Tactical Tanker

[Clark Griswold]

See this… this was informative to the nature of the problems.

And yes to your last point some sort of roll on, “this is now a tanker!” Module like system was kind of what I was thinking.

Essentially it’s what we do with a Chinook or 53 when we outfit it to be a flying FARP, we just know that outside of Osprey there isn’t clean air to drag a drogue in. Osprey there is… the question is whether the juice is worth the squeeze taking its already defined roles and adding a trick to it. Probably is, but that’s because right now an Amphib has no organic tanker, and a hell of a lot of fuel pass requirements if they want to use those F35s. But it’s a conscious decision to take that heavy lift asset and make it a gas station. It isn’t taken lightly because it’s value doing anything else is lost.


I’m just curious if the idea is we need in an INDOPACOM type fight gonna need big numbers of fuel to push stuff but also need it to be able to deploy to austere locations to avoid being targeted…. Ok well here is a big ass airplane that can carry a lot and land in some places a 135/10/46 wouldn’t dream…. Maybe it’s an idea worth pursuing so let’s do the math on a reasons why it won’t work with a list of challenges to overcome. Or maybe we look in a filing cabinet and find a white paper somebody did kinda like sticking Harms on a Fulcrum.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

As to reasons why it wouldn’t work or I think maybe we don’t need it (just playing devils advocate) are we planning on or we will be able to do a plan to defeat PLAN / PLAAF / Ballistic missile attacks that is dependent on strikes primarily delivered by manned short / medium ranged fighters range augmented by Strategic & Tactical Air Refueling? Is that concept of operations something the Chinese will be able to defeat vice a longer ranged stand off strikes focused concept via upcoming B-21s, B-2s, UCAVs, etc?

I think the main argument against the tactical tanker then is let’s throw mo’ money at having a full up modern big wing tanker capability from heavily protected MOBs that are further back the AOR (existing and new locations based in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Australia, Northern Japan, etc…) as it is lower risk and fits into existing acquisition planning.

Again devils advocate just for conversation


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Lawman]

As to reasons why it wouldn’t work or I think maybe we don’t need it (just playing devils advocate) are we planning on or we will be able to do a plan to defeat PLAN / PLAAF / Ballistic missile attacks that is dependent on strikes primarily delivered by manned short / medium ranged fighters range augmented by Strategic & Tactical Air Refueling? Is that concept of operations something the Chinese will be able to defeat vice a longer ranged stand off strikes focused concept via upcoming B-21s, B-2s, UCAVs, etc?

I think the main argument against the tactical tanker then is let’s throw mo’ money at having a full up modern big wing tanker capability from heavily protected MOBs that are further back the AOR (existing and new locations based in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Australia, Northern Japan, etc…) as it is lower risk and fits into existing acquisition planning.

Again devils advocate just for conversation


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

There is an entire domain of conflict that will happen outside the USAF vs PLAAF scenario involving the Chinese which will not just be trading and defending tit for tat long range fires and hoping one side doesn’t go nuclear first… Yes lean to your strengths and all, but the Joint Forces commander is going to ask for a lot more than just long range strike.

If the Chinese put that massive body of ground and Naval forces into the fight in the region something will have to go forward and dislodge them. I’d hope since we have for over half a century planned with the idea of Air Superiority generated from the Air that we wouldn’t be suddenly changing that idea to go it alone on the ground. That’s gonna require those shorter reactive tactical range air assets that have to live close/inside of to Chinese long range precision fires, and those by extension are going to need gas to do anything useful. Suddenly not being just at the couple massive bases and getting off the normal beaten path is going to be necessary for survival of that combat power.

No I don’t see any scenario where it is in our interest to go invade mainland China, but all those islands and regional partners are likely places where we need to put our people on the ground either to deter or dislodge. Since we would more than likely be responding to the aggressor, dislodge (and the offensive fires/prep it will take to make it successful) seems more likely.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Clark Griswold]

There is an entire domain of conflict that will happen outside the USAF vs PLAAF scenario involving the Chinese which will not just be trading and defending tit for tat long range fires and hoping one side doesn’t go nuclear first… Yes lean to your strengths and all, but the Joint Forces commander is going to ask for a lot more than just long range strike.

