this one... been watching the discussion for awhile now, so I guess it's time to weigh in.  

Be careful where you get your sources from-- the "anonymous Hog Driver" quoted by The Aviationist in the 1945 article is a long-time F-16 pilot who only recently converted to the A-10... and is a big advocate of a particular unit converting back to Vipers in the near future.  

The discussion of the gun seems shocking to anyone who's never flown the A-10...  ermahgerd.... you mean it's not good against armor in the face?

As Paul Harvey so eloquently put it... and now, for the rest of the story...

The study referenced here and many other places is based on the LAVP (lot acceptance verification program) that began in 1975.  The study was written in 1979, but the bulk of LAVP occurred between 1978 and 1980.  Why does that matter?  Because the systems on board the A-10 at that time were DRASTICALLY different than what is on the aircraft now.   The aircraft at that time were non-LASTE (Low Altitude Safety and Targeting Enhancement), meaning that the pilots essentially employed iron sights without the benefit of PAC (precision attitude control, which essentially ”locks” the primary flight controls to hold the pipper on the aimpoint and get better bullet density). In other words, the system has gotten BETTER over the years. MUCH better. Some quotes from the test: “Only 93 passes were made in high-rate due to restrictions; and all passes after November 1979 were further limited to low-rate, 1 second bursts. Although not ideal for bullet density, all ammunition fired for LAVP was pure API, not combat mix.” In other words, the results were limited by the test parameters of the time. Even given those constraints, “Of first importance, all the Pk’s were HIGHER than expected; and the low-angle were comparable to the high angle.” A final key note relates to the non-LASTE nature of the test: ”hits usually did not occur after the 25th round fired.” That’s a situation that has been rectified with modern upgrades to the airframe. As the text follows, “ LASTE enables burst length and density to INCREASE through the use of a constantly computed impact point (CCIP) and PAC“. In other words, the gun was good back then, it’s even better now.  

For the "shocking" part... ALL Hog Drivers are taught that we don't shoot tanks in the face if we can avoid it-- that's where the machines are designed to be the most effective in terms of armor, so naturally we train to hit them from the side, top, or rear.  You don't always get that option in combat, so M or F kills are just as acceptable-- any EFFECT that degrades the enemy's ability to fight is a positive step in combat.  If you think that Pk of 1.0 is widespread, you're watching too many movies and not spending enough time in the vault.  

Here's another kicker: the gun isn't the first choice against armor for many Hog Drivers.  Gasp!  The maverick missile, which was designed simultaneously with the A-X program as a PRIMARY munition for the new A-X, provides much better effects, some standoff, and precision capability.  Given the right circumstances and approval, the Hog can sling six of those, rifling three on a single pass.  Think about that-- a PLATOON or armor, completely wiped out by a single Hog on two passes.  A 4 ship can render a battalion of armor combat non-effective on 2 passes with that loadout, and we haven't even gone to the gun yet.  

Now, back to the original discussion of the thread.  Could the A-10 survive and be effective in Ukraine?  

Absolutely. 

In American hands, in the American way of major combat ops.  

Turns out, the Hog community has been training side by side with every aspect of the USAF in major exercises for the last 40 years.  If the Hog was truly an unsurvivable liability as proven in every Red Flag and ME (now WSINT) vul, you bet your ass that Corporate Blue would have trotted those stats out immediately.  I can recall many a RF vul thinking to myself as a Sandy One... "gawddamn... I'd have my hands full after this round..." 

... and none of them were Hogs.  

Our way of fighting is an overwhelming, integrated approach to these kind of operations.  Hogs might be slower, so we launch first, land last, and often times can make it happen without siphoning off tanker gas that the other guys need.  

If you haven't read many of the open-source articles written by some Hog Drivers that occasionally pop up, then you may not be familiar with the applications currently being explored out west-- adding SDB (16 per jet), MALD, and potentially JASSM to the Hog makes it an incredible support asset that makes 5th Gen even more lethal-- freeing them up to do their thing while the swine saturates the battlefield. 

And the kicker is that even once the Hog launches all that "new" stuff, depending on the loadout, she still has enough weapons to engage up to 20 targets.  

Each. 

Now, if you send the Hogs into a fight alone, with less-than-optimum weapons, without SA, without SEAD (neither side has dedicated SEAD/DEAD assets), without effective tactics (both sides are, shall we say, less than impressive), and without training (how long does it take to train up ANY pilot to this level of warfare), then the results will be predictable.  

