B-1 Down at Ellsworth

[polcat]

3 hours ago, Danger41 said:

I noted that he mentioned there were a large amount of interviews that showed similar answers. Also, didn’t one of the WSO’s not have his helmet and gloves on prior to ejection? I saw that being hammered on but wasn’t sure if I read it incorrectly.

You read it correctly. "MP did not utilize a helmet visor, and the MOSO did not utilize an aircrew helmet or gloves."

[Sua Sponte]

On 7/26/2024 at 10:11 AM, Pooter said:

All valid points. But doing those things are all codified community standards so I don’t really buy extrapolating one crew’s mistakes to culture problems of a whole squadron/base. There’s a lot of editorializing at the end of this report, a weird amount for an AIB actually. 6 pages of scorched earth opinion for what essentially boils down to a botched ILS and a broken weather sensor seems vindictive and targeting to me. Makes you wonder if there was bad blood/personality issues at play. 

The Sq/CC didn’t know about the NOTAM, the Sq/DO sorta knew about the NOTAM, and the Mishap IP knew about NOTAM, but didn’t think it applied to their sortie. One of the WSOs had been doing some of their After Landing checklist steps while they were still on the approach in weather.

There are definitely training issues that are cultural within that Sq.

[brabus]

1 hour ago, Sua Sponte said:

There are definitely training issues that are cultural within that Sq.

It appears that way. And the 28th is not the only squadron with them, they’re just the ones who have had the most recent, significant mishap. When I’m around the AD, it’s down right scary what is being allowed to occur in some squadrons. The “Gen Z mindset” combined with flaccid leadership who don’t hold them accountable (generalities, not everyone) will get expensive shit destroyed and people killed. And if you’re a Gen Z guy who isn’t like what you know I’m alluding to, then be a leader yourself and present a positive example for your counterparts to follow. You can hold your peers accountable, just do it.

[hindsight2020]

On 7/25/2024 at 8:45 PM, Danger41 said:

Even if you want to scoff all things non-tactical, that’s a W for the enemy because that asset is gone. Screwing up the monkey skills is bad enough [..snip..]. It’s also not uncommon in other communities.

 

Scoff is one of their core competencies from where I sit. CAF (11F core ID in particular) communities are notorious for the attitude encapsulated by that snarky "your entire existence is just my motherhood". Yet, accident track records continue to show carnivores pooching the motherhood as the regular causal to hull/life loss.

This is why I snark back when they start the gum flapping about how superfluous the nature of our job is down here in "scutwork" land (undergrad/intermediate), how much fat could be trimmed from what we do, and by implication how FTU can handle the bulk of the "real molding". Yeah, how that's working out....

Edited July 27 by hindsight2020

[BashiChuni]

34 minutes ago, hindsight2020 said:

Scoff is one of their core competencies from where I sit. CAF (11F core ID in particular) communities are notorious for the attitude encapsulated by that snarky "your entire existence is just my motherhood". Yet, accident track records continue to show carnivores pooching the motherhood as the regular causal to hull/life loss.

This is why I snark back when they start the gum flapping about how superfluous the nature of our job is down here in "scutwork" land (undergrad/intermediate), how much fat could be trimmed from what we do, and by implication how FTU can handle the bulk of the "real molding". Yeah, how that's working out....

have you ever considered becoming a college english professor? or a poet?

[tac airlifter]

6 hours ago, Sua Sponte said:

The Sq/CC didn’t know about the NOTAM, the Sq/DO sorta knew about the NOTAM, and the Mishap IP knew about NOTAM, but didn’t think it applied to their sortie. One of the WSOs had been doing some of their After Landing checklist steps while they were still on the approach in weather.

There are definitely training issues that are cultural within that Sq.

All valid, but I'll take this opportunity for a side quest: our NOTAM system is garbage.  Why can't they be in priority order, succinct, typed with human grammar, and void of strange acronyms requiring a decoder ring to grasp?

 

[1:1:1]

58 minutes ago, hindsight2020 said:

Scoff is one of their core competencies from where I sit. CAF (11F core ID in particular) communities are notorious for the attitude encapsulated by that snarky "your entire existence is just my motherhood". Yet, accident track records continue to show carnivores pooching the motherhood as the regular causal to hull/life loss.

This is why I snark back when they start the gum flapping about how superfluous the nature of our job is down here in "scutwork" land (undergrad/intermediate), how much fat could be trimmed from what we do, and by implication how FTU can handle the bulk of the "real molding". Yeah, how that's working out....

Not sure who you've been talking to. I can tell you in my neck of the woods instrument procedures are not scoffed, considering we shoot the ILS or PAR to mins in a snowstorm every week in the winter.

