Mid-Air Collision in DC

[Smokin]

1 hour ago, Vetter said:

Anywhere else, I would agree with you.  But it was common in DC, especially among RJs.  It’s a noted procedure in the company pages (at least in ours)and it’s really a non-event even at night…unless there’s a helicopter there that hits you.

Interesting, I never flew into DCA.  I guess if it is an expected procedure, then maybe not the contributing factor I thought it could be.  Although it would have been a fairly minimal one at that.

[Standby]

12 hours ago, Smokin said:

So far, this is about the only criticism of the RJ crew that I can think of: accepting a change to the approach and runway that close in.  In a fighter in VMC?  Absolutely, no problem.  But the latest that I've accepted a change to a landing runway in an airliner has been outside 10 miles and even that was pushing it.

You can hardly call that causal, but it is something to think about and learn from as an airline pilot.  Don't let ATC fly your plane.  Had a captain tell ATC no to keeping us high and fast on an approach (my airplane does not like to slow down in any decent).  He told them 'we can be high or fast, but not both'.  ATC tried to shame us by then slowing us to approach speed and vectoring another flight in front of us and even made a comment to the other airplane about them being able to do it.  Capt basically shrugged said 'whatever'.

I wholeheartedly agree with the idea that you don’t let ATC fly your plane (“BTW…can you accept the PAR for controller training?!). Not accepting approach changes more than 10NM from landing is definitely conservative, but each operator and PIC gets to make their own decision. Normally the circle/night circle risks are hitting the ground and things attached to it, stalling, and losing visual reference followed by piss poor missed procedures. This is the first circle mishap I have heard of that was related to traffic deconfliction.

Not saying this happened…but both pilots nugs down into the FMC to make approach changes definitely could have contributed to the mishap. I don’t suspect it would be causal, but if anything it emphasizes the need for vigilant clearing in congested airspace regardless of altitude. It’s impractical to be 100% committed to traffic search in all phases of flight, particularly on long haul. I met the pilot of the biz jet in this accident. Bolt out of the blue…until you consider they were flying on an airway. Unless you’re flying biz jet, we’re all likely out there on an airway flying in the FL3XX block. My company doesn’t take kindly to the no SID/no STAR FPL remarks, and they also don’t adhere to my “I file direct point to point regardless” attitude. So I’m just as guilty. 

[Biff_T]

4 hours ago, Vito said:

Biff,

 or anyone else in the know, on another website someone mentioned these Helicopter routes don’t have any lateral confines. I find that hard to believe. Is there a hard number ? ie. 1 mile laterally etc 

There are routes and zones around DC.   The routes you have to stick to, if you need to deviate laterally you're supposed to get permission to deviate.   The zones, you can fly wherever your heart pleases but you have yo stay below the maximum altitude.  You're never supposed to go above the altitude listed on the map.  

As for the lateral confines for the routes, they're marked on the map buy a solid blue line.  Otherwise known as the route.  

[StoleIt]

I haven't landed 15, but I have on 33 in the baby bus. Unless it's moist, or I'm in a 320 or 321, I will brief the possibility of a last minute runway change at DCA. It's basically to be expected, doubly so for those who fly an RJ. So while maybe causal, I wouldn't say the "circle" maneuver from runway 1 to 33 at DCA is that cosmic for those who fly in and out of DCA frequently.

Just another hole in the Swiss cheese model though, sadly.

[Day Man]

3 hours ago, Standby said:

Not saying this happened…but both pilots nugs down into the FMC to make approach changes definitely could have contributed to the mishap.

I am not speculating on this particular event, but both pilots shouldn't be in the FMC this late on a visual approach, right?

[Pooter]

Caveat up front: there are good/bad/disciplined/undisciplined pilots in every community and this is not geared toward any individual. 

But I'm gonna be the asshole here. In my experience, the army rotary wing community ranges anywhere from  lackadaisical to outright dangerous WRT instrument procedures, airspace and traffic awareness, and flight discipline.