And I'll throw it out here since it's been floated on other sites:  you send the Ukrainians ANY of our fighters, give them minimal time to get fam'd with it, maybe don't provide them the best weapons we have, and the results will be the same-- disaster.  Tactics, training, and operational integration are key to major combat ops.  They don't have it, so it really doesn't matter WHAT weapon you put in their inventory.  

 

[TreeA10]

Wish I had my coloring book from RTU which showed the most effective areas to shoot a tank. In the face wasn't it. Also, a crowd pleasing fireball explosion isn't required. For example, a Marine M60-A3 main battle tank is slightly lost and in the wrong place at the wrong time during an exercise. A Hawg is called in on a target and shoots the M-60 with TP ammo and not HEI or API which will do far more damage. With the Target Practice ammo, the tank takes 5 hits. With just 5 hits from TP ammo, the tank is no longer capable of moving and it's no longer capable of using the main gun with the added bonus of the crew being incapacitated.  The cannon is far more effective than the author admits. 

Back when we might have to go toe-to-toe with the Rooskies in the Fulda gap, we trained for enroute at 200-300 feet and IP to target at 100 feet using forward firing weapons only. If someone was dumb enough to load freefall weapons on your jet, that was going to be jettisoned before departing the IP. We did expect to take substantial losses but so did everybody else. Nobody is going to fly the same way as was done shwacking jihadis but will adjust tactics accordingly. 

 

[Clark Griswold]

I’ll keep stirring the pot because the comments are good

Ward Carrol plus guest are not on board, don’t think anyone really is but again the discussion is good

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[Zero]

Good video Clark— thanks for posting.  It’s nice to see actual experts discussing the big issues instead of some computer-voice-overs created by DCS gamers claiming to be credible sources of information.  

One major item missing from the discussion, as always though, is actual A-10 expertise and experience.  

Here are my thoughts on the video, for what it’s worth… this discussion and a couple bucks will get you a halfway decent cup of coffee… this is gonna be a long read, so you might as well grab a cup of joe before settling in…

Carrol and Herzinger hit on a key concept in the discussion of transferring ANY aircraft to Ukraine— the proficiency and ability to sustain the assets logistically.  Even if we’re discussing F-16s, which fit the billet of multi-role needs of that nation, comes with a hefty price tag in terms of ground-based requirements.  They jokingly refer to a HAZMAT program to deal with the hydrazine, to which the Ukrainians would probably scoff, but those are long-term, very real considerations.  Do they have fuel trucks that can hook up to these fighters?  What munitions are you giving them?  How many crew chiefs and specs are you sending to get trained in the US?  ANY transfer of aircraft in terms of hardware of this caliber will not produce an immediate effect on the battlefield, and in fact, as I mentioned briefly, can very well be a net DRAIN on their forces as they try to sustain something that is 100% foreign to them.  

Multi-role works best for smaller air forces— they HAVE to live in that realm.  Hell, multi-role is a cornerstone of our programs, but I don’t believe that EVERY aircraft needs to be born and employed under that mantra.  We have that luxury as a force that we can have specialization— though the budgeteers might disagree, we as an American Air Force have that ability whereas others do not.  You could say the same for our approach to CSAR— we have the luxury and budget to dedicate such forces to the mission.  

“Give us an aircraft solution similar to the HIMARS.”  

That’s just not going to happen with western equipment for the reasons listed above and in their presentation.  

Now, back to the A-10.  

These guys are qualified experts in their field— Carrol world-renowned.  But not in the A-10.  If you think that MANPADs make brick walls and close off airspace to A-10s, then you’re not familiar with the Hog’s current suite of defensive systems, tactics, or weapons availability. If you throw out pics of KC’s battle-damaged A-10 and say that this proves the A-10’snvulnerabilities, then you don’t know the context of that situation.  Anyone know how many passes that formation made prior to that hit?  

5.  

Down the same ‘chute, same angle, while carrying 4x Mk-82s.  

Well that doesn’t sound smart now does it?  

It’s what they had to do.  

US forces were pinned down across the river by Iraqi forces under a bridge escarpment, and the only way to hit those Iraqi’s was to come in at a relatively low angle, from one direction, multiple times trying to get gun and rocket passes under the bridge with effective effects based on that battlefield terrain.  A-10 defensive systems were not automatic at that time, and they became predictable due to the requirements of the troops on the ground.  That hit aligns pretty well with the historical averages going back to Desert Storm— no A-10 has ever been hit on its first pass, and it’s usually around that fifth or sixth attack in the same area that gets them.  