If the Chinese put that massive body of ground and Naval forces into the fight in the region something will have to go forward and dislodge them. I’d hope since we have for over half a century planned with the idea of Air Superiority generated from the Air that we wouldn’t be suddenly changing that idea to go it alone on the ground. That’s gonna require those shorter reactive tactical range air assets that have to live close/inside of to Chinese long range precision fires, and those by extension are going to need gas to do anything useful. Suddenly not being just at the couple massive bases and getting off the normal beaten path is going to be necessary for survival of that combat power.

No I don’t see any scenario where it is in our interest to go invade mainland China, but all those islands and regional partners are likely places where we need to put our people on the ground either to deter or dislodge. Since we would more than likely be responding to the aggressor, dislodge (and the offensive fires/prep it will take to make it successful) seems more likely.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Good stuff and playing the foil… I guess my next turd in the punch bowl question is can we reasonably expect our existing and coming online 4/5 gen fighters to be able to operate with the tactical tanker at these dispersed austere locations? Gas is only one component of support but parts, mx, ammo, logistics, etc… The tactical tanker is one part of ACE, I’d like to see but as a fanboy of gripen, a new fighter from the wheels up built for austere ops (high reliability, STOL, focused capabilities, etc…) or a USAF version of gripen to go with the tactical tanker along with the whole road show to support to include naval resupply capabilities to get mass fuel, potable water, food, etc… that’s survivable on its own, no escort required

This is starting to sound like a second Marine Corps but with their pivot and force restructuring I think the USAF could fill this hole (sts)


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[Biff_T]

40 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

.....I’d like to see but as a fanboy of gripen, a new fighter from the wheels up built for austere ops (high reliability, STOL, focused capabilities, etc…) or a USAF version of gripen to go with the tactical tanker along with the whole road show to support to include naval resupply capabilities to get mass fuel, potable water, food, etc… that’s survivable on its own, no escort required

This is starting to sound like a second Marine Corps but with their pivot and force restructuring I think the USAF could fill this hole (sts)


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

This guy will be attached to the bottom (sts) of the tanker.   1/4 scale goblins piloted by little people.   Think outside of the "box".   

[Clark Griswold]

18 hours ago, Biff_T said:

This guy will be attached to the bottom (sts) of the tanker.   1/4 scale goblins piloted by little people.   Think outside of the "box".   

I know but a proven road warrior is what I think we need to go with the theoretical KC-390

This would be an augmentation to the existing and more logistically needy fighter fleet (not a swipe at them) 

How to afford all this new iron?

Divest H model Hercs, oldest F-16s and probably the A-10s (don't taze me for that) but if we wanna get ready to fight the next fight, we're gonna have to sign up some new players and retire others, we're not gonna get more appropriation

[Lawman]

This is starting to sound like a second Marine Corps but with their pivot and force restructuring I think the USAF could fill this hole (sts)

I just think we (all services) have somehow moved away from joint strategy and understanding how we interact in a combatant command, and now all our acquisition strategies seem to be very selfish. The whole public media fight between the AF COS and Army COS about long range precision fires was a good example of it. The Marine Corps wholesale abandoning where it fit in doctrine of being that midpoint between quick reaction and the long spin up of heavy forces being another.

We seem to lack any desire for somebody to sit down and define a strategy of “what and where is our big fight, and how does that define what equipment we have and what we need to go get.” That’s going to get even more pronounced when the big budget axes start coming out and suddenly that thing a service bought in small quantity primarily to support another services capabilities goes away in favor of their own needs *cough JStars* *Cough C27* … oh excuse me… The Army is doing the same thing where it’s said “ok plan they can’t be there now” which makes all our stuff heavier as it’s taking more on and now we’ve made our transport and logistics problem even harder on ourselves.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[ClearedHot]

22 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

As to reasons why it wouldn’t work or I think maybe we don’t need it (just playing devils advocate) are we planning on or we will be able to do a plan to defeat PLAN / PLAAF / Ballistic missile attacks that is dependent on strikes primarily delivered by manned short / medium ranged fighters range augmented by Strategic & Tactical Air Refueling? Is that concept of operations something the Chinese will be able to defeat vice a longer ranged stand off strikes focused concept via upcoming B-21s, B-2s, UCAVs, etc?