I've witnessed a 5-ship Army Apache mission brief take place in the lobby of the San Angelo FBO that was basically: "Alright dudes, we're gonna take off, head east, 200A, everybody fall in. Questions?" "Sick. Step complete."

I've been in control of a T-6 pattern full of solo students and had to send them all breakpoint straight through (half of them didn't even know what to do) because we had a 4 ship of army black hawks blast perpendicular through our pattern while talking to precisely no one on the radio.

The second I saw the news out of DCA my first reaction was "goddammit some army rw clowns got everyone killed." Then I felt bad for jumping to conclusions and not waiting for the report. But after a few weeks, each new piece of data points right back to them and I'm back to being pissed. Why were they off altitude? Why are they dicking around at night in the approach corridor of a major airport? Why are they not on VHF? Why was this even an approved routing for them in the first place? Why were 28 different agencies permitted to fly helos in close proximity to DCA?

These were not one-off, swiss-cheese-holes-aligning, mistakes. This was business as usual, proven by the fact there had been multiple near misses at DCA in the recent past including a helo-caused airliner go-around the day before. Obviously an airspace/procedure re-design is warranted, but I think we need to take a look at community-wide culture that was comfortable operating like this in the first place.

@busdriver said it best that these procedures are "no-step stupid." The problem with that is if you've been raised in a community of hot dogging and "we'll do it live" you're probably not equipped to make a good risk assessment.

[reloder]

46 minutes ago, Pooter said:

The problem with that is if you've been raised in a community of hot dogging and "we'll do it live" you're probably not equipped to make a good risk assessment.

Sadly, too true.

[Standby]

1 hour ago, Day Man said:

I am not speculating on this particular event, but both pilots shouldn't be in the FMC this late on a visual approach, right?

You would certainly hope not…but there was clearly a breakdown in visual scan for both mishap aircraft. What caused that remains to be seen. 

[Vetter]

47 minutes ago, Standby said:

You would certainly hope not…but there was clearly a breakdown in visual scan for both mishap aircraft. What caused that remains to be seen. 

When you’re at 300’ on an approach, your visual scan is the runway in front of you.  There was not a breakdown in visual scan for the RJ.

[disgruntledemployee]

On 2/9/2025 at 3:21 PM, BFM this said:

Waiting for the final report to come out, but it appears that the CRJ crew had one, possibly two nuggets of radio SA that they didn't cue in on.  

While PAT was on another freq, the controller was simulcasting, so the RJ crew at least had one side of the conversation.  Ideally, their ears should have perked up at the controller granting visual separation to PAT, then the controller confirming visual/pass behind deconfliction.  Again, ideally, those two nuggets should have at least cued their eyeballs down to the ND to get a rough BRA on the traffic, then outside for vis pickup.  But what I'm gathering from the NTSB briefings thus far (as well as the final outcome), is that they didn't initiate a scan in the direction of PAT until the TCAS "TRAFFIC TRAFFIC" alert, by which time the die was cast.  Their eyeballs were focused (appropriately) on R33 for the visual curve approach.

DISCLAIMER: this is 100% armchair QB, 20/20 hindsight, from the comfort of my keyboard.  I will admit that I would have to be on my very best game, in that moment, to be able to pick up and cue off of the SA nuggets described.  There but for the grace of God go I...