The jet wasn’t carrying precision munitions that might have allowed for more standoff at that time either— they were A-10As, and precision engagement wouldn’t start for a few more years.  

The point is, in every discussion about hits that the A-10 has taken over the years, there’s A LOT of context required.  The experiences over the Republican Guard in 1991 come up often in this realm, but without getting into that right now, the discussion needs to start with the question, “Why were A-10s operating in that environment at that time that led to those losses?”  It’s a great story that adds so much more to the understanding of what led to those hits.  William Smallwood does a great compilation in his book, “Warthog—Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War.”  A stat you don’t see thrown around often— did you know that we lost just as many F-16s as A-10s during Ops Desert Shield and Desert Storm?  

Which brings me to the point of the SU-25s getting their “asses handed to them,” so why would anyone want something similar?  

I haven’t seen the numbers lately, but during the first three months of the war, SU-25 loss rates were comparable to all other fast-movers.  If you classify the Frog as its own entity vs all other fighters, you’ll see that more traditional fighters were lost than -25s.  Personally, since such a distinction is made between the Frog and all other fighters in terms of survivability, I think this is a fair comparison that proves that the Frog is being lost at a slightly lower rate than other, faster fighters.  

I also am not impressed by the tactics, training, or the apparent lack of effective equipment on the Frogs for that matter.  If you read up on the SU-25SM (Russia’s “best” Frog), you’ll see that it boasts some pretty impressive equipment— on paper, it looks like it’s on par with US gear.  But videos of Frogs in action shows that either this equipment (such as automatic counter measures) either doesn’t work, or the pilots don’t operate them correctly.  So I think that it’s a natural attempt, but ultimately incorrect comparison between the battlefield employment of SU-25s to A-10Cs.  

The quote that the A-10 was “deemed unsurvivable in the 1980s” just shows the lack of familiarity with what upgrades have been done to the jet since then.  I honestly think that many of the “pundits” commenting on the A-10 think that all she does is employ the same tactics, with the same suites and weapons as she did in 1984.  While we’re still VERY good at those tactics, the envelope, effectiveness, and survivability has grown exponentially since then.  If you want an interesting read, check out Douglas Campbell’s book, “The A-10 and the Close Air Support Debate.”  There are passages and quotes in there from the 1980s that I swore were date-stamped 2013 the last time we had this discussion.  

Carrol makes the point that you can’t have an air threat and do CAS— I agree.  In fact, that’s written in the JPUB.  I do NOT agree that you need a limited MANPAD or even SAM threat, particularly when you’re talking about what would REALISTICALLY be associated with front-line units in a CAS fight.  

Carrol and Herzinger both hint at the cynical nature of this original discussion— a desperate long-ball to try to affect a final solution on the A-10.  That knife kind of cuts both ways when you’re offering it to someone else, and you kind of get caught talking out of both sides of your mouth.  “Hey, this jet isn’t good enough for us, but I think it’s just what YOU need in the same fight that I just said it wouldn’t be able to fight!” 

WTF? 

Let me close with this (the old man will stop yelling at clouds for the day).  There are a lot of people with a lot of opinions about the A-10 who don’t have the familiarity with what the airframe can actually do.  I’m reminded of a story from about ten years ago when a VERY senior civilian DoD member who was actively advocating for the divestiture of the A-10 was given a tour by one of the Hog units.  Upon learning about the defensive capabilities of the Hog, this VERY senior civilian was shocked—this person had no idea about what upgrades and capabilities the aircraft actually possessed.  And yet here that person was repeatedly professing the lack of survivability of the aircraft, advocating for a solution without being given the full information.  

We just shook our heads then as we do now.  

If you know, you know.  

