CSAR-X

[60 driver]

It is 90% there without an additional $ for R&D.

That right there is the key concept for the '09 iteration of this discussion.

I have kind of a blue collar mindset on this subject, but I think having a relevant capability in the war we're currently involved in should carry a little more weight in the acquisition process than it currently seems to. For that reason and all of the ones that Jollygreen pointed out, I agree with him. However, when push comes to shove, I don't really care which one we get as long it will fit more than two litters in the back, produce OGE power at a reasonable altitude, and be delivered within the next decade.

Edited March 13, 2009 by 60 driver

[stract]

However, when push comes to shove, I don't really care which one we get as long it will fit more than two litters in the back, produce OGE power at a reasonable altitude, and be delivered within the next decade.

xerox.

though I do think the Chinook is too big for our mission. I'll take what they give me, however!

[busdriver]

Jollygreen and 60 make very good points, both of which I agree with.

[stract]

interesting article about a DARPA program called Sandblaster. If and when we get a new helicopter, hopefully this will be on it. And if we don't get a new helicopter, hopefully this will be added to ours.

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/darpas...am-is-on-03151/

[Guest Krabs]

https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/darpas...am-is-on-03151/

It's about time something like this was developed. Would this be especially good for the Chinooks? There seemed to be concern about the extra downwash the dual rotors would have on CSAR missions.

[busdriver]

Chinook, S92, Blackhawk, H-71, it would be good for everything.

[Guest Hueypilot812]

I've got a few buddies that fly the Chinook, and all say it's a lot more nimble and speedy than most people assume. Another factor, the rotor system configuration allows it to maximize lift instead of wasting any power on the tailrotor. I've had people tell me that the Chinook can keep up with or even speed past many other aircraft in the Army inventory. Yes, it's much larger than the Hawk, but given all the complaints I've heard from CSAR guys about the Hawk's limited payload, the USAF is trying to help there.

Personally, I think the HH-47 will be an effective CSAR platform. The HH-3 was a pretty large helicopter, and the other services have used the -53 as a CSAR asset in the past successfully. I think 75% of the complaining stems from the fact that the Chinook doesn't look sleek. I'll admit, it does look pretty ungainly, but it's a beast when it comes to performance.

[busdriver]

Huey, the Chinook is the fastest helo in the US inventory. It will outrun everything, especially in Afghanistan.

[HeloDude]

I think they should look into purchasing the Mi-17 as the new CSAR-X...I kid I kid. But seriously, a Ukranian civilian Mi-17 ground school instructor spent 1 hour explaining to us why the Mi-17 would be a better purchase for the U.S. vs the S-92 and US-101. His main reasoning was that it's a proven helicopter with a lot of power and that it's wayyy cheaper than the others--but in reality, I think he was secretly working for Kazan...or maybe the KGB.

[busdriver]

As an added benefit of the MI-17, our maintainers could just hit the faulty part with a hammer until it worked again.

[Guest Krabs]

As an added benefit of the MI-17, our maintainers could just hit the faulty part with a hammer until it worked again.

Haha. That would be handy if we could just hit stuff and make it work (I will pass on any misogynist jokes here).

It's ok though, all the 60s need are some more patches for those beam cracks and they are good as new, no new helos needed. (sarcasm)

Edited for spelling and lack of SA on the red line under aforementioned misspelling

Edited March 20, 2009 by Krabs

[Vertigo]

(sacasm)

Is that the space between having SA and not having any SA?

[Guest Krabs]

Is that the space between having SA and not having any SA?

Maybe.

It could also be an acronym for Small Army Casualty Assessment Software Module.

[dmeg130]

First--I love the fact that there's 9 pages of CSAR-related thread anywhere on here.

Second--"Too much Jack" is an oxymoron.

Third--I've never heard anybody call the MH-53 (a platform designed SPECIFICALLY for CSAR) too big even though they got the crap shot out of them in Cambodia. -47,-71,-92, who gives a shit, so long as it works.

Fourth--Why do we still do rescue?

I'd love to punch Mr. Young right in the face if I meet him, but he's got a point. Why in the hell are we looking at spending billions of dollars on rescue helos and tankers that have no AF misison? We've lost on the order of 30 aircraft to enemy fire in the past thirty years of combat. How can we justify the cost of these forces (me) when we have no justification for our existence? If an f-22 guy was killed in combat it would be a tragedy, sure, but that's the cost of doing business. But if he bails out, it somehow justifies throwing scores of aircraft and other dudes to try to rescue him? Ours is a mission that makes no TACTICAL sense (as I've said on several occasions) but is solely about STRATEGIC objectives.

