South Korea…

[Clark Griswold]

Read this:

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/donald-trump-should-end-americas-defense-welfare-for-south-korea/

Not sure if a forward presence as KFOR is now is the right choice… not saying bring everyone and everything back but food for thought.

[Boomer6]

The author suggests, in a roundabout way, that an option to making this happen would be that ROK could develop nukes. A country under the US nuclear umbrella who signed the NPT, would then vote to leave the NPT so they could protect themselves absent of our full support? Not sure that's a great idea. 

If this happens, what is Japan going to do. I mean maybe they re-write their constitution and stop being a defense force in preparation for us leaving their country as well. Or do they cozy up to China expecting us to continue a retrograde from the Pacific? How about the Philippines...all those shipping lanes.

If we author a peace deal giving parts of a sovereign country (Ukraine) to an aggressor and then leave Korea, that would probably make the CCP very happy.

I suppose a counter arguement would be, let's pull all of our forces back from INDOOACOM because if we don't we expect them to be attrited rapidly by china. At what point do so we stop, 1st island chain, 2nd, mainland US?

[Clark Griswold]

Yeah, I saw the author’s point but could not completely buy into his premise.  Like Europe, we need some forward presence just less than what we have now as it encourages anti-strategic behavior from our allies.

Probably a draw down to half of our forces over a set period then another draw down to something like a third after another period while the RoK builds up seems appropriate.

From the article:

The directive has rattled officials at the Pentagon and other agencies” who believed whatever had been must forever be, at least when it comes to military deployments.

This is the crux… even though time and conditions change, the nat-sec blob thinks nothing should ever change in regards to our overseas presence, this is not a permanent mission of the US or one that is not possible or appropriate to change.

We say we are pivoting, people think that should only mean the ETO and ME, it should include what I would call the stable Pacific area.  

Again from the article:

Why spend the money and undertake the risk when South Korea doesn’t need the support? Sean King of Park Strategies opined: “The U.S. should be thanking Seoul for the opportunity to forward-deploy forces and equipment only a few hundred miles from rival mainland China.” However, it is an illusion to imagine American forces using South Korean facilities in a conflict with China. The U.S. Army would have little role in such a conflict.

It’s likely they are a liability to an extent in considering the China Taiwan scenario at their current force levels (KFOR).

Edited March 24 by Clark Griswold

[Lawman]

Yeah, I saw the author’s point but could not completely buy into his premise.  Like Europe, we need some forward presence just less than what we have now as it encourages anti-strategic behavior from our allies.
Probably a draw down to half of our forces over a set period then another draw down to something like a third after another period while the RoK builds up seems appropriate.
From the article:
The directive has rattled officials at the Pentagon and other agencies” who believed whatever had been must forever be, at least when it comes to military deployments.
This is the crux… even though time and conditions change, the nat-sec blob thinks nothing should ever change in regards to our overseas presence, this is not a permanent mission of the US or one that is not possible or appropriate to change.
We say we are pivoting, people think that should only mean the ETO and ME, it should include what I would call the stable Pacific area.  

Again from the article:
Why spend the money and undertake the risk when South Korea doesn’t need the support? Sean King of Park Strategies opined: “The U.S. should be thanking Seoul for the opportunity to forward-deploy forces and equipment only a few hundred miles from rival mainland China.” However, it is an illusion to imagine American forces using South Korean facilities in a conflict with China. The U.S. Army would have little role in such a conflict.
It’s likely they are a liability to an extent in considering the China Taiwan scenario at their current force levels (KFOR).

The Author is at best an isolationist attempting to hide behind a facade of budgetary justification and frame the argument that US Forces Korea exist behind glass separate of any other conflict or use. The author’s idea that the Army is not present in an IndoPacom fight is demonstrated ignorance of not understanding what that fight will actually look like or what previous historical fights in the Pacific were either.

No, there will not be a Tank Division driving across open plains to achieve some sort of armored breakthrough, however the Fires and with it wide area security/control as well as the echelons of intel collection that occur resident to those Army formations will absolutely be at play in a conflict over the 1st Island Chain. And anybody that doesn’t think large scale ground maneuver warfare happened in the Pacific should really go take a look at WWII Burma or Luzon.

The Marines will get the press but the reality is the Army will be the one that secures Islands because mass means something when you talk the scale of the pacific, and keeping those elements in 2ID that far forward grants a lot of reaction space and time made up. Same was true of WWII.


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[dream big]

5 hours ago, Lawman said:

The Author is at best an isolationist attempting to hide behind a facade of budgetary justification and frame the argument that US Forces Korea exist behind glass separate of any other conflict or use. The author’s idea that the Army is not present in an IndoPacom fight is demonstrated ignorance of not understanding what that fight will actually look like or what previous historical fights in the Pacific were either.

No, there will not be a Tank Division driving across open plains to achieve some sort of armored breakthrough, however the Fires and with it wide area security/control as well as the echelons of intel collection that occur resident to those Army formations will absolutely be at play in a conflict over the 1st Island Chain. And anybody that doesn’t think large scale ground maneuver warfare happened in the Pacific should really go take a look at WWII Burma or Luzon.

The Marines will get the press but the reality is the Army will be the one that secures Islands because mass means something when you talk the scale of the pacific, and keeping those elements in 2ID that far forward grants a lot of reaction space and time made up. Same was true of WWII.


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None of which will happen until the AF and Navy achieve air and maritime dominance first respectively. Otherwise, sitting ducks without the logistics to get some Patriot batteries to their locations. 