 

Edited August 1, 2022 by Zero

[Clark Griswold]

Good video Clark— thanks for posting.  It’s nice to see actual experts discussing the big issues instead of some computer-voice-overs created by DCS gamers claiming to be credible sources of information.  
One major item missing from the discussion, as always though, is actual A-10 expertise and experience.  
Here are my thoughts on the video, for what it’s worth… this discussion and a couple bucks will get you a halfway decent cup of coffee… this is gonna be a long read, so you might as well grab a cup of joe before settling in…
Carrol and Herzinger hit on a key concept in the discussion of transferring ANY aircraft to Ukraine— the proficiency and ability to sustain the assets logistically.  Even if we’re discussing F-16s, which fit the billet of multi-role needs of that nation, comes with a hefty price tag in terms of ground-based requirements.  They jokingly refer to a HAZMAT program to deal with the hydrazine, to which the Ukrainians would probably scoff, but those are long-term, very real considerations.  Do they have fuel trucks that can hook up to these fighters?  What munitions are you giving them?  How many crew chiefs and specs are you sending to get trained in the US?  ANY transfer of aircraft in terms of hardware of this caliber will not produce an immediate effect on the battlefield, and in fact, as I mentioned briefly, can very well be a net DRAIN on their forces as they try to sustain something that is 100% foreign to them.  
Multi-role works best for smaller air forces— they HAVE to live in that realm.  Hell, multi-role is a cornerstone of our programs, but I don’t believe that EVERY aircraft needs to be born and employed under that mantra.  We have that luxury as a force that we can have specialization— though the budgeteers might disagree, we as an American Air Force have that ability whereas others do not.  You could say the same for our approach to CSAR— we have the luxury and budget to dedicate such forces to the mission.  
“Give us an aircraft solution similar to the HIMARS.”  
That’s just not going to happen with western equipment for the reasons listed above and in their presentation.  
Now, back to the A-10.  
These guys are qualified experts in their field— Carrol world-renowned.  But not in the A-10.  If you think that MANPADs make brick walls and close off airspace to A-10s, then you’re not familiar with the Hog’s current suite of defensive systems, tactics, or weapons availability. If you throw out pics of KC’s battle-damaged A-10 and say that this proves the A-10’snvulnerabilities, then you don’t know the context of that situation.  Anyone know how many passes that formation made prior to that hit?  
5.  
Down the same ‘chute, same angle, while carrying 4x Mk-82s.  
Well that doesn’t sound smart now does it?  
It’s what they had to do.  
US forces were pinned down across the river by Iraqi forces under a bridge escarpment, and the only way to hit those Iraqi’s was to come in at a relatively low angle, from one direction, multiple times trying to get gun and rocket passes under the bridge with effective effects based on that battlefield terrain.  A-10 defensive systems were not automatic at that time, and they became predictable due to the requirements of the troops on the ground.  That hit aligns pretty well with the historical averages going back to Desert Storm— no A-10 has ever been hit on its first pass, and it’s usually around that fifth or sixth attack in the same area that gets them.  
The jet wasn’t carrying precision munitions that might have allowed for more standoff at that time either— they were A-10As, and precision engagement wouldn’t start for a few more years.  
The point is, in every discussion about hits that the A-10 has taken over the years, there’s A LOT of context required.  The experiences over the Republican Guard in 1991 come up often in this realm, but without getting into that right now, the discussion needs to start with the question, “Why were A-10s operating in that environment at that time that led to those losses?”  It’s a great story that adds so much more to the understanding of what led to those hits.  William Smallwood does a great compilation in his book, “Warthog—Flying the A-10 in the Gulf War.”  A stat you don’t see thrown around often— did you know that we lost just as many F-16s as A-10s during Ops Desert Shield and Desert Storm?  
Which brings me to the point of the SU-25s getting their “asses handed to them,” so why would anyone want something similar?  
I haven’t seen the numbers lately, but during the first three months of the war, SU-25 loss rates were comparable to all other fast-movers.  If you classify the Frog as its own entity vs all other fighters, you’ll see that more traditional fighters were lost than -25s.  Personally, since such a distinction is made between the Frog and all other fighters in terms of survivability, I think this is a fair comparison that proves that the Frog is being lost at a slightly lower rate than other, faster fighters.  
I also am not impressed by the tactics, training, or the apparent lack of effective equipment on the Frogs for that matter.  If you read up on the SU-25SM (Russia’s “best” Frog), you’ll see that it boasts some pretty impressive equipment— on paper, it looks like it’s on par with US gear.  But videos of Frogs in action shows that either this equipment (such as automatic counter measures) either doesn’t work, or the pilots don’t operate them correctly.  So I think that it’s a natural attempt, but ultimately incorrect comparison between the battlefield employment of SU-25s to A-10Cs.  
The quote that the A-10 was “deemed unsurvivable in the 1980s” just shows the lack of familiarity with what upgrades have been done to the jet since then.  I honestly think that many of the “pundits” commenting on the A-10 think that all she does is employ the same tactics, with the same suites and weapons as she did in 1984.  While we’re still VERY good at those tactics, the envelope, effectiveness, and survivability has grown exponentially since then.  If you want an interesting read, check out Douglas Campbell’s book, “The A-10 and the Close Air Support Debate.”  There are passages and quotes in there from the 1980s that I swore were date-stamped 2013 the last time we had this discussion.  
Carrol makes the point that you can’t have an air threat and do CAS— I agree.  In fact, that’s written in the JPUB.  I do NOT agree that you need a limited MANPAD or even SAM threat, particularly when you’re talking about what would REALISTICALLY be associated with front-line units in a CAS fight.  
Carrol and Herzinger both hint at the cynical nature of this original discussion— a desperate long-ball to try to affect a final solution on the A-10.  That knife kind of cuts both ways when you’re offering it to someone else, and you kind of get caught talking out of both sides of your mouth.  “Hey, this jet isn’t good enough for us, but I think it’s just what YOU need in the same fight that I just said it wouldn’t be able to fight!” 
WTF? 
Let me close with this (the old man will stop yelling at clouds for the day).  There are a lot of people with a lot of opinions about the A-10 who don’t have the familiarity with what the airframe can actually do.  I’m reminded of a story from about ten years ago when a VERY senior civilian DoD member who was actively advocating for the divestiture of the A-10 was given a tour by one of the Hog units.  Upon learning about the defensive capabilities of the Hog, this VERY senior civilian was shocked—this person had no idea about what upgrades and capabilities the aircraft actually possessed.  And yet here that person was repeatedly professing the lack of survivability of the aircraft, advocating for a solution without being given the full information.  
We just shook our heads then as we do now.  
If you know, you know.  
 

