B-1 Down at Ellsworth

[Danger41]

2 hours ago, 08Dawg said:

RUMINT in the bomber community is a very serious EP (jet on fire) prior to the approach. Weather was an eyelash above ILS mins. First day back flying after Christmas/New Years. Helluva first day back…

Sounds like a similar stress level to being home with my 4 kids.

[lloyd christmas]

10 hours ago, 08Dawg said:

RUMINT in the bomber community is a very serious EP (jet on fire) prior to the approach. Weather was an eyelash above ILS mins. First day back flying after Christmas/New Years. Helluva first day back…

I get it. We fly and are qualified to operate in bad weather.  However, you’ve got to look at the bigger picture.  It’s cold as shit there, first day back from the long holidays and the weather was horrible.  Approach a day like that anticipating the worst case scenario and break the error chain on the ground by cancelling a training line.  You can do it another day.  Sounds like these guys experienced that worst case scenario (serious EP/jet on fire).  The accident report will be interesting to read.  I’m curious how much blame goes to the SOF or leadership for leaning too far forward.  

[fire4effect]

2 hours ago, lloyd christmas said:

I get it. We fly and are qualified to operate in bad weather.  However, you’ve got to look at the bigger picture.  It’s cold as shit there, first day back from the long holidays and the weather was horrible.  Approach a day like that anticipating the worst case scenario and break the error chain on the ground by cancelling a training line.  You can do it another day.  Sounds like these guys experienced that worst case scenario (serious EP/jet on fire).  The accident report will be interesting to read.  I’m curious how much blame goes to the SOF or leadership for leaning too far forward.  

One of my favorite statements to give the younger troops is "no one remembers the mishap/accident/attack/ambush etc. that never occurs"

It's what we strive for daily if we're doing our job correctly even though you'll rarely if ever get credit.

[FourFans]

8 hours ago, lloyd christmas said:

I’m curious how much blame goes to the SOF or leadership for leaning too far forward.  

Not a poke in the eye, this statement just got me thinking. 

When did we start looking at flying in the weather and pushing it hard in training as a bad thing?  It's the military.  We're supposed to be able to deliver anytime, anywhere, in any conditions.  In my last 5 years before retiring last year, I saw anything that even approached that attitude as being reviled.  In a different world (think Cold War...which we're in again...) this crew MIGHT (depending on what actually happened) have been commended for bringing the jet all the way back and mostly in tact despite what appears to have been an airborne fire.   Instead, the default now is 'who's to blame' and 'why did we take so much risk'.  The military culture used to embrace risk takers.  Go look up documentaries of how the British SAS/SOE used to train their operatives.  Death was normal and expected.  Hell dudes in the USAF in the 50's used to routinely crash jets.  Not abhorant, just expected and normal risk.  Save your life, save the jet if you can.  Get yelled at.  Go do it again tomorrow.  Do difficult and dangerous things specifically because doing those things makes you better.

Now...not so much. 

Observation, not critique.

Edited January 12 by FourFans

[uhhello]

1 hour ago, FourFans said:

Not a poke in the eye, this statement just got me thinking. 

When did we start looking at flying in the weather and pushing it hard in training as a bad thing?  It's the military.  We're supposed to be able to deliver anytime, anywhere, in any conditions.  In my last 5 years before retiring last year, I saw anything that even approached that attitude as being reviled.  In a different world (think Cold War...which we're in again...) this crew MIGHT (depending on what actually happened) have been commended for bringing the jet all the way back and mostly in tact despite what appears to have been an airborne fire.   Instead, the default now is 'who's to blame' and 'why did we take so much risk'.  The military culture used to embrace risk takers.  Go look up documentaries of how the British SAS/SOE used to train their operatives.  Death was normal and expected.  Hell dudes in the USAF in the 50's used to routinely crash jets.  Not abhorant, just expected and normal risk.  Save your life, save the jet if you can.  Get yelled at.  Go do it again tomorrow.  Do difficult and dangerous things specifically because doing those things makes you better.

Now...not so much. 

Observation, not critique.