The point of saying that everything they learned in UPT is motherhood and will be covered in the first 5-10 minutes of the brief is not to say that those things aren't important. Any 11F who's been around more than a year or two knows enough dead pilots to disabuse themselves of that notion. The point of that statement is to say that you are expected to maintain proficiency in those areas yourself so that when we're in an LFE adversary coord, followed by blue mass brief, followed by package coord, followed by 20 minutes of flight fill-ins, we don't spend what little time we have left briefing up the approaches.

Last I checked it's not "11Fs" trying to trim the fat at UPT, but some enterprising General Officers. Those of us who actually instruct at the FTU or MQT in the CAF would tell you that those decisions are making our job harder and more dangerous.

[1:1:1]

It might just be me but this thread reeks of Monday-morning quarterbacking. It makes me wonder if any of my close calls over the years had resulted in a Class A what people would have said about my own culture, mindset, scoffing of this or that. God forbid you found out I wasn't wearing gloves and AFE-approved boots along with my 100% wool standard-issue long john's at the time.

[di1630]

When I’m around the AD, it’s down right scary what is being allowed to occur in some squadrons. The “Gen Z mindset” combined with flaccid leadership who don’t hold them accountable

Stole my words. Happening everywhere.


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[norskman]

On 7/27/2024 at 5:41 PM, 1:1:1 said:

 

Last I checked it's not "11Fs" trying to trim the fat at UPT, but some enterprising General Officers. Those of us who actually instruct at the FTU or MQT in the CAF would tell you that those decisions are making our job harder and more dangerous.

T-6 line IP here, please submit the AGEP surveys (or whatever they're called now...) to actually document the noted deficiencies from UPT grads. Thats the only truth data the Bobs will take at face value to increase the hideously slim amount of actual flight time to earn wings. 

[Pooter]

On 7/27/2024 at 4:56 PM, 1:1:1 said:

It might just be me but this thread reeks of Monday-morning quarterbacking. It makes me wonder if any of my close calls over the years had resulted in a Class A what people would have said about my own culture, mindset, scoffing of this or that. God forbid you found out I wasn't wearing gloves and AFE-approved boots along with my 100% wool standard-issue long john's at the time.

100%

And I think some of the highly experienced flyers in these forums should know better. 
 

Random question for the group: You’re king for a day and a crew in your command crashes a half-billion dollar plane. You need a scapegoat. Is it more politically convenient to:

 

A) acknowledge HAF and MAJCOM-level institutional problems like chronic undermanning and low flight experience

B) blame it on “culture problems” at the squadron level

Edited July 30 by Pooter

[Pooter]

On 7/29/2024 at 12:49 PM, norskman said:

T-6 line IP here, please submit the AGEP surveys (or whatever they're called now...) to actually document the noted deficiencies from UPT grads. Thats the only truth data the Bobs will take at face value to increase the hideously slim amount of actual flight time to earn wings. 

I’ve got a question. How many night sorties do you have to get to complete the T-6/UPT syllabus these days?

[SurelySerious]

100%
And I think some of the highly experienced flyers in these forums should know better. 
 
Random question for the group: You’re king for a day and a crew in your command crashes a half-billion dollar plane. You need a scapegoat. Is it more politically convenient to:
 
A) acknowledge HAF and MAJCOM-level institutional problems like chronic undermanning and low flight experience
B) blame it on “culture problems” at the squadron level

They had an experienced IP onboard who didn’t uphold standards or do the other things expected of someone in that role. There were a shit ton of complacency problems in this crew that are a unit problem. The commander and DO set the tone. There are things within flying that are independent of flying skill that are easy to set the tone on. These people weren’t doing any of those. You can blame big AF for a lot of things, but lackadaisical complacency isn’t it.

Instructors and squadron leadership should be setting the tone on the admin and tactical discipline. These people ed up, and their squadron mates displayed a lot of the same deficiencies, whether the AF has screwed flying training and hours over the last 20 years or not.

Quit trying to provide a cop out.

Edit: as much as can be believed from the nav AIB pres, anyway.

[Pooter]

19 minutes ago, SurelySerious said:

They had an experienced IP onboard who didn’t uphold standards or do the other things expected of someone in that role. There were a shit ton of complacency problems in this crew that are a unit problem. The commander and DO set the tone. There are things within flying that are independent of flying skill that are easy to set the tone on. These people weren’t doing any of those. You can blame big AF for a lot of things, but lackadaisical complacency isn’t it.