And that was why I posted that video…

I agree with you, Carrol and Hertzinger on the White Elephant problem US platforms in the immediate term would generate for the Ukrainians, MiG 29s are not a great solution but a feasible one IMHO for the Ukrainians as they fly them now, would pick them up and use them right now and are good enough for right now, long term post-conflict the next platforms can be figured out


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[busdriver]

6 hours ago, Zero said:

....repeatedly professing the lack of survivability of the aircraft, advocating for a solution without being given the full information.  

Big blue doesn't like the ambiguity of platforms that require anything approaching "art" to employ.  It doesn't fit with the algorithmic thought process to war planning.  What they want is the ability to run an equation:

A aircraft x B munitions x C sorties  = we win.  Basically an operational level JWS.

I suspect that is the actual root cause, but also influenced by shrinking training dollars and some other stuff.

[Zero]

42 minutes ago, busdriver said:

Big blue doesn't like the ambiguity of platforms that require anything approaching "art" to employ.  It doesn't fit with the algorithmic thought process to war planning.  What they want is the ability to run an equation:

A aircraft x B munitions x C sorties  = we win.  Basically an operational level JWS.

I suspect that is the actual root cause, but also influenced by shrinking training dollars and some other stuff.

You’re on to something there— that same thought process propagates through so many aspects of Corporate Blue’s culture— leadership is hard… management by processes is easy.  It’s yet another by-product of the risk-averse mindset that’s risen to many corners of the top.  

Crafting that true “art” of war seems to be fading from the culture day by day.  

[di1630]

Careful on listening too closely to “experts”. They do things like put B-1s in CAS stacks and say F-35s are just fantastic at CAS.

I can saying having flown 3 types of A/G fighters, the A-10 is hands down the most suitable to support ground forces.

That’s only if the pilots are well trained.

Ukraine probably needs artillery more than anything else.

[Majestik Møøse]

On 8/1/2022 at 5:18 PM, busdriver said:

Big blue doesn't like the ambiguity of platforms that require anything approaching "art" to employ.  It doesn't fit with the algorithmic thought process to war planning.  What they want is the ability to run an equation:

A aircraft x B munitions x C sorties  = we win.  Basically an operational level JWS.

I suspect that is the actual root cause, but also influenced by shrinking training dollars and some other stuff.

Shit I wish they thought that way. I don’t see a whole lot of thought on how to sustain a 24-hour shooting war  at many levels of leadership. It seems like they’re just thinking about widget vs widget during one vul. If your 7th-Gen fighters get shot in the ass during the RTB because they’re being asked to extend way too far on an OTH mission with no backfill, well that sounds like a root cause to me.