Just off the top of my head, aircraft have drastically increased in cost per and there are far far fewer.  There were around 7500 aircraft in the 80's and down to 4,100 (2021).   Losing this aircraft is going to require a pull from the boneyard from everything I've read.  You're always going to get the knee jerk reactions right after these crashes.  I'm not saying don't fly in anything but clear and a million but you really have to factor in what a hull loss does to overall force.  

 

 

Edited January 12 by uhhello

[tac airlifter]

1 hour ago, FourFans said:

When did we start looking at flying in the weather and pushing it hard in training as a bad thing?  It's the military.  We're supposed to be able to deliver anytime, anywhere, in any conditions. 

Totally agree.  I never WX cancelled for WX at mins.  An approach to minimums is something aviators should be comfortable with, and you certainly don’t want your first time to be when it matters versus a training sortie. Now below mins is a different story, I’m not going to divert and buy a new toothbrush…

 

[FourFans]

2 hours ago, uhhello said:

Just off the top of my head, aircraft have drastically increased in cost per and there are far far fewer.  There were around 7500 aircraft in the 80's and down to 4,100 (2021).   Losing this aircraft is going to require a pull from the boneyard from everything I've read.  You're always going to get the knee jerk reactions right after these crashes.  I'm not saying don't fly in anything but clear and a million but you really have to factor in what a hull loss does to overall force.  

 

True.  We definitely had more hulls.  I'd be curious to see the relative cost of those hulls vs gdp and adjusted for inflation.  Granted crashing an F-4 in 1965 was in real dollars cheaper than crashing an F-22 today, but by how much?  A straight inflation calculator says a 2.4M F-4 in 1965 would be equivalent to 23M today, but there's a lot more in a proper calculation of value then that.  What's more, I would argue that our pilots are lower density and much more high value add today than they were in 1965.  For example when I moved to the C-130J, it was clear you couldn't have a timid CP who got beat up by the FE for a year before getting value out of him.  We had to train CPs to think like ACs and mission commanders from day one.  I've heard the same about wingmen in the F-22 and F-35.  High value add from day one, and that learning curve will only get steeper with net-centric warfare being what it is.

Either way, I stand by the argument that we've shrunk from risk inappropriately and that it is actively hurting our nation defense.  My gut tells me it's the result of spineless leadership, but that's entirely opinion.

Edited January 13 by FourFans

[RASH]

True.  We definitely had more hulls.  I'd be curious to see the relative cost of those hulls vs gdp and adjusted for inflation.  Granted crashing an F-4 in 1965 was in real dollars cheaper than crashing an F-22 today, but by how much?  A straight inflation calculator says a 2.4M F-4 in 1965 would be equivalent to 23M today, but there's a lot more in a proper calculation of value then that.  What's more, I would argue that our pilots are lower density and much more high value add today than they were in 1965.  For example when I moved to the C-130J, it was clear you couldn't have a timid CP who got beat up by the FE for a year before getting value out of him.  We had to train CPs to think like ACs and mission commanders from day one.  I've heard the same about wingmen in the F-22 and F-35.  High value add from day one, and that learning curve will only get steeper with net-centric warfare being what it is.
Either way, I stand by the argument that we've shrunk from risk inappropriately and that it is actively hurting our nation defense.  My gut tells me it's the result of spineless leadership, but that's entirely opinion.

Your opinion is more common than you might think in your community


Sent from my iPad using Baseops Network mobile app

[TreeA10]

I would say calculation as percentage of GDP isn't as important as percentage of fleet power projection.  Losing one jet out of thousands isn't as critical as losing one jet out of hundreds.

[lloyd christmas]

20 hours ago, FourFans said:

Not a poke in the eye, this statement just got me thinking. 