Instructors and squadron leadership should be setting the tone on the admin and tactical discipline. These people ed up, and their squadron mates displayed a lot of the same deficiencies, whether the AF has screwed flying training and hours over the last 20 years or not.

Quit trying to provide a cop out.

Edit: as much as can be believed from the nav AIB pres, anyway.

I’m not trying to excuse the crew. There are numerous cut and dry things they fucked up. It’s important to take those, debrief, and get better. If one person in a squadron doesn’t know or understand the things this crew missed, that is a foul. 
 

But, for anyone who has read an AIB before you know that they often tell half truths with one eye on the facts and one eye on the eventual public release and how that will reflect on the brass. 

[Skitzo]

100%
And I think some of the highly experienced flyers in these forums should know better. 
 
Random question for the group: You’re king for a day and a crew in your command crashes a half-billion dollar plane. You need a scapegoat. Is it more politically convenient to:
 
A) acknowledge HAF and MAJCOM-level institutional problems like chronic undermanning and low flight experience
B) blame it on “culture problems” at the squadron level

100%
And I think some of the highly experienced flyers in these forums should know better. 
 
Random question for the group: You’re king for a day and a crew in your command crashes a half-billion dollar plane. You need a scapegoat. Is it more politically convenient to:
 
A) acknowledge HAF and MAJCOM-level institutional problems like chronic undermanning and low flight experience
B) blame it on “culture problems” at the squadron level

A.1 - The transformation of the ASEV process into the larger IG inspection process that dilutes focus and has made Stan/Eval inspections friendly instead of feared.

True story as a Team Chief for an A3V inspection I issued a WARNO to the squadron commanders noting a lack of discipline wrt professional equipment - lack of gloves and wearing rings despite V3 guidance prohibiting it and a lack of aircrew having equipment to secure their EFBs during critical phases of flight. I noticed this during my pro sorties and verbally debriefed it many times.

When we got to our inspection site I flew a N/N with the squadron patch who was wearing a ring and whom I politely asked to remove his ring before he started the engine. I did this for the rest of the crew but I did not witness anyone else doing so.

After we landed I Q2d him because he was the person everyone looked to, violated V3 standards after I warned his commander.

Before you flame me for issuing a Q2 for rings, I debriefed it multiple times in sorties and gave verbal corrections and notified commanders directly in advance.

For everyone who flies regularly with rings safely everyday as an airline pilot cool I get it. Had a 679 to change the regs to allow silicone rings in coord.

It wasn’t a silicone ring btw.

When the MAJCOM speaks to commanders and people don’t listen it is a problem.


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[SurelySerious]

I’m not trying to excuse the crew. There are numerous cut and dry things they ed up. It’s important to take those, debrief, and get better. If one person in a squadron doesn’t know or understand the things this crew missed, that is a foul. 
 
But, for anyone who has read an AIB before you know that they often tell half truths with one eye on the facts and one eye on the eventual public release and how that will reflect on the brass. 

Fair.

[jice]

1 hour ago, Skitzo said:

 

 

A.1 - The transformation of the ASEV process into the larger IG inspection process that dilutes focus and has made Stan/Eval inspections friendly instead of feared.

True story as a Team Chief for an A3V inspection I issued a WARNO to the squadron commanders noting a lack of discipline wrt professional equipment - lack of gloves and wearing rings despite V3 guidance prohibiting it and a lack of aircrew having equipment to secure their EFBs during critical phases of flight. I noticed this during my pro sorties and verbally debriefed it many times.

When we got to our inspection site I flew a N/N with the squadron patch who was wearing a ring and whom I politely asked to remove his ring before he started the engine. I did this for the rest of the crew but I did not witness anyone else doing so.

After we landed I Q2d him because he was the person everyone looked to, violated V3 standards after I warned his commander.

Before you flame me for issuing a Q2 for rings, I debriefed it multiple times in sorties and gave verbal corrections and notified commanders directly in advance.

For everyone who flies regularly with rings safely everyday as an airline pilot cool I get it. Had a 679 to change the regs to allow silicone rings in coord.

It wasn’t a silicone ring btw.

When the MAJCOM speaks to commanders and people don’t listen it is a problem.


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What lesson do you think the average Joe flight lead learned from this?

[Day Man]

7 minutes ago, jice said:

What lesson do you think the average Joe flight lead learned from this?

don't get married

[08Dawg]

2 hours ago, Pooter said:

B) blame it on “culture problems” at the squadron level

Anybody else read that AIB report and notice a glaring lack of any kind of blame or indication of a lack of oversight from the Ops Group or the Wing?  They seriously took the OSS/CC and the BS/CC and DO to task, and lambasted the squadron culture....but squadrons don't exist in a vacuum.  They also made no attempt to ascertain whether or not this same cultural lack of compliance existed in the other bomb squadron.  I'd like to think if I were on an AIB and I found this kind of glaring errors, I might at least interview a few of the flyers from the squadron in the same group and ask "Hey, do you guys do this?"