[Lawman]

Shit I wish they thought that way. I don’t see a whole lot of thought on how to sustain a 24-hour shooting war  at many levels of leadership. It seems like they’re just thinking about widget vs widget during one vul. If your 7th-Gen fighters get shot in the ass during the RTB because they’re being asked to extend way too far on an OTH mission with no backfill, well that sounds like a root cause to me.

Ok… Couple points to make here because like so many things it’s been destroyed as a term and turned into something perversely not reality because OIF/OEF….

24 hour ops… That does not mean continuous attack on all axis or more specifically 24 hours of continuous coverage by assets. Yes it is extremely beneficial if we can continue to make things go boom in an enemies support zone without rest, but reality is no force to include the ground force you guys exist to prepare the way for can maintain operation indefinitely.

Munitions consumption would be extreme… You’d have aircraft and crews servicing targets of a lower priority vs taking a tactical pause in the cycle to prioritize and build robust packages so you can achieve greater effect against stuff higher up on the HPTL…

This idea of “get big gun, go forward, reign hell” = effective CAS is just mind numbing from the perspective of the ground element you’re supposed to be supporting. I’ll say this out loud for the people in the back… We Can Kill Tanks! In fact we really don’t need that done for us because we are pretty damn good at it. And we can straight up murder BTR/BMP… What we can’t do, is set ground conditions favorable to the offense/defense to do that under rounds of artillery and heavy rocket fire. No you killing 3-4 armored vehicles advancing on line in a pass doesn’t make or break for effecting the fight, because by prioritizing assets and dollars to that fight you’ve ceded a point where you could have prevented it and the need to stop and dig in entirely! You guys want to talk about old Cold War tactics and requirements and why we needed Hawg and Apache to stem the armor, it wasn’t because of us it was because of our allies in the Fulda scenario. Penetration was talked about earlier (STS)…. There is the often quoted “855 rounds of artillery” from the Joint Firepower courts… Yeah thanks for reminding us that HE point detonating fuse 155 is the least effective way to engage tanks in the maneuver. We appreciate that….Well when the air delivered tank killing requirement was determined the primary tank gun in NATO armies was the rifled 105 L7. NATO acknowledged that across the board even Chieftain not adequate parity to what the Russians seemed to be developing as far as Armor. With the 105 you can kill plenty and deliver it very accurately. What you can’t do is reliably shoot in the face and kill a T-64/72 unless you use DU from within the effective range of their 125mm… So acknowledging that nobody wants to do that an on top of it most of our allies won’t use DU, that’s gonna be at problem. Enter the Reinmetal 120mm…. Well 73 Easting kind showed what that will do to a tank. Regardless though, Tanks aren’t the big problem for us. Tanks won’t produce the MASCAL event that will shape the battlefield and politics unfavorably for us.

The Russians and armies modeled after it have fire support as their center of gravity, not armor. Kill his artillery, get into the support zone and eliminate that threat, and the ground force will deal with the Armor. If you can kill their fire support they lose their most effective enabler to attacking our ground force or resisting counter attack. And considering artillery assets will be further back and staged under more robust defense and ideally in their own revetments requiring more deliberate high angle targeting, suddenly the survivability argument presented earlier changes drastically.


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[Clark Griswold]

Not A-10s but maybe Su-25s…

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-rumors-spin-around-macedonian-su-25-delivery?fbclid=IwAR1-s2XyICYO5qZz0ZP03_U1f35In4kXv8z_rhmIDpViV-AKsRX718PgTj0


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[Lawman]

Not A-10s but maybe Su-25s…

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ukraine-situation-report-rumors-spin-around-macedonian-su-25-delivery?fbclid=IwAR1-s2XyICYO5qZz0ZP03_U1f35In4kXv8z_rhmIDpViV-AKsRX718PgTj0


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I mean even if at this point it’s just pulling together some boneyard parts birds, this is the kind of thing we (State and DOD) should be trying to put into effect.

If we had commonality of equipment I’d be all for letting the Ukrainians run up an owe me tab in the AMARC. We don’t, so let’s play the you be friends to my friends and I’ll be forever appreciative card, and make some deals.