When did we start looking at flying in the weather and pushing it hard in training as a bad thing?  It's the military.  We're supposed to be able to deliver anytime, anywhere, in any conditions.  In my last 5 years before retiring last year, I saw anything that even approached that attitude as being reviled.  In a different world (think Cold War...which we're in again...) this crew MIGHT (depending on what actually happened) have been commended for bringing the jet all the way back and mostly in tact despite what appears to have been an airborne fire.   Instead, the default now is 'who's to blame' and 'why did we take so much risk'.  The military culture used to embrace risk takers.  Go look up documentaries of how the British SAS/SOE used to train their operatives.  Death was normal and expected.  Hell dudes in the USAF in the 50's used to routinely crash jets.  Not abhorant, just expected and normal risk.  Save your life, save the jet if you can.  Get yelled at.  Go do it again tomorrow.  Do difficult and dangerous things specifically because doing those things makes you better.

Now...not so much. 

Observation, not critique.

I think we should be able to discuss ORM without jumping straight to this is the military so we should be all gas and no brakes.  I’m glad we aren’t crashing airplanes like we did in the 50’s, getting yelled at and doing it again the next day…  

Edited January 13 by lloyd christmas
Edit

[fire4effect]

1 hour ago, lloyd christmas said:

I think we should be able to discuss ORM without jumping straight to this is military so we should be all gas and no brakes.  I’m glad we aren’t crashing airplanes like we did in the 50’s, getting yelled at and doing it again the next day…  

Kind of reminds me of a story from a family member who flew with SAC (B-47 and B-52) and in Viet Nam (EB-66). On a training flight in a T-33, which gives you an idea how long ago this was, he departed from I believe somewhere in Missouri enroute to Bryan Texas where a miscommunication with the ground crew regarding refueling led to a flameout and ultimately successful dead stick landing. Turns out the ground crew left the fuel cap(s) unsecured, and he missed that on the pre-flight. He did go to an abbreviated FEB common to that era and he was sentenced to hand carry a fuel cap with him everywhere he went for the next 2 weeks. Different times indeed.

[guineapigfury]

6 hours ago, fire4effect said:

Kind of reminds me of a story from a family member who flew with SAC (B-47 and B-52) and in Viet Nam (EB-66). On a training flight in a T-33, which gives you an idea how long ago this was, he departed from I believe somewhere in Missouri enroute to Bryan Texas where a miscommunication with the ground crew regarding refueling led to a flameout and ultimately successful dead stick landing. Turns out the ground crew left the fuel cap(s) unsecured, and he missed that on the pre-flight. He did go to an abbreviated FEB common to that era and he was sentenced to hand carry a fuel cap with him everywhere he went for the next 2 weeks. Different times indeed.

This is exactly like a football player fumbling and the coach having him carry the football to class.  I love it.

[Prosuper]

8 hours ago, fire4effect said:

Kind of reminds me of a story from a family member who flew with SAC (B-47 and B-52) and in Viet Nam (EB-66). On a training flight in a T-33, which gives you an idea how long ago this was, he departed from I believe somewhere in Missouri enroute to Bryan Texas where a miscommunication with the ground crew regarding refueling led to a flameout and ultimately successful dead stick landing. Turns out the ground crew left the fuel cap(s) unsecured, and he missed that on the pre-flight. He did go to an abbreviated FEB common to that era and he was sentenced to hand carry a fuel cap with him everywhere he went for the next 2 weeks. Different times indeed.

Back in the days of overwing refueling we sometimes install the caps but not latch them on a very hot day to account for fuel expansion and put a write up in the 781 to make sure to check them on crew show.

[Springer]

2 hours ago, Prosuper said:

Back in the days of overwing refueling we sometimes install the caps but not latch them on a very hot day to account for fuel expansion and put a write up in the 781 to make sure to check them on crew show.

I have a permanent blue stain on my white winged RV-8 because of not doing this.

[M2]

AIB is out...

https://www.airandspaceforces.com/app/uploads/2024/07/4JAN24-AFGSC-Ellsworth-AFB-AIB-Report-1-1.pdf

[Danger41]

Damn, that statement of opinion was rough. Sounds like some heads will be rolling at Ellsworth soon. I especially liked the part where he illustrated that the MIP was overweight and that was why he got hurt in the ejection. Woof.

After reading that report, this really makes me mad. They went and did a stand-off weapon sortie and I’m sure they did awesome. Then they went home and screwed up an ILS and wrecked an airplane. Even if you want to scoff all things non-tactical, that’s a W for the enemy because that asset is gone. Screwing up the monkey skills is bad enough but omitting several flight manual and v3 procedures for poor visibility is unsat. It’s also not uncommon in other communities.

