B-1 Down at Ellsworth

[Lord Ratner]

54 minutes ago, jice said:

I’m saying there’s a better way to ensure compliance when commanders deem something important than making a random example of some schmuck (and yeah, that schmuck should have done better.) I think we agree: that evaluator remains right. The examinee remains wrong. My point is that evaluator ALSO remains a human choosing the wrong tools for the right job and can do better, in order to further the mission of his organization.

This just doesn't make sense when you say it out loud. What could be a *more* correct tool for an evaluator to evaluate the performance and compliance of an aviator than... an evaluation ride? If the Form 8 is being used as a career trajectory proxy, that's not on the evaluator, that's on leadership. 

 

Look, I get it, no one likes being the bad guy and putting a mark on someone's record. But the CAF mentality of saving all evaluation downgrades for the debrief instead of the form 8 is in itself invalidating the entire concept of the form 8 evaluation, and thus allowing it to be used for non-evaluation purposes. It also ensures that there's no way for someone looking over the records to effectively stratify pilots based on their actual ability in the cockpit. 

 

And this also ignores the very obvious assumption that in skitzo's example, the squadron was operating under the construct that you are suggesting (debrief, don't document), and yet were not following the regulations to the point that pilots weren't even following them with a majcom evaluator. The bro Network has limitations, and predictable outcomes.

 

The problem in AMC was not that evaluators gave out Q2/Q3s when pilots were deficient during an evaluation. Believe me, the fighter pilots might forget that they are getting the top students from most pilot training classes, but in the KC-135 we absolutely were not. So you have far more deficient airmanship to deal with, and the evaluation is exactly where you would like to see that documented. The problem in AMC was commanders using Q3s in order to punish pilots for things they were doing, unintentionally and normally, on regular flights. 

 

But saying that the form 8 checkride isn't the right spot to document someone failing to follow the regs during an evaluation seems a little... forced. Especially when the squadron was warned ahead of time about the emphasis item, and the pilot in question was supposed to be the apex squadron instructor.

Edited August 3 by Lord Ratner

[jice]

15 minutes ago, Lord Ratner said:

This just doesn't make sense when you say it out loud. What could be a *more* correct tool for an evaluator to evaluate the performance and compliance of an aviator than... an evaluation ride? If the Form 8 is being used as a career trajectory proxy, that's not on the evaluator, that's on leadership. 

We’re talking about different things, man. Correct tool for evaluating the performance of an aviator, sure (when task at hand). Correct tool for ensuring compliance across the formation (3V’s reason for being): not that guy’s form 8, until it becomes the task at hand. The first formal work shouldn’t be an individual Q-2/Q-3 if there’s a known problem.

18 minutes ago, Lord Ratner said:

1)

…invalidating the entire concept of the form 8 evaluation, and thus allowing it to be used for non-evaluation ….

2)

…The bro Network has limitations, and predictable outcomes.

3)

The problem in AMC … was commanders using Q3s in order to punish pilots for things they were doing, unintentionally and normally, on regular flights. 

4)

… Especially when the squadron was warned ahead of time about the emphasis item, and the pilot in question was supposed to be the apex squadron instructor.

1) Clearly different cultures in different commands. I think the CAF does it right, and I suspect if COMACC has a different opinion, he’ll formally ask for a change. (I hope he doesn’t). The CAF is a small place; people know your rep. 
 

2) Bingo. See discussion of the formal SII process and what an effective 3V does to reinforce that process a page or two back.

3) That sucks, and so do those commanders. Glad I don’t work there.

4) Making it formal allows you to PROVE this, making the ding/Q-2/Q-3 even more appropriate and bulletproof.

Thanks for indulging the derail. We’re down to differences in command culture; funny how we all end up places that match our personalities.

[Skitzo]

1)
2) Bingo. See discussion of the formal SII process and what an effective 3V does to reinforce that process a page or two back.

Thanks for indulging the derail. We’re down to differences in command culture; funny how we all end up places that match our personalities.

Corporate / MAJCOM policy to craft SIIs was at the time to scan OG SEB minutes for common items across all MDS plus Special Tactics.

SIIs were approved by the A3…BGEN.

I’ve also enjoyed the convos in this derail.