I think the main argument against the tactical tanker then is let’s throw mo’ money at having a full up modern big wing tanker capability from heavily protected MOBs that are further back the AOR (existing and new locations based in Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, Australia, Northern Japan, etc…) as it is lower risk and fits into existing acquisition planning.

I know you are arguing the other size but very dogmatic thinking.  For 10+ years they have been asking for things that change the calculus, doubling down on big wing tankers and protected MOBs is pure insanity IMHO.  Go look at how many TBMs the Chinese have built...and the accuracy.  They will simply overwhelm and destroy Guam and Tinian.  If Japan enables our ops they will pay a heavy price as well, although they have invested a LOT of $ and brain power in upgrades that will cost the Chicoms dearly.  If you think we enabling ops from Alaska, Hawaii or northern Australia will work, I have some bridges I would like to sell you.  The tyranny of distance is real and using those bases will not allow for the massing of airpower needed to counter the Chinese.  If the defense of Taiwan is to be successful there must be an interdiction effort of vessels crossing the straights and that is going to require far more than a few B-2/B-21 sorties launching long-rang strike munitions. 

[Clark Griswold]

2 hours ago, Lawman said:

I just think we (all services) have somehow moved away from joint strategy and understanding how we interact in a combatant command, and now all our acquisition strategies seem to be very selfish. The whole public media fight between the AF COS and Army COS about long range precision fires was a good example of it. The Marine Corps wholesale abandoning where it fit in doctrine of being that midpoint between quick reaction and the long spin up of heavy forces being another.

We seem to lack any desire for somebody to sit down and define a strategy of “what and where is our big fight, and how does that define what equipment we have and what we need to go get.” That’s going to get even more pronounced when the big budget axes start coming out and suddenly that thing a service bought in small quantity primarily to support another services capabilities goes away in favor of their own needs *cough JStars* *Cough C27* … oh excuse me… The Army is doing the same thing where it’s said “ok plan they can’t be there now” which makes all our stuff heavier as it’s taking more on and now we’ve made our transport and logistics problem even harder on ourselves.

Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

Can't argue with that, probably time for a Goldwater-Nichols level defense reform 

1 hour ago, ClearedHot said:

I know you are arguing the other size but very dogmatic thinking.  For 10+ years they have been asking for things that change the calculus, doubling down on big wing tankers and protected MOBs is pure insanity IMHO.  Go look at how many TBMs the Chinese have built...and the accuracy.  They will simply overwhelm and destroy Guam and Tinian.  If Japan enables our ops they will pay a heavy price as well, although they have invested a LOT of $ and brain power in upgrades that will cost the Chicoms dearly.  If you think we enabling ops from Alaska, Hawaii or northern Australia will work, I have some bridges I would like to sell you.  The tyranny of distance is real and using those bases will not allow for the massing of airpower needed to counter the Chinese.  If the defense of Taiwan is to be successful there must be an interdiction effort of vessels crossing the straights and that is going to require far more than a few B-2/B-21 sorties launching long-rang strike munitions. 

Copy all and as you noted I'm intentionally stirring the pot.  

If king for a day, it's a mixture (not an even mix) of both.  We need the strategic assets to assure all allies we can get to them in mass and the tactical assets to assure the near to the threat allies we can get to them and operate to free them or ideally deter aggression in the first place.  What that mix is, is the 69 billion dollar question. 

Even more so to that, where do we explicitly define, we will intervene immediately / deter directly with prepositioned forces?  The world as we know it now is expensive to maintain and we're approaching the point of having to actually live inside of our means, that's gonna force inevitable prioritization and somebody's gonna be below the line.  We in the West+ (Japan, South Korea, India maybe, etc...) need to be explicit in who's responsible for what and to what are their responsibilities to keep it free and/or developing.  Enough of that tangent.