Putting myself in the RJ's position, this is what I think:

Tower asks if they can circle, the crew likely does a quick yes/no chat and answers yes.  They quickly answer yes because they think they have the experience to take on that risk.  Work load increases.  PM probably looks up the RNAV 33 for box entry or goes straight into the box to set up a runway 33 extended centerline, anything to help them find the runway because they know its a tight turn to final with little margin to get it lined up and its night.  With talk and action on those tasks, the ears probably tune out anything that's not their call sign as they set themselves up for 33 and look for the runway.  Other dude has to fly the plane, maybe autopilot off.  If ATC had called out PAT to the RJ, the ears would have perked up and eyes go outside and maybe this is becomes just another HATR in a pile of DCA HATRs.  TCAS aural alerts are inhibited at low altitudes (500ft I think) so they probably never got anything from TCAS.  Tower reiterating to PAT to "pass behind the RJ" probably isn't enough clue that the RJ is question was them, but it was this point in time where tower should have called the go around for the RJ because PAT was not performing their clearance of maintain separation.  Hell, tower could have tried to notify the RJ of PAT at that last transmission which might have still lead to just a super close near miss.  But tower put maintaining separation wholly on PAT.

Possible fixes.  Procedural deconfliction.  Like sectors into a FOB, I can see the river as 1 aircraft at a time.  Next, full-time helo position in DCA tower, no exceptions.  Third, remodeling of some of the approaches into DCA and the helo routes.  Fourth, night time restrictions for 33 ops, especially by the airlines.  Lastly, slot restrictions on DCA to lower the traffic count.

As HeloDude said, PAT is at fault with ATC contributing.

Ditto the DISCLAIMER.

[ClearedHot]

 

[Standby]

23 hours ago, Vetter said:

When you’re at 300’ on an approach, your visual scan is the runway in front of you.  There was not a breakdown in visual scan for the RJ.

Two pilots in the cockpit for a reason. They didn’t fly the entire approach ant 300’, so there was time to be clearing for traffic well before. I’m not placing blame, just stating my opinion. Until the data is presented I withhold further comment. God rest their souls. 

Edited February 12 by Standby

[BFM this]

On 2/11/2025 at 4:43 PM, Vetter said:

When you’re at 300’ on an approach, your visual scan is the runway in front of you.  There was not a breakdown in visual scan for the RJ.

In principle, I don't disagree with you.  However,  

At what point on a visual approach are you not responsible for see and avoid? 

I don't like it, especially in light of this outcome, but we were all taught that fundamental rule on day one of instrument flying.  And I highly doubt the final report gets published without mention of it.

[brabus]

Visual search from the RJ approaching 300’/1nm from touchdown is a red herring.
 

PCF: helo altitude control/vis lookout

RC: asinine procedures IVO DCA

IF: Change the procedures/amount of traffic using DCA/immediate surrounding airspace. This is an easy fix that should have, and could have, been done years ago

Everything else is just noise in the big picture. 

[Vetter]

1 hour ago, BFM this said:

In principle, I don't disagree with you.  However,  

At what point on a visual approach are you not responsible for see and avoid? 

I don't like it, especially in light of this outcome, but we were all taught that fundamental rule on day one of instrument flying.  And I highly doubt the final report gets published without mention of it.

See and Avoid

1. Pilot. When meteorological conditions permit, regardless of type of flight plan or whether or not under control of a radar facility, the pilot is responsible to see and avoid other traffic, terrain, or obstacle.

I guess the pilot is never absolved of see and avoid unless popeye.  But I would say that avoiding hitting the earth would be a higher priority than avoiding an aircraft that shouldn’t be there. But you raise a good point.  That’s why a lot of us shy away from anything visual in Part 121, esp at night.

[SocialD]

14 hours ago, BFM this said:

In principle, I don't disagree with you.  However,  

At what point on a visual approach are you not responsible for see and avoid? 

I don't like it, especially in light of this outcome, but we were all taught that fundamental rule on day one of instrument flying.  And I highly doubt the final report gets published without mention of it.

 

 

As always, visual lookout, especially at night during a circling maneuver in tight airspace to a short(er) runway, isn't foolproof.  Sure, we're all still responsible for vis lookout.  But at this point in the game, I'd have expected some type of backup from tower that they wouldn't let a helicopter get that close to me.  However, this is one of the reasons I would not have accepted that runway change.  It's kinda like flyovers, at best, you did your job...  