The cold weather correction one is interesting too. That one is confusing to alot of folks. It wouldn’t have made much of a difference on this (20 feet), but still interesting that 8 dudes didn’t think about it with -5°c. 

Im very interested to see the SIB on this one. Tons of good info for all levels and roles to get out of this one. Thank God the crew is okay and that the egress folks did their job well. 

[DirkDiggler]

That board president pulled no punches.  Brutal.  Like Danger said, lots of lessons to be learned for any aircrew, regardless of MDS.

[Pooter]

Conveniently not mentioned in the report is how Ellsworth’s ILS, TACAN, PAPIs, approach plates, displaced thresholds, and taxiways have all wildly fluctuated from operational, to 28 BW use only, to INOP, as the airfield gets turned upside down for B-21 construction in the months leading up to the mishap.
 

But it’s probably a culture problem in the squadron that just successfully did three deployments, a red flag, and the longest combat b-1 sortie in history all in one year  

 

Edited July 26 by Pooter

[SurelySerious]

Conveniently not mentioned in the report is how Ellsworth’s ILS, TACAN, PAPIs, approach plates, displaced thresholds, and taxiways have all wildly fluctuated from operational, to 28 BW use only, to INOP, as the airfield gets turned upside down for B-21 construction in the months leading up to the mishap.
 
But it’s probably a culture problem in the squadron that just successfully did three deployments, a red flag, and the longest combat b-1 sortie in history all in one year  
 

Sounds like if they didn’t brief or pay attention to those things on this sortie, than it’s symptoms of the same problem that plays into not reading notams, not mentioning or briefing low vis crm, not using the appropriate callouts, etc.

[uhhello]

Jesus.  That one is rough.  Getting called out as a fatty and two MX dudes popping hot.  But hey, they have done a bunch of deployments recently.....

[Pooter]

4 hours ago, SurelySerious said:

Sounds like if they didn’t brief or pay attention to those things on this sortie, than it’s symptoms of the same problem that plays into not reading notams, not mentioning or briefing low vis crm, not using the appropriate callouts, etc.

All valid points. But doing those things are all codified community standards so I don’t really buy extrapolating one crew’s mistakes to culture problems of a whole squadron/base. There’s a lot of editorializing at the end of this report, a weird amount for an AIB actually. 6 pages of scorched earth opinion for what essentially boils down to a botched ILS and a broken weather sensor seems vindictive and targeting to me. Makes you wonder if there was bad blood/personality issues at play. 

[Danger41]

2 hours ago, Pooter said:

All valid points. But doing those things are all codified community standards so I don’t really buy extrapolating one crew’s mistakes to culture problems of a whole squadron/base. There’s a lot of editorializing at the end of this report, a weird amount for an AIB actually. 6 pages of scorched earth opinion for what essentially boils down to a botched ILS and a broken weather sensor seems vindictive and targeting to me. Makes you wonder if there was bad blood/personality issues at play. 

I noted that he mentioned there were a large amount of interviews that showed similar answers. Also, didn’t one of the WSO’s not have his helmet and gloves on prior to ejection? I saw that being hammered on but wasn’t sure if I read it incorrectly.

[DirkDiggler]

Question for any B-1 bros; is ~2K hours about average for an 18 year B-1 pilot?

[Sua Sponte]

2 hours ago, DirkDiggler said:

Question for any B-1 bros; is ~2K hours about average for an 18 year B-1 pilot?

Have you seen their MC rates 😂 

[SurelySerious]

All valid points. But doing those things are all codified community standards so I don’t really buy extrapolating one crew’s mistakes to culture problems of a whole squadron/base. There’s a lot of editorializing at the end of this report, a weird amount for an AIB actually. 6 pages of scorched earth opinion for what essentially boils down to a botched ILS and a broken weather sensor seems vindictive and targeting to me. Makes you wonder if there was bad blood/personality issues at play. 

Well shit the author is a nav. Hadn’t considered that.