We have got to get out of the alert business and start supporting the actual wars that we are prosecuting directly and indirectly. In some cases, that equals trash hauling. In others, that means doing exercises or doing MA-1 kit patterns with host nation. It currently means doing MEDEVAC in crappy environmental conditions because nobody else can. The current CSAF knows this (former one was clueless). Truly, I believe we have a much brighter future in a more 6 SOS-type existance than what we've been tasked with lately. If Army MEDEVAC could fly in zero illum, where would we be right now? Why do EUCOM and PACOM have assigned RQ forces while SOUTHCOM and AFRICOM do not? Doctrine and dogma are not so far apart. Time to move on....

Discuss.

[Vertigo]

But if he bails out, it somehow justifies throwing scores of aircraft and other dudes to try to rescue him?

Seriously?

I'm at a lack of words.

If there's even a remote chance of getting one of our brothers or sisters who have been downed out alive then by all means we should be doing everything possible to get them home.

F#ck the cost. Bringing some child's father or mother home is worth it; no matter the cost. I can't fathom how anyone could argue that it's not worth it.

[Wildo67]

Seriously?

I'm at a lack of words.

If there's even a remote chance of getting one of our brothers or sisters who have been downed out alive then by all means we should be doing everything possible to get them home.

F#ck the cost. Bringing some child's father or mother home is worth it; no matter the cost. I can't fathom how anyone could argue that it's not worth it.

I don't think you understand what he is trying to say. This is not a senimental, I'll do anything it takes to save my brothers issue that we are talking about.

I think that what he is trying to say is not that we wont do everything that we can in the eventuality an aircraft is shot down and a survivor is probable. Rather, I believe he is saying that having assets primarily dedicated only to this purpose is irresponsible in the larger scheme of things. When you consider all the work that is out there to be done, then it does seem odd to dedicate very capable assets to a fairly limited scope and theater.

But hey what do I know?

By the way the fate of the free world just called and they need your help.

[Marjackson82]

Don't the CSAR units also assist the CG in CONUS?

[busdriver]

Why have dedicated CSAR forces: aside from the doctrine/dogma issue, if we ever end up in a conventional cross the fence to bomb the bad guys war, all other CSAR capable forces will be committed to doing their own jobs.

That said, having CSAR forces sitting alert solely for recovering CFACC assets in an environment where Medevac forces are just as capable is stupid. CSAR forces should have a primary mission of CSAR, but have stated secondary missions that fall in line with the same skill sets. This isn't a new concept. MH-53s trained to a secondary mission of CSAR, I'd wager a guess that CV-22s do as well.

While CONUS, CSAR units will assist the CG on as capable basis (ie no alert) if requested for through the RCC. Generally we only do civi SAR if the survivor(s) are far out to sea and getting there requires air refueling.

Edited March 21, 2009 by busdriver

[stract]

the Army CAN fly in red illum now (at least in OEF). They have a stand-alone FLIR for SA purposes (not tied to any 1553 bus/nav system or anything, and the display is mounted to the side of the dash (where the adjustment handle for the pedals is), and currently the O-6 accepts that high risk now by mitigating with FLIR and flying acceptable approved low-illum routes. So now we get the call mostly when it's crappy WX. And that bit us in the a$$ recently.

agreed with busdriver on how our assets should be used downrange right now. I'd like to not be sitting on my ass all the time, while the MEDEVAC bubbas fly multiple times a day. It's just not an efficient use of resources!

As to why EUCOM and PACOM have dedicated CSAR (that also deploys downrange, too) is because of the higher potential for bad things to happen in those regions. Technically, we're still at war with NK, and China's looming large as well. That's the sort of conventional cross-the-fence-behind-enemy-lines war that would fall precisely into our mission set. Then on the EUCOM side, there's always Russia, I suppose. That unit used to be based in Iceland and provide SAR for that country as part of a treaty agreement with the US back in the day. Now they do their own rescue (we trained them up sufficiently, just like we trained the ROKAF up as well), and Kef closed, so they moved them somewhere else.

Edited March 21, 2009 by stract

[M2]

Got this from the AFA President via email this morning…

Cheers! M2

Note from AFA President -- Search and Rescue

Friday, March 27, 2009

AFA Members, Congressional Staffers, Civic Leaders, and DOCA members,

One of the (dumber) ideas floating around Washington these days is to cancel the AF's replacement rescue helicopter – designated Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) – X. The logic behind this idea is that other assets can do the mission, and therefore, the DOD does not need specialized assets.