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[Clayton Bigsby]

So what’s shooting the HARMs?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u-s-confirms-air-launched-anti-radiation-missiles-sent-to-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR1f7pWPQlNtsmgTt-4eZ9swzskGs1UB_cZ-2ps7XJImSQpQ0OoOa0_0jV8

[uhhello]

1 minute ago, Clayton Bigsby said:

So what’s shooting the HARMs?

https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/u-s-confirms-air-launched-anti-radiation-missiles-sent-to-ukraine?fbclid=IwAR1f7pWPQlNtsmgTt-4eZ9swzskGs1UB_cZ-2ps7XJImSQpQ0OoOa0_0jV8

Ground launched

[ClearedHot]

This war and the number of casualties Russia is sustaining will change their society for years to come. 

Latest DoD estimates released yesterday and reported in the Washington Post suggest Russian has sustained 80,000 killed or wounded in just SIX MONTHS.  As a frame of reference the United States suffered 160,000 casualties (58,000 deaths), over TEN years during the Vietnam War.  Russian casualties from their invasion of Afghanistan were at 15,000 killed and 35,000 wounded, again over ten years.  Afghanistan losses caused great debate in their society which ultimately caused them to quit and leave.

It is important to keep in mind Russia's total population is about 1/3 of the United States and these losses will impact a far larger portion of the population...even as Putin tries to cover up those losses.  More and more it looks like Putin has bet his future on the outcome which I hope we and others are using as we calculate and employ our strategy and response.

 

[BFM this]

11 hours ago, uhhello said:

Ground launched

Makes sense.

I mean, since you can launch a Maverick on the ground, of course you could shoot a HARM.

[BFM this]

2 hours ago, ClearedHot said:

It is important to keep in mind Russia's total population is about 1/3 of the United States and these losses will impact a far larger portion of the population...even as Putin tries to cover up those losses. 

BBC’s Ukrainecast explored some of the creative accounting the Russians are using to hide casualty figures from the Russian public in their episode from last Wednesday.  Contractors recruiting from prisons to start with.  

But yeah, this one is going to affect their society for generations.

[VMFA187]

On 8/1/2022 at 6:27 PM, di1630 said:

Careful on listening too closely to “experts”. They do things like put B-1s in CAS stacks and say F-35s are just fantastic at CAS.

I can saying having flown 3 types of A/G fighters, the A-10 is hands down the most suitable to support ground forces.

That’s only if the pilots are well trained.

Ukraine probably needs artillery more than anything else.
 

The F-35 is a capable CAS platform. It might not have the same ability to bring ordnance to the fight as a F-15E or A-10, but 6 bombs per aircraft is more than I ever carried in the Hornet in actual combat. And I'm hitting the same TOTs, and many of our CAT-1s are as well - Plus or minus 5", that I did in the Hornet. 

Granted, a great deal of that is due to the fact that there is no "Contact the mark ... from the mark West 50 ... Tally Target in 090." Its a lot less busy employing only 12s and 32s vice 82s, 83s, and 84s. 

[Clark Griswold]

I mean even if at this point it’s just pulling together some boneyard parts birds, this is the kind of thing we (State and DOD) should be trying to put into effect.

If we had commonality of equipment I’d be all for letting the Ukrainians run up an owe me tab in the AMARC. We don’t, so let’s play the you be friends to my friends and I’ll be forever appreciative card, and make some deals.


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Concur - since we don’t GAF about the Russians opinions on much these days why not let our aerospace industry reverse engineer parts for Ukraine to solve support problems for existing equipment and new used equipment to be acquired by hook or crook?
Just a thought

Added for discussion on 3/4 gen attack aircraft (do attack platforms have generations?) - write up on improved Frogfoot variants deploying to Syria

https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-03-22/further-improved-su-25sm3-redeploys-syria


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[di1630]

The F-35 is a capable CAS platform. It might not have the same ability to bring ordnance to the fight as a F-15E or A-10, but 6 bombs per aircraft is more than I ever carried in the Hornet in actual combat. And I'm hitting the same TOTs, and many of our CAT-1s are as well - Plus or minus 5", that I did in the Hornet. 
Granted, a great deal of that is due to the fact that there is no "Contact the mark ... from the mark West 50 ... Tally Target in 090." Its a lot less busy employing only 12s and 32s vice 82s, 83s, and 84s. 

Yeah, I’ll need to disagree with you here. IMO the F-35 is sh-t at CAS. Is it the poor CAS weapons choices? Is it the pilot vehicle interface? Is it the community not having a good understanding of CAS?

It’s all of the above.

I can’t think of really any CAS scenario I’d rather be in an F-35 vs an A-10 unless the CAS was specifically taking out air defenses which would make it more SEAD.