Referencing @Lawman and his point on we haven't figured out or have drifted from an overall joint strategy, this platform could be a point to begin the discussion or reinvigorate it as to who has the strategic, operational and tactical missions / responsibilities for X contingency and in X theater(s)? 

Back in the weeds and more on the actual requirement potentially driving the acquisition for this platform, if I were a staffer at the Puzzle Palace considering this, I guess it's a matter of questions if you have decided that yes you need it and no nothing you have now can do it (sts).

How much gas do you need in the air at most at any one time?

How far do you need gas in a relevant quantity to be available for receivers?

How many AR orbits do you have to support at most any one time?

How long do you have to maintain your max effort AR mission?

How much in logistical support does it cost to sustain your max effort AR mission?

Can the logistical support network sustain your tactical AR capability without detracting from other missions unduly?

Other considerations?

The SCS and Taiwan scenario is front and foremost in considering this but looking west from Australia, the Indo part of the theater is looking like it will need some of both very heavy strategic big wing AR and tactical AR to give options for other shenanigans (Iranian or Pakistani adventurism, aggressive Chinese operations from HOA, etc...) 

Big wing enables / supports Tactical over the tyrannical distances, Tactical supports inside the WEZ of A2AD.  Probably only support on initial ingress or as able after the A2AD bubble has been shrunk but it's part of the plan(s).

Edited October 17, 2022 by Clark Griswold

[ClearedHot]

33 minutes ago, Clark Griswold said:

Other considerations?

One of the biggest flaws with the current plan (aside from trying to protect MOBs from a swarm of TBMs), is the way the employment of Big Wing Tankers from Guam and other distances will limit our asymmetric 5th gen advantage.  If you think we can operate Big Wing Tankers outside the island chain and they won't be detected, then again lets go bridge shopping.  A quick google search and you will see China has been working on Bi Static Detection for some time.  They will be able to track the tankers and know exactly where the B-2/B-21/F-22/F-35s are marshaling, creating a single point of failure in our attack plan.

There is a reason ACE has been a buzz concept for the past 10 years, \Agile Tanker finally opens that door.  Also, it does not hurt that the Philippines recently announced that they Will Provide Military Base To US During China-Taiwan Conflict.    Aside from allowing multiple booms at multiple points simultaneously opening multiple axis of attack it also minimizes the problem Big Wing Tankers face with the tyranny of distance.  As a frame of reference, Guam to the likely top-off points is a 3300NM flight...ONE WAY! 

[Clark Griswold]

One of the biggest flaws with the current plan (aside from trying to protect MOBs from a swarm of TBMs), is the way the employment of Big Wing Tankers from Guam and other distances will limit our asymmetric 5th gen advantage.  If you think we can operate Big Wing Tankers outside the island chain and they won't be detected, then again lets go bridge shopping.  A quick google search and you will see China has been working on Bi Static Detection for some time.  They will be able to track the tankers and know exactly where the B-2/B-21/F-22/F-35s are marshaling, creating a single point of failure in our attack plan.
There is a reason ACE has been a buzz concept for the past 10 years, \Agile Tanker finally opens that door.  Also, it does not hurt that the Philippines recently announced that they Will Provide Military Base To US During China-Taiwan Conflict.    Aside from allowing multiple booms at multiple points simultaneously opening multiple axis of attack it also minimizes the problem Big Wing Tankers face with the tyranny of distance.  As a frame of reference, Guam to the likely top-off points is a 3300NM flight...ONE WAY! 

My work here is done


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[ThreeHoler]

Guam to Taiwan is 1500 NM one way…


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

[ClearedHot]

3 hours ago, ThreeHoler said:

Guam to Taiwan is 1500 NM one way…


Sent from my iPhone using Baseops Network mobile app

Correct, typo on my part.  *Hawaii* to top off points is 3300NM.

Guam to center point of Taiwan is 1700 miles, to the center of the straights is another 100 miles.