This logic is ably disputed with an op-ed written by former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Gen (Ret) Michael E. Ryan [see: https://www.afa.org/EdOp/2009/edop_32609.asp]. Gen Ryan argues that the CSAR mission area is not a "pick-up" game; AF CSAR forces have rescued over 3000 people in CENTCOM's Area of Responsibility since 9/11; and CSAR is a very complicated and dangerous mission … for which we need … a ready, trained, and dedicated force.

In a recent panel discussion of AFA's Mitchell Institute at the National Press Club, a similar question was asked to the panel. I thought Gen (Ret) Gregory S. Martin's answer deserves your attention. He said that there are a lot of experts on CSAR … but none of them are in positions of authority. He (Martin) has commanded CSAR forces and understands a little bit about the mission. If you are interested in rescuing people who have been shot down, then you need a dedicated force … one that is trained, equipped, and properly sized to be available to rescue people who become isolated behind enemy lines. You don't know where you will have to go … you may have to go into the mouth of the tiger; you may have to shoot your way in or out … but it is the American military ethos to not leave people behind.

Since I also commanded a group with two CSAR squadrons in it … if only for just a short period of time … let me add that my units saved lots of lives "in peacetime." They were scrambled, often in the middle of the night, to go to some faraway places. The crews, to include the PJs, were the most professional of any I saw during my career. They were deployed over 200 days per year and saved hundreds of civilians in their assigned area. Further, in Iraq and Afghanistan, our present enemies don't exactly have POW camps. They don't bother to follow the Geneva Conventions. They torture and kill their captives. To quote Gen (Ret) T. Michael Moseley, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, " … to protect our people – not just Airmen, but those of all Services – it is a moral imperative that we field a new system." That is why the CSAR – X was and still is the #2 acquisition priority (behind KC-X) of the Air Force.

For a transcript of the Mitchell Institute event, go to: https://www.afa.org/Mitchell/presentations/...nCrisis_tnx.pdf

For the latest Mitchell Institute study [Combat Air Forces in Crisis], go to: https://www.afa.org/Mitchell/Reports/CAF_0309.pdf

For those of you interested in Blogging on this issue, visit our blog site, Air Force Association Blog.

For your consideration.

Mike

Michael M. Dunn

President/CEO

Modern Dedicated CSAR Helicopter Needed

By General Michael E. Ryan, USAF, Retired

The United States Air Force has been attempting to replace their aging Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) force consisting primarily of old HC-130 tanker aircraft and HH-60 helicopters. The recapitalization effort has run into some stumbling blocks. The selection process for replacement helicopters was deemed flawed by the Government Accountability Office. The Air Force has corrected the process and is now on the verge of a go ahead decision except for an intervention from an outgoing official in the Department of Defense.

Recently Mr. Young, the holdover head of DOD acquisition, cut the Air Force CSAR tanker replacement from 7 to 2 and, in what appears to be an attempt to delay or derail the decision on the CSAR helicopter, has questioned the need for a dedicated force. The need for the force has gone through the rigorous pentagon process that approves requirements and has the support of the combatant commanders worldwide. It is interesting that an official who is supposed to oversee the purchase, not the requirement for approved programs, opines negatively on the requirement at the eleventh hour as he leaves the Pentagon. Several of his uninformed quotes pertain. "The whole (Concept of Operations) CONOPS is doubtful…" and "We have a lot of assets that can be used in rescue missions with planning…"

First, the CONOPS is based on the inherent and solemn promise to the combat aircrews of all services that, should they go down, military leaders will make all reasonable efforts to rescue them. Not to reveal the operational art, but time is of the essence, for the longer an aircrew is down, the more likely they will be captured. Therefore, orchestrating a rescue is an intense and time compressed activity, involving almost every asset available to the commander to provide diversions, air cover, defense suppression, command and control, escort and the applicable rescue force. The CSAR forces are poised on alert well forward of other operational fixed wing aircraft ready to react rapidly, not just for downed airmen, but for any members of the joint force in jeopardy. I’m not sure how this CONOPS is doubtful, given that Air Force CSAR forces rescued nearly 3000 individuals on over 1000 missions in CENTCOM since 9/11. No knowledgeable commander I know thinks this concept or its purpose is flawed.