 

Before someone gets their panties in a wad.  I'm not blaming these pilots for what happened.  I'm sure they've done this circling approach many times and it's no sweat to them.  I have not doubt they can fly their jet better than I could fly mine in that environment, because I just never do it.  I'm just saying that I won't accept it because I don't see any good reason to do so.  

[Lord Ratner]

People also need to remember that the regionals are not mainline. Yeah, it's all the same FAA rules and all the same Captain's authority, in theory, but these guys are all in the rat race to get to mainline, and nobody wants to do anything that might remotely affect their chances. 

 

Being the guy who won't take a night circling approach at DCA when everybody in the regionals has been doing it for years is not the type of attention I would imagine many of them want to draw to themselves.

 

Personally I see 0% of the blame going to the regional crew. It's just not rational to think that Tower at one of the most controlled air spaces in America would let a helicopter get that fucking close. I certainly am never clearing for helicopters directly below me on short short final, and I fly a ton of visual approaches. 

 

The helicopter crew definitely fucked up, but the real blame here goes once again to one of our "institutions" that hasn't been holding up its end of the bargain for a long time. Even if we fix the FAA tomorrow, we're going to see the unfortunate results of a couple decades of laziness and complacency keep popping up.

[Swizzle]

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA25MA108.aspx

Wearing Nogs, Rx/Tx's stepped on, Helo pilot alititude callout errors with Helo IP corrections, Helo pilot checkride....this will be a good final report to read and heed (as if it already wasn't).

[nunya]

Helo dudes, NTSB dude said the helo crew would have used their baro altimeter as their primary reference instead of radalt. Is that true? Radio was always my primary on Herk low levels. But I guess the charted ceiling of 200' was baro, not radio, so maybe baro was primary?

Edited February 14 by nunya

[BFM this]

27 minutes ago, Swizzle said:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA25MA108.aspx

Wearing Nogs, Rx/Tx's stepped on, Helo pilot alititude callout errors with Helo IP corrections, Helo pilot checkride....this will be a good final report to read and heed (as if it already wasn't).

At what point would the army decide to sequester all of their data under privilege?  Could they, given a civil aircraft was involved?

[Pitt4401]

39 minutes ago, Swizzle said:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA25MA108.aspx

Wearing Nogs, Rx/Tx's stepped on, Helo pilot alititude callout errors with Helo IP corrections, Helo pilot checkride....this will be a good final report to read and heed (as if it already wasn't).

Thanks for the link, It's brutal to read the preliminary data.

I know it is frowned upon to speak ill of the dead, but every time I read news articles where friends of the deceased Blackhawk aircrew are described as 'seasoned' or 'diligent,' it is nauseating.

Should the DCA controller done a better job? Sure. But it's mind-numbing that the BH crew wouldn't have been extra cautious about altitude while close to such a busy airport.

 

[Standby]

19 minutes ago, Pitt4401 said:

Should the DCA controller done a better job? Sure. But it's mind-numbing that the BH crew wouldn't have been extra cautious about altitude while close to such a busy airport.

Complacency. Like doing high risk combat operations…just because you’ve done it a thousand times prior doesn’t make it any less risky. Your ability to manage the risk may improve, but that doesn’t equate to mitigating aka eliminating. 

[gearhog]

1 hour ago, Swizzle said:

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA25MA108.aspx

Wearing Nogs, Rx/Tx's stepped on, Helo pilot alititude callout errors with Helo IP corrections, Helo pilot checkride....this will be a good final report to read and heed (as if it already wasn't).

Taking an NVG checkride around a busy airport with that much cultural lighting seems odd to me.

[uhhello]

2 minutes ago, gearhog said:

Taking an NVG checkride around a busy airport with that much cultural lighting seems odd to me.

Agreed.  If they were both using NVGs in that area....asinine 

[busdriver]

And flying without NVGs at <200' over a river would be a good idea?