[arg]

2 hours ago, Skitzo said:

 

 

A.1 - The transformation of the ASEV process into the larger IG inspection process that dilutes focus and has made Stan/Eval inspections friendly instead of feared.

True story as a Team Chief for an A3V inspection I issued a WARNO to the squadron commanders noting a lack of discipline wrt professional equipment - lack of gloves and wearing rings despite V3 guidance prohibiting it and a lack of aircrew having equipment to secure their EFBs during critical phases of flight. I noticed this during my pro sorties and verbally debriefed it many times.

When we got to our inspection site I flew a N/N with the squadron patch who was wearing a ring and whom I politely asked to remove his ring before he started the engine. I did this for the rest of the crew but I did not witness anyone else doing so.

After we landed I Q2d him because he was the person everyone looked to, violated V3 standards after I warned his commander.

Before you flame me for issuing a Q2 for rings, I debriefed it multiple times in sorties and gave verbal corrections and notified commanders directly in advance.

For everyone who flies regularly with rings safely everyday as an airline pilot cool I get it. Had a 679 to change the regs to allow silicone rings in coord.

It wasn’t a silicone ring btw.

When the MAJCOM speaks to commanders and people don’t listen it is a problem.


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If they were wearing a ring while TDY-Q3 for judgement 

[Boomer6]

You guys think the Colonel's middle name is "Dick"? That'd be unfortunate.

[Skitzo]

What lesson do you think the average Joe flight lead learned from this?

I don’t know. Don’t ignore the Vol3 blatantly in front of a MAJCOM evaluator?


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[tac airlifter]

Skitzo, thanks for your comments.  I mostly agree with you (especially in your anecdote), but there is an issue with retarded v3 restrictions that cannot be undone.  Copy your point on a 679 submission, but the uncomfortable truth is that it takes too long for that process to work (which it mostly doesn’t).  You were great in A3V but many of your predecessors were both unreasonable in execution and unrealistic in the many absurd emails they’d send to the ops DO/CC teams.

I’m speaking generally because specificity is impossible in this forum.

[jice]

8 hours ago, Skitzo said:

I don’t know. Don’t ignore the Vol3 blatantly in front of a MAJCOM evaluator?


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Ok… regarding rings in the cockpit and a particular evaluator, sure. I suspect Joe average also learned something about a forest, trees, and to not trust the humans on staffs that supposedly support the mission.

Wasn’t there; context of the examinee’s intent matters. I’m sure you did the right thing. This just strikes me as perpetuating the “you’re incapable of understanding the divine calculus that resulted in an AFI” attitude that’s resulted in a generation of officers who choose compliance over problem solving and reading assignments over leadership. 

[Skitzo]

Ok… regarding rings in the cockpit and a particular evaluator, sure. I suspect Joe average also learned something about a forest, trees, and to not trust the humans on staffs that supposedly support the mission.
Wasn’t there; context of the examinee’s intent matters. I’m sure you did the right thing. This just strikes me as perpetuating the “you’re incapable of understanding the divine calculus that resulted in an AFI” attitude that’s resulted in a generation of officers who choose compliance over problem solving and reading assignments over leadership. 

What context of intent are you inferring?

I feel like you think the point of my post was to flex all over the little guy to show how much riz the MAJCOM has fr fr no cap.

I think you are missing the point of my original post. When ASEVs were lumped into overall IG inspections it became included into the overall mindset of emphasis on “detecting unidentified non compliance” versus measuring compliance in the Stan/Eval programs.

With standalone ASEVS I was in squadrons where there were prep sessions (MQT testing internal to the squadron, OGV SAVs, and N/N evals independent of the ASEV). I once saw a guy removed from IP upgrade or was it AC for failing the practice test required by the squadron commander.

That was my original point and the point of my anecdote.

||BREAK BREAK||

As far as the MAJCOM role to help subordinate units — certainly there is a time and place for that. But the MAJCOM can’t just unilaterally SAV a unit unless asked. And in my experience we more than helped units that did ask for help with no penalty to the unit being SAVed. As far as other efforts I more than certainly subscribed to the motto “a call from the unit isn’t it a nuisance it is the reason your job [expletive] exists.”

There is a tension between a MAJCOM’s purpose to OT&E and A3V’s role to also provide oversight of subordinate OGVs / CCVs.


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