As explained earlier I had debriefed the issue prior. I’ll explain. Annual MSN eval with patch from the squadron I was attached to. He was wearing a ring and also deviated 500 feet during a “mission event,” from desired altitude.

During debrief I made the exact point someone made earlier, on both the altitude and the ring. Stating that he was the one everyone was looking to and everyone follows / watches / listens to what a patch says / does.

He quibbled a little bit about the altitude discrepancy stating that he deviated with awareness, I then told him I could buy that if he would have at least verbalized that to his crew.

But if it were a demo/do for a young ac he would have terminated and set back up for a proper demo. Pressing 500 feet below and well outside of Q- tolerances in front of his crew was not what I wanted him to do. Combat fine, lives on the line fine do it. But during a training ride / eval why???

Not being a heartless a-hole contrary to other evidence I gave him a downgrade on that event.

That Eval with a patch and my daily rides with the squadron led to my informal email to squadron leadership. Looking back on it maybe the SII would have been the correct way to go but I’d also had been sniped by squadron commanders for being too heavy handed and not allowing them to fix things at the lowest level—issuing something from my office directly to a GO for approval is the opposite of what all the commanders I’ve worked with have ever desired.

So like I said, that led to the email which stated “If we see X, Y and Z during our inspection then it’s probably going to be more than a Q-“


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

[BashiChuni]

5 hours ago, Lord Ratner said:

It's funny, as I get dangerously close to 40 I finally understand why the majors and lieutenant colonels in the squadron all wore the damn reflective belt when we were on the flight line in Bagram.

nope. you lost me there. was and will always be RETARDED

[Lord Ratner]

2 minutes ago, BashiChuni said:

nope. you lost me there. was and will always be RETARDED

I didn't say it wasn't retarded. 

Try reading the post a little slower for comprehension. 

Edited August 3 by Lord Ratner

[hindsight2020]

On 8/3/2024 at 10:14 AM, arg said:

So, everybody wants to wear rings and nobody wants to wear gloves. Am I reading this right?

...while unable to handfly cat-I minima to save their literal lives.

 

Edited August 4 by hindsight2020

[M2]

Any truth to this?

[08Dawg]

6 hours ago, M2 said:

Any truth to this?

The current Wg/CC did fleet up directly from OG/CC, if that’s what you’re asking. 

[BashiChuni]

from the goldmine that is amn/snco page:

 

Inbox: "Had to laugh when I saw who the IO was on the Ellsworth AIB. Talk about throwing stones in a glass house. Then Lt Col Lord, as 9 BS/CC at Dyess, led one of the most dysfunctional B-1 squadrons I’d ever seen (20+ years at the time). Always seemed to be a crew member when some of the oddest in-flight emergencies or incidents occurred. Also, anything that went wrong for his sq, he’d find ways to blame mx or another support agency…never his fault, like water off a ducks back! But that tactic backfired spectacularly when he asked wing to use his sq’s WSINT launch out to “exercise” on a weekend. So Mx generates eight B-1s, crew show, engine start….followed by engine shutdown. Turns out the good Lt Col didn’t have clearance into Nellis, because they were a day EARLY! There was no one else to blame that day. I was in the room when they notified the Wg/CC. Let’s just say it was pretty clear at that moment just how little respect the guy had within the community. Would say I’m surprised he made Col, but we all know how that goes…"

[Pooter]

https://open.substack.com/pub/radarblog/p/bone-of-contention?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

[Pooter]

14 hours ago, Pooter said:

https://open.substack.com/pub/radarblog/p/bone-of-contention?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Since I posted the link with zero context.. BLUF: the Tony Carr (formerly JQP) rips the B-1 AIB a new one. 
 

Specific issues he brings up:

-Sq/cc’s being criticized for manning shortages entirely out of their control

-strange contextual omissions throughout

-potential conflict of interest with the board pres being in direct career competition with the people he’s investigating

-does no root cause analysis on why aircrew CRM/GK/experience/skill level were low enough to result in a crash

-OG/CC firing timing looks to be directly the result of AIB backlash and done reluctantly, Potentially indicating daylight between the SIB and AIB

-alleges deep culture problems but bends over backwards not to implicate anyone above the squadron level