[Lawman]

None of which will happen until the AF and Navy achieve air and maritime dominance first respectively. Otherwise, sitting ducks without the logistics to get some Patriot batteries to their locations. 

Which is the kind of logic this guy is trying to use to just keep all that crap out the infrastructure advantage and move all that combat power to Nebraska and Texas.

PrSM is going to be part of the discussion of achieving dominance over the 1st Island chain just because of the fact you don’t need to resupply it at Sea or bring it back to regenerate it. Remember there are more HiMARS in just the 17th FAB than in the Marine Corps. There’s a reason they designed the things to fit in a cargo plane or on a container ship and keep showcasing that capability at exercises across the theatre.


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[Boomer6]

11 hours ago, Clark Griswold said:

It’s likely they are a liability to an extent in considering the China Taiwan scenario at their current force levels (KFOR).

If one assumes KJU won't be part of china's gameplan..

The author's premise falls apart if china uses N. Korea to spread out US forces during a Taiwan push. If we're attempting to reinforce ROK with all the assets we removed from the pen whilst simultaneously trying to prevent Taiwan from falling that'd be Chinese new Year for Xi.

Edited March 25 by Boomer6

[Lawman]

If one assumes KJU won't be part of china's gameplan..
The author's premise falls apart if china uses N. Korea to spread out US forces during a Taiwan push. If we're attempting to reinforce ROK with all the assets we removed from the pen whilst simultaneously trying to prevent Taiwan from falling that'd be Chinese new Year for Xi.

Not to mention the standing readiness of forces on the peninsula vs the wider active force.

You’re 300 miles from Mainland China and one of its most critical economic hubs vs >3000. It’s like the author doesn’t own a map.


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[Clark Griswold]

On 3/24/2025 at 9:02 PM, Boomer6 said:

If one assumes KJU won't be part of china's gameplan..

The author's premise falls apart if china uses N. Korea to spread out US forces during a Taiwan push. If we're attempting to reinforce ROK with all the assets we removed from the pen whilst simultaneously trying to prevent Taiwan from falling that'd be Chinese new Year for Xi.

That may be but our foes fear and hate each other to varying amounts, we may get a coordinated attack from a new axis of evil but I don’t see it right now, they’ll help each other to a degree, by help I mean direct / almost direct assistance but I don’t see them right now acting as the Axis or Central Powers did.

Still that would be a thorn in our side and boost their chances (PRC vs Taiwan in a fast action) to try to tie us up in too many places when they invade.

Returning to the article, I think the more appropriate question is not whether to forward deploy but what is the purpose of the deployment?

Backstop or a primary force integrated to provide daily and continuous deterrence for said country?  My 2 cents, Europe, Korea, Japan, etc… it is to draw down to true backstop, enough to matter but not enough to use as your primary fighting force.

[pbar]

Was a Korea FAO and went to the ROKAF ACSC as an exchange student and talked to my Korean classmates and staff about this stuff extensively.  I can't see the ROK letting us conduct ops from their soil against the PRC, even ISR, unless the PRC attacks the ROK first.  The ROKs greatly fear the Chinese and have noticed how many times we have left allies twisting in the wind. Also, whenever I would ask the ROKAF guys about what they thought about us packing up and leaving Korea, they would only mention that they don't want us to do so because it would cost them too much money to replace what we bring to the fight.  They never mentioned the alliance, friendship, etc. Well, one ROKAF officer did but he was the NKAF F-6 (MiG-19) defector from 1996.  Of course my info is a decade or more old so take it with a grain of salt.  There used to be another Korea FAO who posted on BO.net so maybe he can chime in. 

As the ROK pays a huge amount for the cost of stationing US troops in Korea, IMHO, that's one of the main reasons we still keep forces there is because it's cheaper to maintain that force structure than it would be in CONUS, plus the fact that the Army is loathe to give up the USFK/CC 4-star billet (maintaining GO/FO billets seems to be DoD's #1 priority).  

Edited 14 hours ago by pbar

[Clark Griswold]

Was a Korea FAO and went to the ROKAF ACSC as an exchange student and talked to my Korean classmates and staff about this stuff extensively.  I can't see the ROK letting us conduct ops from their soil against the PRC, even ISR, unless the PRC attacks the ROK first.  The ROKs greatly fear the Chinese and have noticed how many times we have left allies twisting in the wind. Also, whenever I would ask the ROKAF guys about what they thought about us packing up and leaving Korea, they would only mention that they don't want us to do so because it would cost them too much money to replace what we bring to the fight.  They never mentioned the alliance, friendship, etc. Well, one ROKAF officer did but he was the NKAF F-6 (MiG-19) defector from 1996.  Of course my info is a decade or more old so take it with a grain of salt.  There used to be another Korea FAO who posted on BO.net so maybe he can chime in. 
As the ROK pays a huge amount for the cost of stationing US troops in Korea, IMHO, that's one of the main reasons we still keep forces there is because it's cheaper to maintain that force structure than it would be in CONUS, plus the fact that the Army is loathe to give up the USFK/CC 4-star billet (maintaining GO/FO billets seems to be DoD's #1 priority).  

Good stuff
Another thought on KFOR or really any forward overseas basing, what capes are we providing and are they ones that allow free riding or under investment in the host’s own military capabilities?
Maybe this question is not exactly for Korea though I’m sure to some degree it could be applied but is it boots on the ground in numbers or really things they can’t supply themselves that we should supply?


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[arg]

If we leave, South Korea will attack the north

[Boomer6]

7 minutes ago, arg said:

If we leave, South Korea will attack the north