Second, the idea that CSAR can be done effectively by non dedicated assets, is belied by the fact that the combatant commanders ask for these dedicated forces as a prerequisite before commencing operations. Indeed, 21% of all AF CSAR helicopters are forward deployed to the CENCOM AOR today. That is the highest percentage of any services rotary winged force. Because most CSAR missions by their very nature cannot be preplanned, success depends on a combat team of tankers, helicopters, and escort aircraft honed through constant training to work together and operate in a hostile environment on short notice. Doing that with untrained "pick-up" crews courts disaster.

If the CSAR forces are to survive and succeed, they need and deserve to be equipped with the most modern and capable systems.

The CSAR tanker force is what allows the combat rescue helicopters to extend their reach. The tankers also act as a vital link in the command and control system. That CSAR tanker force is made up of only 32 HC-130s, about half the number required. Their average age is 42 years old and their old and worn systems have about 40% of the force not ready for combat at any given time. At a rate of 2 per year it would take more than 30 years to meet the required force. That paltry rate cannot be allowed to continue.

The combat crews need a modern helicopter, one that is swift, agile, quiet, armed, with self protection, net enabled and with mission systems that allow them to perform the rescue tasks in severe conditions. Their current equipment does not. The CSAR HH-60s are operationally limited and at the end of their service life. It is a credit to the hard working men and women who maintain and fly them that they are still operating at all. It is also unfortunate that there is no alternative until the next combat search and rescue helicopter is chosen, built and fielded. The first replacements will take until 2013 to be fielded even if the decision is made today. The challenge will be to hold the combat rescue force together until then.

Just as in a rescue mission, time is of the essence. It is imperative that the Defense Department move swiftly to bring on the tanker replacement in numbers and to bring the CSAR helicopter competition to a satisfactory conclusion that provides our rescue forces with the best equipment for their dangerous mission. Lives depend on it.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

General Michael E. Ryan (Retired) was Chief of Staff for the United States Air Force from 1997 – 2001. During his career he participated in and directed CSAR operations.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reprinted with permission.

Way to go Booger!

[Guest Curt22]

Rather, I believe he is saying that having assets primarily dedicated only to this purpose is irresponsible in the larger scheme of things.

I think most understand his sentiment, but the logic fails if we apply this rational to other examples of equipment the tax payer buys that are designed for a single purpose such fire trucks, or an ambulances etc.

Would Mr Young dare say we don't need these public safety machines designed for one purpose as well?

Anyone experienced in helos (especially in the design aspect) want to comment on how to make a helicopter:

"swift"

"agile"

"quiet"

"armed"

Just my opinion here, but the first three adjectives are almost antitheses of helicopters.

Nonesense! We've had this capability for years!

airwolf.bmp

[Guest Krabs]

Got this from the AFA President via email this morning…

Great update. I will be reading the stuff from the Mitchell Institute later.

Nonesense! We've had this capability for years!

Hahaha. Well played.

[stract]

I want it.

How do you land a helicopter in a sandstorm? Soon the answer may be, “Push a button.” Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. recently demonstrated such a system to the U.S. Army. Participating were its teammates, Honeywell International and Sierra Nevada Corp.

https://www.aopa.org/aircraft/articles/2009...;WT.mc_sect=gan

[Guest Krabs]

Does anybody know when the decision will be made (or even if the program will still be alive)? Last I heard it was May or June.

[Guest Curt22]

Gates calls for cancellation of CSAR-X and VH-71

Among other programs getting the axe...here's what Gates had to say about the pending helo programs.

First, I recommend that we terminate the VH-71 presidential helicopter:

• This program was originally designed to provide 23 helicopters to support the president at a cost of $6.5 billion. Today, the program is estimated to cost over $13 billion, has fallen six years behind schedule, and runs the risk of not delivering the requested capability.

• Some have suggested that we should adjust the program by buying only the lower capability “increment one” option. I believe this is neither advisable nor affordable. Increment One helicopters do not meet requirements and are estimated to have only a five- to 10-year useful life. This compares to the current VH-3 presidential helicopters that are 30 to 40 years old.

• We will promptly develop options for an FY11 follow-on program.

Second, we will terminate the Air Force Combat Search and Rescue X (CSAR-X) helicopter program. This program has a troubled acquisition history and raises the fundamental question of whether this important mission can only be accomplished by yet another single-service solution with single-purpose aircraft. We will take a fresh look at the requirement behind this program and develop a more sustainable approach.

www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1341